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SYNCHRONIZING THE EAGLE’S TALONS:
NATIONAL LEVEL COORDINATION OF FLEXIBLE DETERRENT OPTIONS FOR USE IN CRISIS RESPONSE

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Synchronizing the Eagle’s Talons:
National Level Coordination of Flexible Deterrent Options for Use in Crisis Response

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This paper proposes a methodology similar to that of Flexible Deterrent Options, which allows planning for all elements of national power to be employed, singly, or in unison, to achieve deterrent effect. The proposed methodology is predicated on planning conducted during times of non-crisis, in an interagency forum.
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"Clearly, the complexity of meeting the challenges of regional stability demands the use of all the elements of national power... . A key question is how to integrate them effectively... . The current approach to addressing national security engages the Department of Defense and services too often and too quickly in situations that should have been resolved by non-military means. ... Put in a more positive way, by strengthening our diplomatic, political, economic, and other assistance efforts, we may be able to prevent the breakdown of order, which requires the use of military force."

The role of peacetime deterrence is a concept consistently found in current U.S. national security documents - all of which are derived from the Quadrennial Defense Review and its concept of Shape, Respond and Prepare. The National Security Strategy (NSS) notes that deterrence “straddles the line between shaping ... and responding...” The National Military Strategy (NMS) declares peacetime deterrence as “... the military’s most important contribution...” to actions which shape and respond to crises. Consistent with this concept, the Department of Defense (DOD) has developed Flexible Deterrent Options (FDOs) as a planning construct that allows regional Commanders in Chief (CINCs) to recommend the employment of all elements of national power to deter conflict.

Yet, as the observations by the National Defense Panel indicate, there remains a void in national level planning for the employment of the elements of power in order to respond to crises
and achieve deterrence. The talons of the eagle remain partially sheathed because of the lack of structure at the national level for developing deterrent options for use during crises. This paper will demonstrate that the requisite tools are in place, the processes and concepts that will allow the eagle to unsheathe its talons, already exist. They simply must be brought together at the appropriate level and at the appropriate time.

THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. DETERRENCE

The purpose of deterrence has remained universal: "policy that seeks to persuade an adversary, through the threat of military retaliation, that the costs of using military force to resolve political conflict will outweigh the benefits." This persuasion can be achieved by denying the aggressor his military objectives, thereby requiring a symmetrical and more powerful military capability on the part of the deterrer. Another way to achieve this persuasion is to punish the aggressor by attacking his leadership, population centers or other targets which will impose intolerable pain, suffering or damage to his people or regime. The capabilities required to punish must also be powerful; however, asymmetrical means may be more effective at punishment than merely a stronger set of symmetrical forces.

The U.S. has relied on deterrence as a means to further its interests and those of its allies around the world. Deterrence in the post-World War II era was cast in the context of the bipolar Cold war and the advent of nuclear weapons. U.S.
strategic concepts for deterrence in the Cold War ran the gamut from Eisenhower’s "Massive Retaliation" through "Flexible Response", to "Mutual Assured Destruction". Each of these concepts relied upon military instruments, and in particular, nuclear weapons to achieve deterrence. Even the strategy of employing conventional forces in a Flexible Response scenario, had at its core the threat of the use of nuclear weapons. In all these concepts, the deterrent value of nuclear weapons was primarily in their ability to inflict punishment on an adversary. This ability to inflict enormous destruction has led to the concept of "self deterrence" in which the destruction brought about by a nuclear response to an attack on the U.S. or an ally is viewed as irrational, and therefore no U.S. nuclear response is launched.

Coexisting with nuclear weapons and thresholds for their use were threats to which conventional forces posed a more credible deterrent. For example, there was the understanding that the nuclear threshold would not be crossed in a conflict with a lesser-developed nation because of the potential for worldwide outrage. Nevertheless, deterrence strategy during the Cold War was primarily focused on achieving "global deterrence of a single adversary on a regional basis". This strategy had its limitations and problems, which changed when the Cold War ended. But the end of that twilight conflict did not simplify the basic problem of how to achieve deterrence.

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Empire, the U.S.
emerged with a strategy focused on achieving "general extended conventional deterrence". Nuclear weapons still have a place in deterrence, but because of the restrictions that rationality imposes on their use, they are only useful in deterring the use of an aggressor's nuclear weapons, or other weapons of mass destruction. Deterrence in the post-Cold War world relies on the enhanced capabilities of conventional military instruments that provide the U.S. with the capability to deny and punish any adversary. This exclusive reliance on military instruments, however, is not enough. There have been situations in which the threshold for the use of conventional forces arguably restraints their use. Had the U.S. resorted to armed invasion of Haiti, the outcry at home and abroad would have been substantial. The perception of a bullying U.S. was evident following the 1989 invasion of Panama. The U.S. must develop the capability to deter using all elements of national power. When thresholds for the use of conventional forces cannot be rationally crossed, there must be other options available to decision-makers. While military instruments will always be required to deny an aggressor, offensive non-military instruments, properly coordinated with military instruments, can threaten the punishment necessary to achieve deterrence.

Although U.S. deterrent strategy has evolved, the underlying components required to achieve deterrence have not changed. Those components are: acquisition of the instruments which
provide the capability to retaliate, credibility by the aggressor that resolve and intent exist within the nation to take action to protect a given interest, and the communication to an aggressor of the capability and will to carry out a threat⁹. Discussions of post-Cold War deterrence have confined themselves to deterrence achieved through military power. A concept for post-Cold War conventional deterrence relies on capabilities that are "...asymmetrical in threat and application, ...intense, offensive with a capability for punishment as well as denial, and extended globally through new technologies..."¹⁰. This concept, applied using all the elements of national power, can clearly achieve economical, effective, and synergistic deterrence. In fact, judicious use of all elements of national power goes to the heart of asymmetry. An adversary who derives his capability to threaten from a strong military may be deterred when his financial markets begin to totter. A politically and morally acceptable U.S. capability to punish the people of an adversary state could well exist only in the realm of American economic and informational elements of power.

There are those who contend that the essence of deterrence is military power, that any other means of achieving deterrence represent false thinking.¹¹ The contention that the military provides the primary element of deterrence is essentially true, it is not exclusively so. If an aggressor were to experience a full day or a week with no telecommunications circuits to the
rest of the world and no access to satellites, he might think twice, or his people might think twice about their support for aggression against a neighbor. A sudden shutdown of the automation support to financial markets, or the withdrawal of foreign credit from government sponsored projects may be enough to deter. These kinds of asymmetrical actions might not cause individuals to fear for their lives, as exclusively military deterrence theorists would have them. But such actions could very well cause them to fear for their livelihoods. The global marketplace and multi-polar environment of the post-Cold War world has given these non-military instruments new potentiality. During the Cold War, ideologically motivated states, fearful of and reliant upon their sponsors, could resist the power of these instruments; this is no longer the case.

Superpower support of surrogates made these client states virtually nondeterrable in the bipolar Cold War security environment. The security environment now consists of nation states that are largely interdependent, transparent, and inextricably linked by their reliance on other nations for economic and informational reasons. Most important to this discussion, they are independent of sponsoring superpowers. These states are now vulnerable to deterrent actions that they previously could ignore since these actions could not affect their interests. For instance, many of the former clients of the USSR were not concerned with world opinion, the accumulation of
wealth, access to information, or economic access. Now these factors have a direct impact on their national interests. The vulnerability of potential aggressors to the non-military instruments of national power is greater now than at any time during the Cold War. Not only are these states now deterrable, they can now be deterred using previously ineffective means. Military force need not be the only means to achieve effective deterrence. This new environment is one in which deterrence can be achieved by wielding all the appropriate tools in the national power toolbox in a synergistic manner.

New capabilities resulting from Information Age technologies, and the synergistic effects achieved by the application of well-planned, multidimensional deterrent actions will provide more effective and economic application of resources. For instance, postulate that in July 1990, the U.S. had firm knowledge of the Iraqi intentions and its build up of armored forces on the border with Kuwait. However, instead of a poorly worded message of concern by the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, U.S. reaction is initially a sharply worded resolution denouncing Iraq in the U.N. Security Council. Next, deployments of brigade-sized U.S. air, naval and ground forces to the region show resolve and reassure allies. This deployment is complemented by a freezing of all Iraqi assets in the U.S. and several like-minded nations and an embargo on all but humanitarian shipments to and from Iraq. As Iraq threatens to withhold of its oil from
the world market, U.S. negotiators conclude agreements with oil producing allies to increase their production to offset the loss of Iraqi crude. Iraqi communications, banking systems, and power grids begin to experience long blackouts. The Iraqi regime can only communicate with its people sporadically using mass media. Satellite links to the rest of the world shut down, causing loss of commerce and communication with the outside world. Well-publicized support for the growing coalition that the U.S. is building under U.N. auspices is made known to the Iraqi people. As Iraq appeals to its Arab brothers for support, a well-planned information campaign, based in fact, emphasizing Iraq’s intentions toward its neighbors, begins to appear in media throughout the Middle East. Soon, internal popular support for aggression by the regime in Iraq begins to wane. The regime, realizing its future is in jeopardy from either within or outside Iraq, withdraws its armored formations from the border with Kuwait. This is achieved with a smaller force and less than the six months required to prepare for Desert Storm.

While this example may be wishful thinking in hindsight, it serves to illustrate the synergy that can be achieved when multiple elements of national power are applied in concert, in an orchestrated manner. Synergy is a function not only of multiple elements arriving at the right place and at the right time, but also by those elements being employed before the aggressor can counter them. The key element here is speed, and speed of
action, particularly complex and multidimensional actions, can only be achieved through prior planning. And this kind of planning can only be achieved effectively at the national level. There are still "crazy states" to contend with, those irrational states that appear impervious to any kind of reasoned approach to deterrence. We are faced with a few options when potential cost serves as no deterrent, or even as an enhancement to their rulers' prestige. In these cases we must deter early, multilaterally, and obviously, using military power "...with other power elements as an instrumentally rational link to clearly defined political objectives." The over-reliance of the NSS and the NMS on the military element of national power in deterrence is shortsighted. Even in the case of "crazy states", the U.S. has practiced multidimensional deterrence. Iraq remains a case study in progress on this use of all elements of power to deter and to compel an aggressor. During Desert Shield, the U.S. formed coalitions, blockaded Iraq, and isolated Saddam Hussein economically, politically, and militarily. The information campaign conducted by the Bush administration prepared America and her Allies for the fighting and informed the Iraqis of the price of peace. Following the Persian Gulf War, the U.S. has sought to deter Saddam Hussein through economic and commercial sanctions, forward based military forces and a constant diplomatic and information campaign.

Prior to 1991, talk of deterrence conjured up visions of
"counterforce and countervalue nuclear strikes" and other Cold War manifestations of the nuclear balance. The post-Cold War security environment has produced vigorous dialogue on deterrence using conventional vice nuclear forces. This dialogue however, confines itself to deterrence achieved by use of only one dimension of national power, the use or threat of military force. In order to achieve best effectiveness and economy, the national security architecture must address deterrence as a multidimensional function, employing all appropriate elements of national power to achieve synchronized effects. Deterrence through the use of all elements of national power is not something new; what will be new is a disciplined, interagency approach that anticipates the requirement to deter an aggressor rather than a procedural void that guarantees that the U.S. will have to react to react.

FLEXIBLE DETERRENT OPTIONS

Although an interagency approach to deterrence does not exist at the national level, DOD has taken steps, albeit marginally effective ones, to fill it by requiring regional CINCs to use "adaptive planning principles" in fulfilling their operational planning tasks. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) assigns tasks to the CINCs requiring them to develop operations plans (OPLANs) which respond to threats that are extant, or likely to arise in their assigned Area Of Responsibility (AOR). The JSCP further requires CINCs to develop
a set of FDOs for each directed OPLAN. These FDOs are one of the key components of adaptive planning. These sets are drawn specifically from four of the elements of national power (military, diplomatic, economic, informational), and designed to provide national level decision-makers with a menu of response options. The menus are structured to allow decision-makers to gauge their chosen options to a range of crisis conditions in order to avoid an all or nothing, too much too soon, or too little too late response.

FDOs are to be employed in response to indications or warnings that an aggressor may be planning a hostile act against an interest of the U.S. Theoretically, these FDOs provide a menu from which national level decision-makers choose in crisis. These menus are prepared by theater level planners during deliberate peacetime planning and should represent the best advice of those planners on how the elements of national power could best be employed, either as discrete acts or in concert, to achieve synergistic deterrent effects in a specific situation. If deterrence fails, at worst the US is postured to quickly defeat an adversary.

From the description provided above, the uninitiated observer might surmise that FDOs are the product of a planning conference attended by representatives of the national level agencies, which wield the instruments of national power. Nothing could be further from the reality. The CINCs staff develops
FDOs, perhaps with the input of the CINC's Political Advisor (POLAD), normally a State Department official. The JSCP authorizes CINCs to coordinate with non-DOD agencies to develop appropriate options. But this is a rare occurrence. The military options are generally well thought out and thoroughly planned, to include timelines, resources required and conditions for employment. Options involving the other elements of national power are not imaginatively conceived and suffer from inadequate planning, primarily the identification of resources required to execute the option. In no case are recommendations made for the employment of options in concert, or in series, to achieve synergistic deterrent effects. The quality of the non-military options usually is a direct reflection of the extent of diplomatic, informational, or economic knowledge on the part of the authors of the OPLAN (military officers). In some cases, these options are a taken straight from the generic lists of FDOs found in the JSCP or AFSC Publication 1. Following their conception by the theater level planners, the non-military options are not coordinated with or planned by the appropriate non-DOD agencies during the plan development or approval phases. Finally, the repository for FDOs is a DOD OPLAN, not the first place planners at the national level look for options in the face of an impending crisis, nor are these OPLANs immediately available to national-level planners.

The ability of members of the DOD to plan in both deliberate
and crisis circumstances is held in high regard by members of non-DOD agencies. Unfortunately, this high regard has not been matched by the development of a similar capability for planning. In time of crisis, non-DOD agencies will develop and recommend deterrent options independent of DOD. These deterrent options will likely suffer from incomplete planning and integration. The non-military FDOs found in OPLANS will likely not be considered by non-DOD planners during crisis, mainly due to their source. Non-DOD agencies will not take ownership for a course of action which is not of their making. Simply put, in time of crisis, national-level planners and decision-makers would likely hold in low regard recommendations made by military planners for the employment of non-military elements of national power. Another pitfall found when military planners create FDOs is the natural tendency to over reliance on military options. The highly destructive nature of even conventional arms and a casualty averse populace, require that the development of deterrent options include non-military options in order to maintain their credibility. In today’s complex, interdependent world, the credibility of the national-level leadership will depend on the development of deterrent options drawn from all elements of national power. Popular support for US action, and the message sent to our adversaries, will rely on this multidimensional wielding of national power.

The lack of adequate planning for the employment of non-
military FDOs will virtually ensure that they will not be employed at the right time. The capability and the credibility required to achieve deterrence will suffer as non-military FDOs are employed either too late or not at all due to the lack of planning. The pressures of time constraints will cloud the ability of planners to anticipate opportunities to achieve synergistic effects unless FDOs are planned and coordinated in time of non-crisis.

Non-military FDOs, as they are currently developed, are the worst case scenario for any military operator. Every operator's nightmare is that he be required to execute a plan that was planned by someone outside of his organization. DOD should not plan for actions to be executed by non-DOD agencies. The ability of the U.S. Government to develop credible, effective deterrent options rests in the interagency arena.

CRISIS ACTION PLANNING AND DECISION-MAKING

Crisis action planning is differentiated from deliberate planning in the amount of time available, the level of decision-making, and the use of immediate circumstances rather than assumptions for plan development. The resource that cannot be increased in a crisis is time, and the lack of time is the primary source of stress affecting sound national level decision-making. Time is a factor because the decision-maker wants to "base ... responses upon a cool and clear-headed means-ends calculation. ... uses the best information available and chooses
form the universe of possible responses that alternative most likely to maximize his goals.\textsuperscript{18} While this theory postulates a purely rational-actor model for decision-making, decision-making primarily involves aspects of the organizational and political influences. Planning options for response at the national level allows the organizational and political processes to work in advance of the decision being made. The decision-maker is not required to deal with these aspects if interagency planning and coordination have been conducted in time of non-crisis. In addition to the savings in time provided to a decision-maker by options that are well thought out and planned in advance, the cognitive search for simplicity, consistency and stability while faced with great responsibility and uncertainty is answered by a menu of options that advisors have agreed to in advance\textsuperscript{19}. Confidence and certainty can be attached to products developed in a deliberate, unpressurized environment.

One way to ameliorate stress is to conduct deliberate planning before a crisis occurs. In the case of small scale contingencies (SSC) and major theater wars (MTW), pressure as well as time can be saved by thoroughly planning, during peacetime, for the use of all appropriate elements of national power to achieve deterrence. This planning would be conducted by the appropriate agencies, and then coordinated by the National Security Council staff to determine possible synergistic or disjunctive effects. Each option developed would be accompanied
by the resources (including time) required to execute it. This would give planners in a crisis a way to rapidly assess cost and effectiveness of each option. Some assumptions would have to be made, and if execution were required, some adjustments would have to be made based on the current situation. But, as a recent Presidential Decision Directive on decision-making points out, the benefits gained through sound national level decision-making that effectively and efficiently employs national power to deter crises would far outweigh any inconvenience in lost time by planners:

"While agencies of government have developed independent capacities to respond to complex emergencies, military and civilian agencies should operate in a synchronized manner through effective interagency management and the use of special mechanisms to coordinate agency efforts. Integrated planning...early on in an operation can avoid delays, reduce pressure on the military to expand its involvement in unplanned ways, and create unity of effort within an operation that is successful for the success of the mission."^20

Crisis response policy has three key elements: the capability to respond across the full spectrum of crises, selectivity in responding to crises based on U.S. interests and the capability to make a difference, and finally, the prescience to "use the most appropriate tool or combination of tools - acting in alliance ... or unilaterally...".\(^{21}\) The NMS also outlines a crisis response policy nested in the national level policy. It's components include; deterrence of aggression or coercion in crisis, the ability to fight and win major theater wars, and the
ability to conduct multiple, concurrent small scale contingencies. Clearly, deterrence is a component of national security critical in underpinning both the NSS and the NMS.

A reading of the NSS and the NMS, as well as a passing acquaintance with the current state of the U.S. Armed Forces make it clear that the military maintains a robust full spectrum response capability. While other government agencies do not outline their posture or strategies as concisely as the DOD, it is reasonable to assess that they maintain a like capability to respond to crises. Selectivity in response to crises is exercised by Executive Branch decision-makers at the highest level and is as much politically derived as it is from previously devised strategy and national interests. The final element of national crisis response policy is the one lacking coherent ways to support it. The use of "...the most appropriate tool or combination of tools..."^22 is the full extent of this policy. How those tools are to be chosen and employed is developed no further.

The range of threats requiring a crisis response as outlined in the NSS includes terrorism, international crime, drug and arms trafficking, environmental concerns and natural disasters, SSCs and MTWs. Deterrence of these threats (those which can be deterred, unlike natural disasters) is the primary policy goal, followed by the capability to respond across the full spectrum. The NSS recognizes that, for both reasons of economy, and for
maximum effectiveness, deterrence must be undertaken using, as appropriate, any and all of the full range of instruments of national power. In fact, this integrated, interagency approach to crisis response is lauded in the NSS for its success in combating terrorism, reducing drug trafficking, and countering international crime cartels. In the case of SSC and MTW, an integrated, interagency approach to deterrence is unrealized and will remain unrealized as long as the U.S. lacks the ways, namely a policy at the national level, to achieve deterrence of SSCs and MTWs using all the available instruments of national power.

Effective deterrence is clearly the first and the preferred response to an impending crisis. With deterrence as a critical component of U.S. capability to shape the strategic landscape and respond to crises, it is reasonable to expect that there would be readily available a rigorous structure designed to quickly develop effective, integrated deterrent options from the full range of instruments of national power. In the cases of drug trafficking, the National Drug Control Strategy and the Office of National Drug Control Policy provide this structure and rigor at the national level. In the case of combating terrorism, a well developed set of plans and policies and a standing Interagency Working Group, as well as offices at DOD and Department of State (DOS) charged with policy in this arena provides direction and coordination at the national level. Yet, to coordinate national level, integrated deterrence of those crises that most
likely have a direct impact on vital or important national interests (SSC and MTW), the U.S. has no like policy or processes in place.

THE WAY AHEAD

The current national security architecture brought the U.S. successfully through the Cold War and several hot wars as well. This architecture has proven itself sufficiently flexible to respond to the needs of individual Presidents, as well as to a changing strategic landscape. Rather than wholesale overhaul, what is required is a more ordered, structured and disciplined way to plan for and employ the elements of national power.

While flexibility in the national security architecture is an asset, a lack of permanent structure and procedures, and significant changes in these aspects from one administration to another leave us with an architecture which may or may not approach critical national security challenges with the concomitant level of discipline. The process at the core of our national security architecture is the working of the NSC system. This process is capable of being subjected to some rigor. PDD 56 is one such attempt to bring some rigor to the interagency process that produces national security policy for peace operations. It is essentially an application of the military paradigm for campaign planning, to interagency planning for peace operations at the national level within the context of the current national security architecture. This concept was
implemented in order to produce more effective results, and to capitalize on lessons learned from recent experiences. In a highly flexible national security architecture, lessons learned are not institutionalized unless they are captured in procedures like PDD 56.

Change is required in the post-Cold War environment, more than ever before, due to the reduced resources available for national security. The American people have begun to reap their peace dividend in the form of reduced funding for military, diplomatic, foreign aid and ideological programs. While the profligate days of Cold War spending are not likely to return, this is no reason to rebuild the national security architecture. Disciplined use of the resources currently allocated for national security can result in synchronization; where the resulting whole is greater than the sum of the parts. Deliberately planned, wargamed and synchronized application of all appropriate elements of national power can result in more bang for the buck.

This rigorous approach to interagency operations and planning has achieved success in the realms of countering illegal drugs and combating terrorism. Successful results through a disciplined, interagency approach can be achieved in the realm of deterrence. It will require a new way of thinking about how to deter aggressors, as well as some structure to guide the process. The structure should use as its paradigm the military concept of Flexible Deterrent Options; discrete diplomatic, military,
economic, and informational actions conducted to deter an aggressor.

The major problem is how to take advantage of this new opportunity to achieve deterrence while realizing economies and unprecedented efficiency? There are few choices. The first is to continue the status quo. Clearly, this is unacceptable. The National Defense Panel in its review of the Quadrennial Defense Review calls upon the Executive Branch to develop "coordinated and coherent strategy and synergistic plans that look beyond the bounds of DOD...and ensure more effective use of U.S. military forces".

The other choice is to take coherent action now at the national level to address the shortfall. Using FDOs as outlined in the JSCP or AFSC Pub 1 as a paradigm, DOD should solicit the NSC to form Interagency Working Groups (IAWGs), chartered to develop FDOs. The current interagency structure as outlined in PDD 2 is adequate to this task. Form these IAWGs initially on a regional basis (using current CINC AORs) with an initial task to develop sets of FDOs for the plans tasked to the regional CINCs in the JSCP. Members of the IAWGs would include the non-DOD agencies, ranging from Commerce to Treasury to State and EPA, that wield specific instruments of national power, as well as representatives from the regional CINCs. CINC representatives are critical in order to provide the regional orientation and understanding required for the effective employment of national
power in any form. Additionally they represent the subject matter experts on relevant OPLANs and the impact of FDOs on possible warfighting should deterrence fail.

IAWGs would develop sets of FDOs employing instruments from the economic, military, political (domestic and diplomatic), psychological, and informational elements of national power. Each FDO should meet these criteria: relatively small and discrete actions, focused on achieving a desirable deterrent effect (asymmetrical, capable of punishment and denial). As FDOs are developed, they are evaluated for suitability, acceptability and feasibility. Those that meet these criteria are then fully developed by the responsible agency. Full development includes planning to determine timelines for employment, resources required, expected results, expected reactions, etc.

Once a set of fully developed FDOs is assembled for a planning task (initially JSCP tasks) the IAWG then conducts analysis to determine which FDOs can be combined under various crisis conditions in order to achieve an effect greater than the sum of the parts. Conversely, FDOs would be evaluated for their potential disjunctive effect if employed in concert or in serial. Once agreed upon, fully developed and coordinated, these combinations and conditions provide a usable, flexible menu that decision-makers can employ in crises to deter conflict, or at worst, postures the U.S. for success should deterrence fail.

The capability to present the NCA with a menu of thoroughly
planned, multidimensional options for deterrence will instill self-confidence in the NCA and allow for rapid, cogent decision-making. A regular review of the sets of FDOs is required to reassess the strategic landscape, and to take advantage of emerging instruments of national power. This review process would, at a minimum, mirror the biannual JSCP cycle, and at most could be executed upon request of any member of the IAWG based on changes in the current situation.

Once sets of FDOs for the planning tasks in the JSCP are complete, regional CINCs, country teams, other USG agencies, and ultimately the NSC staff can be polled by the NSC staff to propose additional tasks for FDO development. The NSC staff serves as the final authority to approve or deny requests for development of FDO sets. IAWGs to develop these FDO sets would continue to be formed along regional lines to best employ the assets of all USG agencies.

Generic or functional FDO sets can be developed for threats which may still be over the planning horizon, such as attacks on information systems, detection of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) technology in the hands of previously non-WMD states, etc. In most cases, regional or country specific approaches to FDO development will prove more effective than functional approaches. FDO will not be developed for combating terrorism, countering drugs, or other areas where interagency, integrated approaches are currently effective. Obviously, FDO will not be developed
for nondeterrable threats such as environmental threats or natural disasters.

Credibility is enhanced when quick responses are applied to crises, thus communicating will and resolve to an adversary. Credibility is even further enhanced when the speedy response is synergistic in the application of all appropriate (context dependent) elements of national power. This synergism actually enhances the capability of the deterrer, which in turn further strengthens credibility. Only when these deterrent responses are effectively preplanned and coordinated, can synergism, and the resultant credibility and capability be achieved.

CONCLUSION

Effective deterrence is achieved when an adversary believes you will use a capability which he knows you possess in a manner which will either deny him the fruits of his aggression, or will visit punishment upon him through destruction of something he values. The concept of developing multidimensional FDOs is not new; the U.S. has used combinations of military threats, economic sanctions, diplomacy and information operations to achieve deterrence in the past. During the Cuban Missile Crisis for instance, the Kennedy Administration used all the elements of national power to deter further Soviet development of nuclear missile launch sites in Cuba. What is new is the proposal to plan and coordinate multidimensional deterrent actions in advance of crisis, and at the national level. Perhaps if the NSC had
been able to present the Kennedy's Executive Committee with a menu of options, members of that Committee would not have been reduced to tears by the overwhelming stress of decision-making in a world on the edge of nuclear war. While the Cuban Missile Crisis may be an extreme example of the kind of crises the U.S. will face on a routine basis in the post-Cold War world, it serves as a reminder of the wisdom of having well thought out ideas available when time is short and stress is high.

Execution of timely, well orchestrated and effective deterrent actions will only serve to enhance the value of future deterrent endeavors. In this case, success will breed success. When potential aggressors see the U.S. rapidly employing multidimensional deterrent instruments, the credibility of U.S. will to deter will be enhanced. If the U.S. can maintain the integrity of alliances and still achieve deterrence through non-military means, its credibility as a multilateral partner and international seeker of peace will be enhanced. In this case, deterrence need not "fail" in order to reinforce credibility.

In addition to the credibility gained by timely, well coordinated action, new technologies provide opportunities for increased capabilities. Just as digitization has provided conventional military deterrence with the added capabilities of precision guided munitions, so too has the information age provided new capabilities for deterrence using non-military means. The ability to deny an aggressor access to information,
or to disable the computers running his economy, information systems or infrastructure, may prove more threatening than an aircraft carrier off his coast. Threatening a nation's livelihood involves fewer risks than threatening the lives of its citizens. The potential economic, social and political damage from information attacks may prove too great to allow a regime to remain in power when subjected to these kinds of attacks. If conducted properly, information attacks provide the most favorable kind of calculus: no loss to the protagonists and either significant loss, or the prospect of significant loss to the antagonist. Added benefits to the protagonist accrue from the fact that unlike economic sanctions, attacks on the financial holdings and livelihood of a populace can have effects that are immediately palpable to the man on the street.

The national level security apparatus has evolved to a point where it is capable of conducting planning as envisioned by this proposal. As demonstrated by the relative success of PDD 56, the interagency process can be subjected to rigor. Cooperation and unity of purpose can be achieved on the national level only by planning in an interagency forum. The interagency process is the forum in which complex, concept based planning must be conducted. It allows all participants in future actions a voice in what will be accomplished and how it will be achieved. Concurrence on these matters, in advance, by all involved U.S. government agencies is critical in achieving speed and synergy in the
application of national power.

This proposal uses as its means all the instruments of national power. The way centers on a regionally oriented, integrated, efficiency-driven, deliberate process, which results in synchronized, fully developed options for decision-makers to employ in order to achieve the end: deterrence during crises. This proposal will provide the U.S. with an opportunity to conduct preparations for shaping the environment and responding to crises with actions that achieve deterrence. The eagles' talons will be unsheathed and work in concert to that end.

Word Count 6171
ENDNOTES


5 George H. Quester, "Conventional Deterrence: The Past as Prologue" in Ibid., 31-32.

6 Paul Nitse, "Deterring Our Deterrent," Foreign Policy, No. 25, Winter 1976-77. As quoted by Haffa, 16.

7 Haffa, 9.

8 Ibid., 20.

9 Ibid., 8.

10 Ibid., 19.

11 Alan Gropman, "It's All About Deterrence," Armed Forces Journal International, October 1997, 26. Gropman's point is that "...to deter is to frighten... to paralyze him with fear of the consequences of striking the U.S. or its interests. ...One deters with credible offense...and ...the believable will to use it. ...we maintain deterrence primarily through our people in uniform."

12 David Jablonsky, Strategic Rationality is Not Enough: Hitler and the Concept of Crazy States, (U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1991) 78-79.

The statements contained in this paragraph are the result of interviews conducted in Jan 98 with a plans officers from two theater CINCs, as well as my own experience as a plans officer on a CINC staff. Those officers interviewed wish not to be identified.

The statements contained in this paragraph are the result of an interview conducted 15 Dec 97 with a Joint Staff J7 plans officer who wishes not to be identified.

The ideas in this sentence are based on remarks made by a speaker participating in the Commandant’s Lecture Series.


William R. Farrell and Mel Chaloupka, "Four Perspectives on Decision Making and Execution in National Security Organizations" in AWC AY98 Course 2: "War, National Policy &Strategy", (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, August 1997), 264-267. This article analyzes Graham Alison’s “Essence of Decision”, discusses the rational actor model, the organizational model and the political model as factors in decision-making. It then goes on to posit a fourth model which is the mind’s search for cognitive structure to ease decision-making. Essentially, the authors contend that all 4 factors are at work in any given decision.


Ibid., 9.
23 Ibid.


25 Vice President’s Task Force on Combatting Terrorism, Public Report of the Vice President’s Task Force on Combatting Terrorism, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1986), 8, 23. There is a standing Interagency Working Group on Terrorism, it has been in existence since the Reagan Administration.

26 PDD-56.


BIBLIOGRAPHY


