Interpreting the 20th Century: The Struggle Over Democracy
Part I
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Pamela Radcliff was born in Passaic, New Jersey, and grew up in Clifton, New Jersey, and Escondido, California. She received her B.A. in history, with membership in Phi Beta Kappa, from Scripps College, one of the five Claremont Colleges, then spent a couple of years traveling around the world before beginning graduate education at Columbia University. She studied modern European history at Columbia, where she received her M.A. and Ph.D. degrees, completed in 1990.

Since the conclusion of her graduate work, Professor Radcliff has been teaching at the University of California, San Diego, in the Department of History. She teaches undergraduate courses on 20th-century European history, modern Spanish history, the history of women and gender in modern Europe, and 20th-century world history. She has received two awards for undergraduate teaching, one granted by the university faculty and another by the students of her world history course.

Professor Radcliff’s historical research has focused on Spanish history in the 20th century, with particular emphasis on popular mobilization and the long-term struggle to establish a democratic system of government. She has published articles and books on these issues, including From Mobilization to Civil War: The Politics of Polarization in the Spanish City of Gijón, 1900–1937, which received the Sierra Book Award from the Western Association of Women’s Historians in 1998. She also co-edited (with Victoria Enders) a collection of articles on the history of women in modern Spain, Constructing Spanish Womanhood: Female Identity in Modern Spain. Her current book project focuses on the construction of democratic citizenship during the transition from an authoritarian to a democratic regime in Spain in the 1970s, and her latest article on this topic is “Citizens and Housewives: The Problem of Female Citizenship in Spain’s Transition to Democracy,” appearing in the fall 2002 issue of the Journal of Social History.

Professor Radcliff also served as an associate editor for the recent multivolume Encyclopedia of European Social History and belongs to a number of professional associations, including the American Historical Association and the Society for Spanish and Portuguese Historical Studies.

Professor Radcliff lives in Solana Beach, California, with her husband, Bill Perry, and their two children.
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Interpreting the 20th Century:  
The Struggle Over Democracy

Scope:
The 20th century transformed the world in ways few could have imagined in 1900. Making sense of this transformation is the challenge of this 48-lecture course. Because one course could never provide a history of every corner of the globe, our focus will be on how the different regions and countries interacted with each other. It is through this interaction that we can discern the common themes that allow us to talk about the history of the world.

One of the key themes was precisely how the growing interaction between regions would operate. By 1900, the process of Western expansion and imperialism had created a level of global interdependence that would only get stronger as the century progressed. But the interdependent world order created by Western imperialism was a fundamentally hierarchical one, based on Western leadership or domination of the non-Western world. The 20th century was defined by the various efforts to transform this connection into a more democratic relationship between Western nations and the rest of the world, or between the developed and less developed regions of the northern and southern hemispheres. In the first two-thirds of the century, these efforts focused on the struggle for independence from colonialism, while in the latter part, Third World nations pursued the more complex search for prosperity and stability.

The struggle over democracy was also a key theme in the Western, or developed, world. Most Western nations had some form of representational political systems in 1914, but they were not democratic. Furthermore, the process of democratization was neither automatic nor harmonious. Until almost the end of the century, the democratic ideal had to compete with powerful challengers, especially fascism and communism. The fascist alternative was defeated with the Second World War, while the communist challenge lasted until 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet bloc. Parallel to these challenges, there were ongoing debates about the nature and practice of democracy that did not end in 1989. Although democracy emerged at the end of the century as the unquestioned political ideal, the parameters of a truly democratic world order are still vigorously contested. Thus, the struggle over democracy frames the end, as well the beginning, of the 20th century.

The first lecture in this course sets up the framework of struggle over liberal democracy and a broader set of ideas associated with it, what we will call the “Enlightenment project.” The remaining two lectures in Section 1 explain why this new era began in 1914 rather than 1900, with the outbreak of the First World War and the “crisis of meaning” it precipitated.

Section 2 explores in more detail this “crisis of meaning” of the interwar years, in which a generation of Western artists and intellectuals questioned all the certainties of the Enlightenment project and the cultural and social order in which they lived. Section 3 focuses on the political manifestation of the interwar crisis, in the form of alternative political ideologies and regimes that challenged liberal democracy’s claim to offer the best form of government and society. In Lectures Twelve through Fourteen, we will look at what these ideologies promised and why they attracted so many people; in Lectures Fifteen and Sixteen, we will focus on what happened to communism and fascism in power in the USSR and Germany.

Section 4 shifts the locus of struggle to the non-Western world, where the competition among liberal democracy, communism, and fascism took shape in the first serious anti-imperialist movements of the century. Each of the four case studies, China, India, Mexico, and Japan, illustrates a different kind of imperialist influence and a distinct path to national independence in the decades leading up to World War II. Section 5 analyzes the Second World War as a mid-century watershed that marked the culmination and defeat of the fascist challenge but also the end of an imperialist world order based on European domination. Section 6 explores the new world order that emerges out of the Second World War, one dominated by the clash between democratic and communist systems and by the stalemate, that is, the Cold War, between two new superpowers. In particular, we will look at the contested origins of the Cold War and its impact on American society and its democratic system.

Section 7 shifts again to the non-Western world, where the Cold War realignment helped set the stage for the process of decolonization. Although this process created dozens of independent nations, it also generated a new set of problems and challenges for the developing world, or what became known as the Third World. Through the use of case studies once again, these lectures will chart alternative paths to development and the successes and pitfalls of communist, liberal democratic, and mixed models. Section 8 looks at a series of challenges that undermined the...
Cold War order, from Western-based social movements that questioned the democratic credentials of the “free world,” to Eastern-bloc dissidents who cast doubt on the socialist credentials of the USSR, to a new political movement based on religious fundamentalism that rejected many of the values on both sides. The section ends with a lecture on the demise of the Soviet bloc after 1989, which analyzes how and why the communist challenge finally collapsed. The final lectures of Section 9 will speculate on the post-Cold War world since 1989 and the prospects and challenges for a democratic world order in the 21st century.
Lecture One
Framing the 20th Century

Scope: How do we create a framework for understanding this tumultuous century of dramatic transformations? This lecture presents possible frameworks of interpretation and defines the perspective of the course. Most scholars would agree that the struggle over democracy was a key theme spanning the entire century, as well as the different regions of the globe. This course emphasizes the complexity and unresolved nature of that struggle, in contrast to some accounts that have claimed the final victory of democracy. It is true that the century witnessed the triumph of what we will call the “Enlightenment project,” or the adoption of liberal, democratic, rationalist principles in much of the world. However, the period was also marked by serious challenges to democracy in theory and practice, exposing contradictions and alternative visions not easily dismissed.

Outline

I. The 20th century transformed the world in ways few could have imagined in 1900. Making sense of this transformation is the challenge of this 48-lecture course.

   A. Every scholar would agree that what most defines the 20th century is the degree of changes experienced over a 100-year period. To state what might seem obvious, the world was a dramatically different place in 1900 than in 2000.
      1. First, there has been a demographic revolution of unprecedented dimensions.
      2. The population of the globe has tripled and, moreover, has been dramatically redistributed.
      3. Whereas in 1850, more people lived in Europe than in any other region, by 1975, a majority lived in the developing world.
      4. Likewise, whereas in 1900, 90 percent of the world’s population lived in rural areas, most of them farmers, now more than 50 percent live in cities.
      5. Part of the reason population has expanded is the dramatic increase in life expectancy, even in the poorer countries, as a result of technological and scientific advances.
      6. The increase in life expectancy has propelled other changes, including the decline in the birth rate and the extension of education, as parents focus more energies on their fewer children. Thus, in the 1970s alone, the number of universities in the world doubled.
      7. The changes in political systems have been equally momentous. In 1900, the primary political reality was empire, mainly the overseas European empires, but also the Ottoman, Russian, and Austro-Hungarian empires in Europe.
      8. In the year 2000, this colonial world is gone, replaced by a panoply of new nations—from 50 in 1900 to 180 in 2000.
      9. In addition, in 1900, few if any states qualified as fully democratic, but in 2000, the vast majority of nations are democratic, at least on paper.

   B. It is easy to stack up a list of facts that illustrates the level of transformation that marks the 20th century, but it is more difficult to decide how to make sense of these changes.
      1. At some level, the decision to define the 20th century as a single historical subject is an arbitrary one.
      2. One approach would be to stick closely to a chronological accounting, without trying to isolate particular themes or tell a single story.
      3. Another would be to focus on a particular theme or themes and build a narrative story around those themes.
      4. Finally, another approach is to abandon the idea of a single story and pick several independent themes to analyze.
      5. All these methods have their strengths and weaknesses, because no single approach can provide a complete history of such a complex subject.
      6. The only way to approach such a challenge, then, is to be aware that every telling of the 20th century implies a perspective, a position, an interpretation of what the history of the world was about during this period.
II. In this course, we will follow the narrative approach of focusing on particular themes and building a story of how those themes developed over the course of the century.

A. This approach has the benefit of telling a coherent story that is more accessible, although of course, it has the disadvantage of sidelining numerous other themes.

B. The major theme chosen, “the struggle for democracy,” implies a political reading of the 20th century, although it is important to understand this struggle in the broadest terms—as the debates over, and the practice of, democratic ideals and forms of government. In other words, it is about the efforts to define and establish “liberty and justice for all” on a global level.

C. Others have told this narrative as a triumphant success story, but in this course, the emphasis is on a struggle that is still unresolved.

III. Within this framework, the course will focus on the “struggle for democracy” at two levels.

A. The first is how it shaped the interaction between different regions and countries, especially between the West and the non-Western world.
   1. By 1900, the process of Western expansion and imperialism had created a level of global interdependence that would only get stronger as the century progressed. But the interdependent world order created by Western imperialism was a fundamentally hierarchical one, based on Western leadership or domination of the non-Western world.
   2. The 20th century was defined by the various efforts to transform this connection into a more democratic relationship between Western nations and the rest of the world, or between the developed and less developed regions of the northern and southern hemispheres.
   3. In the first two-thirds of the century, these efforts focused on the struggle for independence from colonialism, while in the latter part, “Third World” nations pursued the more complex search for prosperity and stability.

B. The struggle over democracy was also a key theme in the Western, or developed world.
   1. Most Western nations had some form of representational political systems in 1914, but they were not democratic.
   2. Furthermore, the process of democratization was neither automatic nor harmonious. Until almost the end of the century, the democratic ideal had to compete with powerful challengers, especially fascism and communism. The fascist alternative was defeated with the Second World War, while the communist challenge lasted until 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet bloc.
   3. Parallel to these challenges, there were ongoing debates about the nature and practice of democracy that did not end in 1989.
   4. Although democracy emerged at the end of the century as the unquestioned political ideal, the parameters of a truly democratic world order are still vigorously contested.
   5. Because the United States has been the model for the democratic world, it has also been at the center of debates and controversy and, fairly or unfairly, held to a higher standard.
   6. Thus, the struggle over democracy frames the end, as well the beginning, of the 20th century.

IV. To comprehend the terms of this struggle, we need to begin with a clear understanding of the “world order” in 1900, as seen from the European center of the world.

A. Most Western European countries were guided, at least theoretically, by what we could call the “Enlightenment project.”

B. Its defining principle was liberalism, the ideas of which provided a framework for political, social, and economic organization.

C. Liberalism defended the rights of individuals, a contract form of government, the rule of law, and some form of representative government, not necessarily democratic.

D. In the economic sphere, it promoted a laissez-faire approach to the market, which was supposed to operate best without any government interference.

E. Because of the focus on individual rights, private property was a cornerstone of liberalism.

F. The faith in individual self-management derived from a philosophy that assumed the basic rationality of men.
G. By implication, liberalism was an optimistic philosophy, given that the rule of reason served as the basis for continual progress.

H. In 1900, the Enlightenment project underpinned an optimistic European civilization, confident of its own future and its right to rule the rest of the world.
   1. Underneath the surface, there were blatant contradictions.
   2. In liberal European societies, not all individuals had the same rights; that is, these societies were not yet democratic systems.
   3. And, of course, the principles of self-determination did not apply to the colonial world.
   4. What forced these contradictions into the open was the First World War, which undermined confidence in Western civilization and threw doubt on the validity of the Enlightenment project.

Essential Reading:
Tony Judt, “The Story of Everything.”
Gary Wills, “A Reader’s Guide to the Century.”

Supplementary Reading:

Questions to Consider:
1. Is tracing the history of the 20th century a valid undertaking, or are we left with the choice of leaving out too much or including so much that it is meaningless?
2. How would you define your own perspective on what the history of the century was about?
Lecture Two
The Opening Act—World War I

Scope: For most historians, the 20th century began in 1914, not 1900. This lecture analyzes why the First World War played this pivotal role of opening a new historical era and addresses why it had such a destabilizing political, economic, and psychological impact on the existing world order, led by a dominant Western Europe. We will examine the new form of trench warfare, which confounded conventional expectations about how war was to be waged, and the brutal physical and emotional costs of such a war. Finally, the lecture argues that the war opened up a “crisis of meaning,” or a sense of uncertainty about the political, cultural, and economic values of Western Europe, a crisis that set the stage for the turmoil of the following decades.

Outline

I. Why did the First World War become such a pivotal moment, opening a new era in world history?
   A. To answer this question, we must understand where the major European powers were on the eve of World War I.
   B. Although Europe appeared to be at the height of its power and prestige, there were underlying tensions among the dominant countries in the interdependent system of markets and alliances.
      1. After the unification of Germany in the 1860s, this country became a new industrial power and threatened Britain’s hegemony.
      2. The Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires were beset by growing nationalist movements.
      3. Jockeying for power pushed European countries into opposing blocs of alliances.
      4. This kind of political maneuvering had been the goal of European politics since 1815. Ever since Napoleon, European leaders agreed that alliances should be formed to continually shift the balance of power to maintain equilibrium.
      5. By 1914, there was an interdependent world market but no international police system to defend Europe’s domination of it.
      6. Major European powers competed for colonies, resources, markets, and military supremacy. They felt increasing pressure to maintain their extended empires, their living standards at home, and their control over world markets.
      7. These tensions increased during the Balkan crises and erupted after the assassination of the heir to the Hungarian throne in June 1914.
      8. Everyone expected war in the summer of 1914, but no one expected a new kind of war.

II. What was new about this war?
   A. From the Battle of the Marne in September 1914, the war entered a stalemate that lasted four years.
   B. The stalemate led to the invention of a new form of trench warfare, which claimed high casualties.
   C. In addition, a technological revolution in weaponry, including the invention of the machine gun, made existing strategies obsolete.
   D. All these events combined to create a war of staggering casualties with no foreseeable end; it was a war of attrition in fact and in theory.
   E. The eastern front did not have the same trench warfare but had equally high casualties.

III. How did the war finally end, and what were the results?
   A. The stalemate was finally broken by:
      1. The Russian Revolution in 1917, which closed the eastern front when the Bolsheviks signed a separate peace;
      2. The entry of the Americans into the war after Germany declared open submarine warfare in the Atlantic in August 1917.
   B. An armistice was signed on November 11, 1918.
   C. With the war over, the enormity of the destruction could finally be absorbed.
1. The world economy took years to recover prewar levels of production and trade.
2. Human casualties were much worse: approximately 10 million dead (mostly young soldiers) and 20 million wounded—the destruction of almost an entire generation.

D. While the material and human losses were horrific, it was the emotional impact of the war that was so transforming.
1. The governments tried to define the war as a struggle for democracy, but many were not convinced.
2. Many struggled with the gap between Enlightenment notions of progress and the death of 10 million men, which created a new culture of pessimism and alienation.
3. The best expression of this new culture is found in the poems, essays, and memoirs of combatants, who feared that they had sacrificed so much for a senseless war.
4. Two poems exemplify the shift from prewar to postwar culture: Rupert Brooke’s “The Soldier,” written in the summer of 1914, and Wilfred Owen’s “Dulce et Decorum Est” (“How Sweet and Noble It Is...To Die for Your Country”).

E. The disillusionment revealed by Owen’s poem brings us back to the original question of why the war was such an important turning point. It wasn’t simply the level of destruction but the way that its irrationality exposed all the comfortable assumptions of a 19th-century Europe that had been, literally, on top of the world.

Essential Reading:
Erich Maria Remarque, All Quiet on the Western Front.
Wilfred Owen, The Collected Poems of Wilfred Owen.

Supplementary Reading:
Paul Fussell, The Great War and Modern Memory.

Questions to Consider:
1. What kind of disaster would it take today to create the kind of shock and disillusionment that followed World War I?
2. Of the factors contributing to the “crisis of meaning” brought on by the war, what do you think was the most powerful?
Lecture Three

Framing the Peace—The Paris Peace Treaties

Scope: In many ways, the complex peace settlement embodied and fed the contradictions of an uncertain world order. In part, the settlement was inspired by Woodrow Wilson’s idealistic Fourteen Points, which proclaimed the mission to make the world safe for democracy. Thus, the settlement created the League of Nations to mediate future international disputes and carved out a dozen new countries following the lofty principle of national self-determination. In direct contradiction to the Fourteen Points, however, the settlement did not apply these lofty principles elsewhere, either in the colonial world or in the treatment of the defeated European power, Germany. Such inequalities helped set the stage for the upcoming political challenges launched from inside and outside Europe.

Outline

I. During the peace process, the Western governments had a chance to reflect on what had gone wrong and to design a peace settlement that would restore stability and confidence in European leadership.

A. The Paris peace talks (at Versailles) were infused with the idealistic rhetoric of U.S. President Wilson’s state-of-the-union address delivered in January 1918.
   1. Ever since his 1912 election, Wilson had been cultivating a new foreign policy for the United States that was to be based on morality, not self-interest. He withdrew from the imperialist policies of Theodore Roosevelt and pledged that the United States would withdraw from its colonial presence in the Philippines as soon as a stable government could be established.
   2. In his union address, Wilson laid out his Fourteen Points that would ensure world peace and bring the benefits of democracy and freedom to the rest of the world.
   3. The essence of these points lay in the principle of individual and national self-determination, which would be the basis of a new world order; on a fundamental level, it was a continuation of 19th-century liberalism.
   4. Perhaps the most novel feature was Wilson’s call for the interests of the colonized to be given the same weight as the interests of the colonial government.

B. The peace agreement at Paris (the Versailles treaty), with its five separate treaties, included many idealistic applications of Wilson’s Fourteen Points.
   1. In particular, the settlement included his last point, the establishment of a League of Nations, which would have the job of mediating international disputes.
   2. Moreover, the league was to give equal representation to all countries, no matter how small and weak, thus establishing the liberal principle of equality under the law on an international scale.
   3. In practice, the league was unable to construct the peaceful democratic world that Wilson envisioned, because Wilson’s Congress refused to join and because the league lacked authority to implement its decisions.
   4. The other major application of the Fourteen Points was in the creation of nearly a dozen new countries out of the former Turkish, Russian, and Austro-Hungarian empires according to principles of national self-determination, although even this process was partly shaped by pragmatic considerations, as well.

II. However, the settlement only exposed the contradictions of European leadership and its claims to “make the world safe for democracy” (the words of Woodrow Wilson).

A. In practice, the creation of new “nation-states” did not strictly follow the ideal of one people/one state.
   1. Because most ethnic groups lived intermingled, not neatly isolated from each other, ethnic minorities were created in the new countries.
   2. The ethnic tensions fostered in these states were still not resolved by the end of the 20th century, as the ethnic wars in Yugoslavia demonstrated.

B. The containment of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia was another determining factor in drawing boundaries and establishing strong buffer states.

C. Instead of a new world order based on the foundation of independent and satisfied states, the peace settlement had created the grounds for a whole new set of territorial disputes.
Moreover, supporters of the Allied cause were rewarded, while others were punished for their support of Germany or Austria.

The principle of self-determination, while lofty in its appeal, provided little guidance for managing competing claims in multi-ethnic regions.

Although there were contradictions in the attempt to apply the principle of self-determination to the European continent, at least these measures were generally in line with the Fourteen Points. There were other agreements, however, that directly contradicted them.

The most glaring exception to the application of liberal equality was the treatment received by the colonial world.

1. Colonial self-determination was not on the table, even in colonies taken away from defeated powers.
2. For example, when the Koreans rose against Japanese colonial rule in early 1919, inspired precisely by Wilson’s Fourteen Points, they appealed to the United States for support. The U.S. State Department, however, declared their revolt to be a purely internal, Japanese affair, effectively accepting the idea that Korea was the property of Japan.
3. German colonies in Africa and Turkish colonies in the Middle East were taken over by World War I victors, who named them “protectorates,” with a promise of independence when they were ready for it.
4. But by World War II, only a few protectorates had been granted independence.
5. The obvious contradiction between the lofty rhetoric of the peace talks and the different standard applied to the colonial world is clearly illustrated in a dramatic event, known as the Amritsar massacre, which occurred during the middle of the talks, in April 1919.
6. The massacre was the British response to a peaceful demonstration against the Rowlatt Bills, which deprived protesting Indians of basic civil rights.
7. Outrage over Amritsar and the general double standard provided the fuel for the first anti-colonialist movements, especially in India and China.
8. In China in 1919, the Paris peace settlement transferred control over several provinces from Germany to Japan, resulting in mass public protests in major cities across China.
9. It was partly disillusionment over the double standard followed by Western liberal powers that made Mao Tse Tung turn from liberalism to revolutionary Marxism in the years following China’s transfer to Japanese control.

There was one other major contradiction in the settlement, embodied in the Versailles treaty, between Germany and the Allied nations.

1. Because the Allies blamed Germany for starting the war, they imposed a vindictive settlement that included huge reparation payments and military occupation of German territory.
2. The treaty also called for a demilitarized zone in western Germany; the complete dismantling of the German military machine; and the right of France to occupy parts of Germany, if the terms of the treaty were not kept, and to administer the Ruhr Valley coal mines to extract reparation payments.
3. Not only did this treaty undermine Germany’s national self-determination, but it undermined her new democratic government.
4. Just as the settlement provided fuel for anti-colonialist movements outside Europe, the Versailles treaty also provided fuel for anti-liberal nationalists, such as Hitler, inside Europe.

The upshot of these inconsistencies was that the 200-page peace settlement embodied the contradictions of an idealistic Enlightenment project that was applied selectively and unequally. In this sense, it set the terms for the next half-century of political conflict, instead of achieving its declared intention of protecting world peace.

Woodrow Wilson, “14 Points.”

Manfred Boemeke, et al., The Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment after 75 Years.
Harold Nicolson, Peacemaking, 1919.
Questions to Consider:
1. Why do you think European leaders could sustain such contradictory perspectives on the new world order they were creating?
2. Or is it impossible to operate international diplomacy according to consistent moral and political principles?
Lecture Four

Intellectual Foundations—Nietzsche and Freud

Scope: This lecture begins to examine the crisis of meaning, as articulated by a generation of European artists and intellectuals who questioned the existing social and cultural order. It focuses on two influential thinkers, Nietzsche and Freud, and on how their work set the parameters for a critique of some of the basic principles of the Enlightenment project, including the faith in rationality, progress, and objective truth. Finally, it argues that this new uncertainty was reinforced by the revolution in physics, which replaced the knowable Newtonian world with one of relativity and indeterminacy.

Outline

I. The war opened up a crisis of meaning, which the Paris peace settlement symbolized through its contradictions. The next two lectures will explore how intellectuals and artists articulated and understood this crisis, building on the work of Nietzsche and Freud.

II. First, we need to define what the crisis of meaning consisted of for a generation of postwar thinkers.
   A. In general terms, artists and intellectuals rejected the comfortable Enlightenment assumptions of rationality, progress, and objective truth and embraced varying degrees of irrationality, subjectivity, and skepticism.
   B. Once the crisis is defined, it is important to understand how important this intellectual defection was, marking a dramatic shift from the 19th century.

III. More than any other philosophers, Nietzsche and Freud provided the intellectual foundation for the critique of the Enlightenment project by questioning the basic rational structure of human society.
   A. Although Nietzsche died before the war in 1900, his ideas were popularized after the war by various movements.
      1. He was the first Western philosopher since Socrates to deny the essential rationality of the universe.
      2. Instead of operating according to rational laws, the universe was a place of irrational disorder.
      3. By deluding himself about rational order, man had actually been suppressing his most creative animal passions.
      4. For Nietzsche, Christianity was the cornerstone of this rational order, and he called it a slave morality.
      5. Nietzsche proposed, instead, a new morality, what he called the “transvaluation of values,” based on the liberation of man’s primitive life force, or the “will.”
      6. The result of the unleashed “will to power” would be a world in which the strong would dominate the weak and the rule of force would replace the rule of law.
      7. Although Nietzsche had few followers during his lifetime, his ideas seemed to make more sense in the postwar climate, when people were coming to terms with a war in which millions had died but no one could explain why.
   B. Unlike Nietzsche, Freud didn’t celebrate man’s irrational nature, but he, too, argued that we could not ignore it.
      1. Freud was a scientist who sought to map the irrational terrain of the human brain, or what came to be known as the unconscious.
      2. For Freud, humans were divided creatures, torn between the rational and the irrational impulses of our brains.
      3. Freud began his work on individual patients but, after the war, turned his methods to the analysis of society at large in his major philosophical work, Civilization and Its Discontents.
      4. Like the work of Nietzsche, Freud’s work on the unconscious became popular only after the war, when his ideas helped explain why the most civilized countries could act in such a barbaric fashion.
      5. Civilization argued that human progress had involved a tradeoff in which men’s deepest primitive desires had been repressed in return for the relative security of living under the rule of law.
      6. Primitive man had made this tradeoff, Freud argued, to avoid annihilation.
      7. Although the tradeoff was a good one, it meant that civilization was constructed on the repression of man’s deepest sexual and aggressive impulses, which created ongoing tensions.
8. Ironically, then, the more advanced the civilization, the more repressive it is and the greater the potential frustration. In this framework, World War I made perfect sense to Freud.
9. Repression was necessary to civilization, but there was no permanent solution to the tensions created, leading Freud to a pessimistic prognosis for humankind.

IV. Nietzsche’s and Freud’s focus on the irrationality of human nature dovetailed with developments in scientific thinking in the early 20th century.

A. Most people understood little of the revolution in atomic physics, but what filtered down was the sense that the certainties of the Newtonian world were being replaced by a new universe of relativity and indeterminacy.
B. In particular, Einstein’s theory of relativity and Werner Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle trickled into laymen’s terms as evidence that there was no clearly rational order to the universe.
C. All these intellectual currents come together in a new understanding of human nature and the way the world operates that will be used by a postwar generation to challenge the basic assumptions of Western culture since the Enlightenment.

Essential Reading:
Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents.
Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil.

Supplementary Reading:
H. Stuart Hughes, Consciousness and Society: The Reorientation of European Social Thought, 1850–1930.
Peter Gay, Freud: A Life for Our Time.

Questions to Consider:
1. What do you think is the lasting legacy of Nietzsche’s and Freud’s challenge to the rationality of human nature?
2. Why do you think they came to such different conclusions about what to do with the irrational side of human beings?
Lecture Five
Art and the Post-War “Crisis of Meaning”

Scope: Building on the intellectual foundations of Nietzsche and Freud, postwar avant-garde movements turned what had been isolated ideas into a popular movement. This lecture explores the concepts and critiques expounded by the major artistic movements of the period, as expressed in the Dadaist, Surrealist, and Futurist Manifestos. Although each of these three movements took different perspectives, the lecture will argue that they shared a common critique of 19th-century Western civilization. Through their rejection of rationalism, their disdain for the past, and their call for an act of spontaneous will to transform the world, they epitomized the crisis of meaning that hit a younger generation coming of age after the war.

Outline

I. Although Freud’s and Nietzsche’s ideas existed before the war, it was only afterward that they became diffused in a newly political avant-garde culture that was defined mostly by its rejection of the past. Instead of a coherent movement, the postwar avant-garde launched a chaotic attack on the certainty, rationality, and objectivity of Western culture and society that brought these ideas into the mainstream of European society.
   A. To provide a sense of the parameters of this attack, we will focus on three different movements whose founders articulated their ideas in written manifestos: dadaism, surrealism, and futurism. These movements attracted a number of artists who tried to translate these ideas into paintings and other forms of art.
   B. The Dadaist Manifesto was written in 1918 and was based on the simple premise of an absurd world.
      1. Dada was a nonsense word chosen to communicate this absurdity.
      2. It declared that only irrational acts made any sense in an absurd world.
      3. The goal of dada was to destroy the false rational order and expose the irrational undercurrents beneath.
      4. The Nietzschean influence on this movement is clear, because dadaists agreed that man’s rational mind was blocking the creative forces that lurked inside.
      5. How was one to behave in a world without signposts? The only option left was pure spontaneous action.

II. How was dadaism translated into artistic expression?
   A. A common dadaist theatre piece was two people at a blackboard, one writing and the second one erasing.
   B. Several paintings give us a better sense of dadaist mentality.
      1. Hannah Hoch’s Cut with the Kitchen Knife Through the Last Weimar Beer-Belly Cultural Epoch (1919) is a collage portraying the idea of dada acting like a kitchen knife slashing a complacent “beer-belly culture” into chaotic pieces.
      2. Marcel Duchamp’s L.H.O.O.Q. (1919) is a reproduction of the Mona Lisa with a superimposed mustache, symbolizing the dadaist desire to tear down the old world to show how ridiculous it is. In a sense, Duchamp’s act of vandalism directly expresses Nietzsche’s call for a transvaluation of values.
      3. The dadaists’ rejection of all previous artistic and social values had an impact on other artists who did not necessarily call themselves dadaists, including Otto Dix and George Grosz.
      4. Dix and Grosz lived in Germany in the 1920s, the decade before the fascist revolution, when Germany underwent an especially agonizing identity crisis. They added a bitterness to the dadaist jeers and pushed the dadaist idea of the ridiculousness of man’s self-consciousness in a different direction: They pictured man as a disgusting, pathetic creature, implicitly contrasting him with the noble, rational man of the Enlightenment, as seen in Dix’s The Skat Players and Grosz’s Beauty, I Praise Thee.

III. Like dadaism, surrealism attacked the pretense that man was a rational creature, but while dadaists focused on destroying the existing rational order, surrealists focused on creating a new reality that they called “surreality.”
   A. The Surrealist Manifesto was written in 1924 by André Breton, a psychiatrist and student of Freud’s.
   B. Surreality would represent a fusing of the rational and irrational, thus building on Freud’s discovery of the unconscious.
C. Surrealists aimed to create a new reality through various techniques of releasing the unconscious, such as stream-of-consciousness or automatic writing.

D. Dali, the most famous surrealist, explained that he induced a dream-like state before he started painting.

E. How was surrealism translated into artistic expression? Two paintings demonstrate the surrealists’ technique of using familiar objects placed in completely unfamiliar settings:
   1. Dali’s *Dream Caused by the Flight of a Bee Around a Pomegranate One Second Before Waking Up.*
   2. René Magritte’s *The Familiar Objects.*

IV. The last movement to be discussed is futurism, which was launched before the war in Italy in a manifesto written by Marinetti in 1909 but flourished in the postwar years, as well.

   A. Like the other two movements, futurism was motivated by a desire to shock people into rejecting their comfortable assumptions and to exult in the irrational, emotional side of human nature.

   B. Thus, at one of the early futurist theatre productions, Marinetti passed out leaflets denouncing Dante and Michelangelo and campaigned for the abolition of museums.

   C. Crucial to their worship of the future was a fascination with modern technology and its transformation of society.

   D. One of their favorite metaphors was the speeding automobile, which expressed their desire to hurl into the future and leave the past behind.

   E. The speeding automobile also embodied the focus on spontaneous action versus rational thought.

   F. The translation of futurist thought into art is best expressed by examining some of the paintings it inspired.
      1. Futurist paintings capture the sense of cacophony and movement by beginning with the object in motion and trying to represent it
      2. Thus, Umberto Boccioni’s *Riot in the Galleria* (1910) is the epitome of people in motion that seems to give voice to the line from the Futurist Manifesto: “We will sing of great crowds, excited by work, by pleasure and by riot.”

V. Although each of these three movements had a different focus, their rejection of rationalism, their disdain for the past, and their call for a spontaneous act of will to transform the world epitomized the crisis of meaning that engulfed the generation coming of age after the war.

**Essential Reading:**
André Breton, “Manifesto of Surrealism.”

**Supplementary Reading:**
Peter Gay, *Weimar Culture: The Outsider as Insider.*

**Questions to Consider:**
1. Can you imagine the cultural context in which this kind of wholesale rejection of the past would be attractive in today’s world?
2. Freud was horrified that many of these artists looked to him for inspiration—why do you think this was so?
Lecture Six
Gender Crisis—The “Woman Question”

Scope: Another important indicator of the identity crisis in European civilization was a pervasive uncertainty about the existing gender roles. Gender roles describe what is normally expected of men and women in a particular society, and women’s historians have argued that they are central to the stability of the social order; that is, when men and women “know their place” the social order functions smoothly. In contrast, a crisis in gender roles signifies that a society is in deep turmoil. This lecture examines the nature of this crisis through anxieties about what was called the “new woman” and through the different solutions to the “woman question” offered by liberal feminists and their political challengers, the communists.

Outline
I. To demonstrate the pervasiveness of a crisis of meaning in Western civilization, we will focus in this lecture on one of the most important indicators of social dislocation: the crisis in gender roles.
   A. Because gender roles are central to the social order, a crisis in men’s or women’s “place” signifies a society in deepest turmoil.
      1. What did the postwar gender crisis involve?
      2. The “new woman” became a cultural icon and a locus for debate and anxiety.
      3. Many wanted to know what would happen in a changing world where women were taking on new roles as citizens and workers.
      4. This debate had political implications, because liberals, socialists, and later, fascists all had different solutions to the “woman question.”
   B. Before we focus on the crisis, we must look at the accepted role for women in the 19th century.
      1. The ideal was often defined as the “angel in the house,” in which the woman’s role was confined to the private sphere of home and family.
      2. This meant that a woman could not make all the decisions of an autonomous individual without the permission of her husband. Women were not citizens, had no right to vote or hold office, and could not be hired for certain jobs.
      3. The argument was that women were physically and emotionally weak and, therefore, needed protection. They were part of a man’s family unit and were represented by the male head of the household.
      4. On this premise, it was argued that because women were already represented by the male head of the household, to give them a vote meant giving them a double vote.
      5. Although this role was accepted, it created a major contradiction in liberal regimes, because theorists had to explain why women should not be equal citizens.
II. One solution to this contradiction came to be known as liberal feminism, which was articulated in the 19th century by such theorists as John Stuart Mill and embodied in what came to be known as the “first-wave” feminist movement.
   A. Mill’s argument is a classic utilitarian argument: that society would be much better off if it benefited from the talents of the other half of the population.
   B. Mill and other liberal feminists demanded that women be treated as individuals, not as a separate class of humans exempt from political rights.
   C. They argued that liberalism’s promise of universal rights should be taken seriously and that women should be given equal opportunities.
   D. Mill began a debate questioning the justice of excluding an entire group from basic liberal rights. It was hotly contested well into the interwar period of the 20th century by those who saw women as such a different species of human that the rules of equality could not apply to them.
   E. The basic liberal program was accepted by some European countries after the war had demonstrated women’s ability to contribute to the war effort and, thus, play a role in public life.
III. Another solution to the woman question emerged from the socialist movement.

A. Engels defined the terms of Marxist feminism in his pamphlet on the “Origin of the Family.”
   1. The key to the socialist critique of women’s current role was that their oppression derived from the structure of capitalist society.
   2. In basic terms, women were enslaved by a marriage system designed to protect private property, not nurture love.
   3. Engels argued that the solution was to push women into the workforce in order to gain economic independence.
   4. In the long run, Engels argued, the socialist revolution would abolish the root of women’s oppression—private property.
   5. Then, the bourgeois form of marriage would die out and men and women would form relationships based only on love and affection.

B. The key socialist feminist thinker, however, was Aleksandra Kollontai, who went beyond Engels to argue that the overhauling of gender relations should be central to the socialist revolution.
   1. What she did was explore Engel’s vague notion that the “bourgeois family” would fade away to identify what kinds of relationships would replace it and how these relationships would protect women’s independence.
   2. Her work focused on replacing the two functions of the existing family: erotic love and the social obligations of feeding, clothing, and raising children.
   3. Kollontai proposed replacing marriage with a “comradely union” of two equals, based on sexuality and independence, although she did not advocate promiscuity.
   4. She proposed making child care a public rather than a private responsibility: The state should help to raise children.
   5. She also proposed the establishment of communal kitchens so that women were relieved of related domestic chores.

IV. What made all these ideas about the “woman question” more than abstract debates was that the war opened up a period of experimentation.

A. In Western Europe, experimentation began with a series of legal changes.
   1. Women gained individual rights. For example, they were allowed to obtain university degrees, enter professions, testify in court, and travel or open businesses without their husbands’ permission.
   2. The new woman was exemplified by the “flapper.”

B. In Russia, although many of Kollontai’s ideas were not implemented, there was a good deal of experimentation.
   1. The new Bolshevik woman entered the workforce; by 1936, 40 percent of the workforce was female.
   2. Women participated in the regular army and ran for legislative office.
   3. They also got divorced in record numbers.

C. The postwar period seemed to offer the promise (or nightmare) of real gender revolution.

Essential Reading:
Friedrich Engels, “The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State.”

Supplementary Reading:
Aleksandra Kollontai, “Sexual Relations and the Class Struggle.”

Questions to Consider:
1. Why do changes in gender roles, especially women’s roles, generate such opposition or backlash?
2. Which, if any, of the analyses of women’s oppression did you find most convincing?
Lecture Seven
The Origins of “Mass Society”

Scope: The identity crisis exemplified by the debates over the “woman question” took a different form in the anxieties raised by an emerging phenomenon labeled mass society. In the pessimistic version circulated in the 1930s, the celebrated individualism of Enlightenment liberalism was being undermined by a society in which everyone and everything had become so standardized and uniform that it had erased individual differences and created an undifferentiated mass. In this lecture, we examine the paradoxical roots of mass society in the evolution of liberal democracy and capitalism in Western society.

Outline

I. Western civilization had undergone a dramatic economic and social transformation, which was considered a great accomplishment, but now, in the pessimistic postwar period, some intellectuals focused on the dark underbelly of this transformation. The next two lectures will explore their critique.
   A. The basic critique launched in the 1920s and 1930s by a group of philosophers connected to the so-called Frankfurt school was that the modernization process celebrated by the West had produced a crisis they called “mass society,” in which individualism had been replaced by standardization and uniformity.
      1. This image of a world of clones is nicely illustrated in a poem by W. H. Auden, “The Unknown Citizen” (1939).
      2. The implication was that if the individual were really dead, then so was liberalism.
   B. What were the roots of this condition that these thinkers called “mass society”?  
      1. The irony, in their minds, was that mass society had emerged out of the triumphant processes of Western civilization: industrial capitalism and liberal democracy.
      2. The implication was that Western civilization carried the seeds of its own destruction within itself.

II. How had the process of democratization helped create the conditions for mass society?
   A. The democratic ideal of creating a level playing field for all citizens had formed the basis of progressive politics since the French Revolution.
   B. In the 19th century, only conservatives, such as Alexis de Tocqueville, worried about the impact of pervasive egalitarianism.
      1. De Tocqueville elaborated his concerns in his well-known treatise on democracy in America. In his famous phrase “the tyranny of the majority,” he defined the fear that a culture of the masses would stifle individual creativity. Thus, democratic rule of the majority could be just as oppressive of individual freedom as any other kind of tyranny.
      2. Moreover, social mobility, for de Tocqueville, symbolized the rootlessness of a democratic society.
   C. Nietzsche took up de Tocqueville’s concerns, his ideas entering the mainstream after World War I.
   D. By the 1930s, more voices echoed these concerns. What brought these concerns about democracy to the forefront was the new era of mass politics—demagogic parties, such as the fascists, whipped up enthusiasm through spectacle and pageantry.
   E. In 1929, the Spanish philosopher Ortega y Gasset published a book called The Revolt of the Masses.
      1. In it, he coined the concept of the “mass man” who “doesn’t value himself” and “is satisfied in being identical to others.”
      2. He argued that society should be a dynamic between the common people and “superior minorities”—an aristocracy not of birth but of talent.
      3. He claimed that the basis of rule in the modern world was the “preponderance of an opinion.”
      4. What worried him was that the opinions of the masses were subject to passing whims.
   F. What made the fear of the “mass man” more concrete in the 20th century was the combination of universal suffrage, expanding literacy, and the new power of public opinion.
   G. Walter Lippman’s book Public Opinion, written in 1922, focused on the danger of irrational public opinion shaping public policy.
1. Lippman argued that, although democratic theory always assumed that citizens would make rational decisions based on their knowledge of the world around them, it was a fiction that each citizen could form a competent opinion about all public affairs.
2. He feared that public opinion had overwhelmed individual thinking on politics; it was an irrational force that could sway politicians from “doing the right thing.”
3. Like Ortega, Lippman thought that democracy needed to be tempered by the expertise of the rational minority—in this case, political scientists who had the knowledge to organize public opinion.
4. Public opinion had become institutionalized in the 1930s by the creation of the public opinion poll, which became a symbol of democratization in modern society.

III. Paralleling the process of democratization, capitalist industrialization also had a leveling impact.

A. On a basic level, capitalism reduced all interactions to a cash nexus.
B. More specifically, industrialization reduced the distinctions between products by mass-producing them.
C. Finally, industrialization created the new technology, such as radio, film, and later, television, that provided the basis for standardized interaction between people who didn’t know each other.
D. It was these new forms of communication, or mass media, that created the possibility of a single message reaching an entire population.
E. The print mass media developed in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, while electronic media made their impact from the 1920s.
F. One final offshoot of industrialization that contributed to these new linkages was urbanization and geographic mobility.
   1. These demographic shifts led to the demise of stable local communities and regional cultures.
   2. This development led to a new more homogeneous urban culture.
G. All these conditions, then, which could be interpreted as signs of progress, could also be seen as contributing to the process of erasing distinctions between individuals and preparing them to become part of the undifferentiated mass.

Essential Reading:
Walter Lippman, Public Opinion.

Supplementary Reading:
Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America.
Ortega y Gasset, The Revolt of the Masses.

Questions to Consider:
1. Do you think the fears about the “leveling” impact of democracy are justified, or should such fears be dismissed as mere elitism?
2. Has the process of standardization increased or decreased since the 1930s?
Lecture Eight
Defining Mass Society and Its Consequences

Scope:  This lecture defines the nature of mass society and how it functioned, according to its critics. We will focus on the emergence of a new mass culture, looking forward into the post–World War II United States, which provides the best case study of the phenomenon. The dispersion of radio, television, and a national record industry established the basis for a mass culture that could, for the first time, be consumed and experienced by an entire country, not just local spectators. After laying out the parameters of a mass society, the lecture discusses the pessimistic reading of this development, particularly as articulated by the Frankfurt school of German philosophers in the 1920s and 1930s.

Outline

I. In the previous lecture, we discussed the origins of mass society. Now, we will talk about how mass society functioned and what its negative consequences were in the minds of its critics.
   A. The basis of mass society was the existence of a mass culture, shared and experienced by an entire nation (and, later, the world).
   B. Key to the formation of a mass culture was standardization and diffusion.
      1. Two important examples of this process were the development of the movie and record industries in the 1920s and 1930s.
      2. The invention of records transformed music from a local phenomenon to a national one.
      3. Music became a mass commodity, and in the process, songs became increasingly bland and generic in their lyrics—no longer the expression of local and marginal communities.
      4. Going to the movies became one of the most important new leisure activities that millions shared.
      5. During the same interwar period, sport was being transformed into a mass spectator activity.
      6. All these new national leisure industries created a common set of cultural references, which replaced more localized, heterogeneous forms and increasingly became the culture, that is, a mark of social membership in the community.

II. One of the characteristics of the new mass culture was that it was something to be purchased and passively consumed.
   A. Traditional forms of leisure were more participatory, as well as free of charge, while the mass leisure industries were designed for paid spectators.
   B. What are the implications of this passivity?
      1. People have lost the option of choice and creativity.
      2. Although there is an appearance of choice in mass culture, it is really the choice to buy or not to buy into a homogeneous entity.
      3. As mass culture increasingly becomes defined as the culture, it becomes progressively more difficult not to consume it and still participate in the American way of life.
      4. And the consumption of shared leisure activities only increases the uniformity and standardization of life characteristic of mass society.

III. The breakdown of older forms of community-based leisure was enhanced by another important technological innovation—the invention of the automobile.
   A. The automobile stands at the center of all the processes we have been talking about: mass production and consumption, mass culture, and urbanization.
   B. It was not the automobile per se, but Henry Ford’s vision of producing cheap cars for the masses that had such a broad impact on social life.
   C. Once people owned cars, they traveled out of their communities and onto a set of shared roads and national travel destinations.
   D. The impact of the automobile on community life was brilliantly analyzed in the 1920s local study of Middletown by a husband and wife team of sociologists.
IV. While most people agreed about the basic contours of mass culture and its homogenization of society, philosophers associated with the Frankfurt school rendered a particularly pessimistic judgment of its implications.

A. Their basic argument was that mass society created an atomized society of individuals susceptible to centralized control.

B. Thus, anyone who could control the monolithic mass culture, or the “culture industry,” and its messages could control what people thought and did.

C. The heart of the problem was the demise of local, community, and associational ties that connected ordinary people to each other in horizontal ways.

D. Instead, people were connected vertically through participation in a uniform culture that could be easily manipulated.

E. If such control could be asserted, freedom would be extinguished and replaced by a condition that came to be called totalitarianism.

F. In the 1930s, this was more than an abstract fear; fascism and Stalinism seemed to embody the threat of a mass culture channeled to reflect the will of a single man. In Germany under the Nazis and in the Soviet Union under Stalin, the state used the tools of mass media to control and manipulate public opinion.

V. Even today, the debate about the impact of mass culture remains. On the one side are optimists who see mass culture as a sign of democratic diversity and on the other are pessimists who see mass culture as a way to enslave the brain-dead masses into buying its products.

Essential Reading:

Supplementary Reading:
Alan Swingewood, *The Myth of Mass Culture*.

Questions to Consider:
1. What contemporary evidence could you use to support the optimist or pessimist analyses of mass society?
2. As mass culture has become globalized, are there any new dangers or benefits to consider?
Lecture Nine
Crisis of Capitalism—The Great Depression

Scope: While the First World War opened up a cultural and political crisis of confidence, the Great Depression of the 1930s brought into question the economic system of capitalism and the liberal principles that had brought such wealth and prosperity to Europe and the West over the previous century. This lecture begins by explaining the origins of the Depression in the postwar economy and why an apparently “roaring '20s” ended with the stock market crash of October 1929, which set off a domino effect throughout the world economic system. The lecture ends by exploring the psychological and political impact of the Depression, which was a crucial element in the crisis of Western liberalism and the attraction of political alternatives.

Outline

I. The fear that Western civilization contained some sort of self-destruct mechanism was exacerbated by the huge blow of the Great Depression in the 1930s.
   A. The poignant symbol of the Depression was the unemployed man standing on the street corner in a hundred cities, from Berlin to New York.
      1. What this image symbolized was the failure of the economic system to live up to its promises to provide wealth for all those who worked hard.
      2. It also symbolized the failure of liberal economic policies to control capitalism, thus bringing into question the sacred laissez-faire notion of a self-regulating economy.
   B. The repercussions of the Depression, then, like that of the First World War, were much greater than its material impact.
      1. Inside the West, it provided fodder for the anti-liberal political movements that were gaining steam.
      2. Outside the West, it demonstrated how fragile Western economic power was and undermined its claims to bring wealth and prosperity to the rest of the world.

II. Beginning with the Depression as an economic phenomenon, what were its origins?
   A. One of the great traumas of the Depression was that it was so unexpected.
      1. By the mid-1920s, it appeared as if the world economy had recovered from the disruptions of World War I.
      2. The sense of wealth was enhanced by loose credit and the recovery of confidence in the world financial system, which created an easy flow of money and credit.
      3. This, together with loosening social mores, led to the image of the “roaring ‘20s”—lavish expenditure and a general sense of indulgence.
   B. But this apparently thriving economy was riddled with weaknesses.
      1. One weakness was the war debt. The United States made loans to Germany, which then paid off the loans received from the United States. By 1928, the United States had poured more than $1 billion into the European economy to prop it up.
      2. Another weakness was the crisis in the old industries that had made the industrial revolution. New non-European industrial powers, particularly Japan and the United States, were driving Europe out of the markets.
      3. A third weakness that especially affected non-Western countries was the fall in world agricultural prices. Because new technology increased yields, among other factors, agricultural production went up and prices plummeted.
      4. Agricultural depression hit Eastern Europe and the colonial world especially hard, because their economies were largely dependent on staple agricultural exports.
      5. The decline in the agricultural and industrial sectors caused shrinking markets for other goods, both at home and abroad, because it reduced consumer buying power.
      6. Already in 1929, 60 percent of American households lived below the poverty level.
      7. Because credit was loose, speculation pushed the price of paper money and stocks to absurdly high values—profits spiraled simply on the basis of the buying and selling of money.
      8. Governments placed no controls over financial transactions.
C. These weaknesses remained invisible before 1929, both because they were unconnected and because attention was focused on the images of visual wealth, financed largely by loose credit.

D. What brought these weaknesses to the surface was the New York stock market crash of October 1929. All the paper fortunes simply evaporated.
   1. Within a year, 5,000 American banks shut down, because they ran out of gold to cover demands for conversion into gold.
   2. The collapse of the financial system spread to Europe, where every major bank had closed its doors by the summer of 1931.

E. But the financial crisis was only the first phase of a broader crisis provoked by its reverberations through the rest of the economy.
   1. The financial collapse cut purchasing power, which in turn, cut demand, which in turn, caused companies to lay off workers, further shrinking purchasing power.
   2. The fact that this vicious cycle only aggravated existing weaknesses provided the elements of a full-blown depression.

F. The material impact of the Depression can be measured by statistics on the reduction of international trade, the drop in production, and the rise in unemployment in the Western economies.

G. The Depression also hit the colonial world hard, with a particular impact on peasants dependent on First World markets for their livelihood. Significantly, the hardest hit regions were those most deeply involved in the world market.

H. But, as in the case of World War I, the psychological impact was more important than the material in changing how people viewed the world in which they lived. One window into this world is provided by personal accounts, such as those collected in Studs Terkel’s *Hard Times* or chronicled in George Orwell’s *The Road to Wigan Pier*.

III. It is not difficult to see how the experience of the Depression disillusioned many people and attracted them to the anti-liberal movements, such as communism and fascism, which promised strong government control of the economy instead of the laissez-faire response of most European governments.

IV. There was another response to this crisis, formulated by John Maynard Keynes, but it was not until after the Second World War that a new model of managed capitalism was widely adopted in the form of the welfare state; we will deal with Keynes in a future lecture.

Essential Reading:
George Orwell, *The Road to Wigan Pier*.

Supplementary Reading:
Studs Terkel, *Hard Times*.

Questions to Consider:
1. The debate over the efficacy of laissez-faire economics is still raging today: Does the Depression provide any contemporary relevance for this debate?
2. After the Depression, individual countries put safeguards into place that sought to prevent similar crises in the future, but are there circumstances under which it could be repeated?
Lecture Ten

Communist Ideology—From Marx to Lenin

Scope: Intertwined with the cultural and intellectual critiques of the Enlightenment project was a serious political challenge to liberal democracy. In the next few lectures, we will discuss communism and fascism as political alternatives, first in theory, then in practice. In theoretical terms, both movements claimed to offer political systems better suited to the new world of mass society and politics, and both based these claims in communally based forms of social and political organization instead of the individualism of classic liberalism. By closely examining what these ideologies promised and how they sold themselves, we can better understand their broad appeal at this historical moment. This lecture focuses on communist theory, beginning with the ideas of Marx and demonstrating how Lenin adapted these ideas in important ways that made them more in tune with the spirit of the age.

Outline

I. In this lecture, we move from the philosophical and economic critiques of Western civilization to the political challenge mounted by two major movements, communism and fascism, both of which also flourished as a direct result of the war.

II. Although communism and fascism were quite distinct ideologies, both claimed to have a solution to liberalism’s failure to come to terms with the new era of mass politics and mass society, that is, to successfully integrate the masses into the political system.
   A. They both claimed that the politics of individualism was dead.
   B. Both movements argued that instead, society should be organized into groups, in one case, the class; in the other, the nation.
   C. As members of their group, the masses could then be organized politically by the “dynamic minority,” in Mussolini’s words, or the “vanguard party,” in Lenin’s.
   D. Both movements challenged the Enlightenment project in another important way.
   E. To reach the masses required not reason but emotion, and both movements argued that revolutions were made by heroic acts of will, not rational progress.
   F. In their rejection of individualism and their emphasis on action over reason, both communism and fascism fit well into the postwar spirit defined in earlier lectures.

III. Communism was not a new ideology, as fascism was, but it did have a new face, incorporating elements that made it particularly attractive at this historical juncture.
   A. The person who most epitomized the new elements was Lenin, who became the architect of 20th-century communism.
   B. To understand what Lenin added to Marxism as defined by Marx, we need to begin with a review of Marx’s ideas and what made him a product of the 19th century.
      1. Marx certainly attacked basic liberal values and rejected individualism and capitalism.
      2. But in his belief in the power of reason and progress, he was thoroughly a product of the Enlightenment.
      3. The difference came in his definition of what constituted progress and reason.
      4. Marx devised a theory of history to explain the inevitable progress from capitalism to socialism as a result of economic transformation.
      5. Key to Marx’s scientific socialism was the certainty that history was moving according to the rational laws he had discovered and that revolution would occur inevitably when capitalism had reached its highest stage.
      6. By 1914, no socialist revolutions had occurred, however, and the socialist movement was at an impasse, waiting around for the right moment.
   C. Key to breaking this impasse was Lenin, who understood more than anyone else the failures of 19th-century Marxism.
1. Lenin shared all of Marx’s basic goals and his enemies.
2. But as a 20th-century thinker, Lenin was more skeptical about progress and the power of reason.
3. What he did, then, was to shift the emphasis from Marx’s theory of inevitability to a theory based on the force of will or action.
4. This apparently simple change made Marxism more fluid, more applicable to situations not envisioned by Marx, such as that in Russia.
5. Lenin knew that Russia was a weak, not an advanced industrial country, but he thought it was ready for revolution.
6. Thus, he proposed pushing the political revolution first and only later completing the economic transformation, reversing Marx’s order.
7. As a result of this new perspective, other differences followed.
8. Because the working class in a weakly industrialized country was small, the peasants would have to be incorporated.
9. For the same reason, the revolution would have to be made by a small group who knew where history was headed: the vanguard.

D. This shift in Marxist thought brought a new excitement to the movement, at the same time that its language of community attracted many who felt they had never benefited from liberal individualism.

Essential Reading:
V. I. Lenin, *State and Revolution*.

Supplementary Reading:

Questions to Consider:
1. Has the gap between the individual and the community ever been bridged in Western liberalism, in that people still seem to be willing to die more for the community than the individual?
2. Is the lack of community a fundamental weakness in liberal societies, or are people really motivated more by self-interest?
Lecture Eleven
The Rise of Fascism

Scope: In this lecture, we discuss the fascist platform, which is more difficult to define than communism, because it lacked the latter’s sophisticated body of theory. The various characteristics of fascism will be presented, from its goals (the creation of a dynamic, new national culture), to its powerful negations (its anti-communism and anti-liberalism), to its stylistic features (new techniques of mobilization and the cult of authority). Finally, the lecture addresses the issue of who joined this movement and offers some of the explanations of why it appeared at this particular moment in history.

Outline

I. As the previous lecture argued, fascism and communism spoke a similar language that appealed to many people in the interwar period. But while communism was a “makeover” of an older, established political movement, fascism was a complete newcomer on the scene. Furthermore, it had no coherent body of theory that defined exactly what it meant. Yet, during the interwar period, it became a powerful “third way,” in opposition to both communism and liberalism.

A. Because fascism lacked a coherent theory, it requires more effort to define what it stood for, and some scholars even argue that there is no generic phenomenon called fascism. The definition we will follow is the tripartite one laid out by Stanley Payne in his A History of Fascism.

B. Payne begins with what he calls the fascist goals and ideology.
   1. Fascism’s primary goal was the regeneration of the nation, and fascists adopted an extreme form of nationalism to achieve this.
   2. In Nazi Germany, this took the form of racism.
   3. Italian fascists defined their identity through their culture and history.
   4. Whether racist or not, ultra-nationalism was based on the belief in inherent superiority.
   5. Fascists also proposed a new economic system, neither communist nor capitalist, which would support the “little guy.”
   6. Payne includes the embrace of violence as one of their goals, thus making clear that violence was not simply a means to power but a value in and of itself.

C. Payne follows with what have been called the “fascist negations,” because it has always been easier to define what fascists were against than what they stood for.
   1. They were fundamentally anti-liberal, in the sense that the nation, not the individual, was the fundamental unit of society.
   2. For the same reason, they were anti-communist, given that communists proposed the union of all working classes across national boundaries.
   3. Finally, they were also anti-conservative, even though we usually identify fascism as a right-wing movement. Scholars have used such terms as the radical right to articulate the difference.
   4. Fascism departed from conservative tradition in that it was a mass movement, not an elite movement; fascism was contemptuous of upper-class values, attacking the church and the aristocratic hierarchical order.
   5. Although fascists claimed to preserve some traditional values, such as nation and family, they were willing to use radical and violent means to do so.

D. The last part of Payne’s definition of fascism refers to features of style and organization.
   1. What made fascism a new kind of movement went beyond its ideas to its new methods of mobilizing support. In many ways, the fascists were the first to take full advantage of the tools and resources of mass society to create a mass following.
   2. Techniques included the full use of mass media and public rituals, the exaltation of a single leader, and the embrace of militarism.
   3. Mass patriotic rallies and military demonstrations symbolized a union of people bound together in agreement.
E. The need for such an elaborate three-pronged definition comes from the fact that fascism overlapped with existing movements in certain aspects, and it is only through a holistic model that we can begin to capture the dynamism of such a vague and even incoherent movement.

II. Who were the people who responded to the fascist message of national rebirth?

A. Unlike supporters of communism, fascist followers were not drawn from a specific class but from various socioeconomic levels.
   1. Fascism drew from the lower middle classes, army veterans, students, small peasant farmers, the unemployed, and middle-class people dissatisfied with their opportunities in life.
   2. What joined them together was their disenchantment with their own lives and with the status quo, rather than a set of common interests.
   3. Fascism offered a transcendent purpose to people’s lives—they were offered a glorified sense of national purpose to replace their own dull existences. A sense of community was an important factor in fascism’s appeal.
   4. The appeal of extreme nationalism provided a language of mission for the marginalized.

B. Benito Mussolini, who founded the fascist movement in March of 1919, provides a good example of the kind of psychologically displaced person who would be drawn into the movement.
   1. After World War I, the veteran Mussolini struggled to put his life back together. He expressed disgust with both liberals and socialists and found himself marginalized by the prevailing liberal, but stagnant, political system in Italy.
   2. He turned to nationalism as a path to restoring national dignity.
   3. Thus, the fascist historical movement emerged out of a specific set of problems: of mass society, socialist revolution, and the liberal crisis, which came to a head with the end of the First World War.

Essential Reading:

Supplementary Reading:
Frank Snowden, *The Fascist Revolution in Tuscany*.

Questions to Consider:
1. Consider the fact that the fascist label has been loosely applied to all sorts of movements and regimes since the 1920s and 1930s, and scholars argue about whether it should be narrowly or broadly applied.
2. Did you find the complex definition of fascism a convincing way to understand the phenomenon, or a confusing attempt to make fascism into something more coherent than it was?
Lecture Twelve

Communist Revolution in Russia

Scope: The Russian Revolution provided the first opportunity for a communist movement to take power. This lecture analyzes why this happened. We look at the social and economic conditions of pre-1917 Russia that, compounded by the pressures of the war, favored a revolutionary situation. We then chart the course of the revolution itself and explore why the liberal democratic forces that took power after February 1917 succumbed to the Bolshevik Revolution of October 1917. Finally, the lecture addresses the symbolic meaning of the Russian Revolution for the rest of the world, both as shining example and worst nightmare.

Outline

I. In the next three lectures, we move from theory to practice. We have explained, to some degree, why workers all over Europe would be attracted to the new communist movement, but only in Russia did communism take power. This lecture addresses the question of why: partly because Bolshevik Russia will play such a crucial geopolitical role over the next 70 years and partly because the reasons that communism appealed in Russia reoccur in a slew of Third World revolutions, where communism and liberalism would face off.

A. Part of the answer lay in Lenin’s theoretical adaptation, which made Marxism more applicable to an undeveloped country, such as Russia.

B. But there were also historical reasons that communism seemed a more attractive alternative to the tsarist regime, for many Russians, than liberalism, at least in theory.
   1. Politically, Russia was still an autocracy, although the 1905 Revolution forced the tsar to sign a manifesto, agreeing to the basic liberal principles of constitutionalism.
   2. He created the Duma, but because it had no real powers, the country was left with the facade of liberal political institutions without the substance.
   3. Economically, Russia was a largely agrarian society, with 80 percent of its population peasants.
   4. Because of weak industrialization, the middle and working classes were both small and concentrated in a few major centers.
   5. Most of the social groups were unhappy and alienated, but there was no political group that could bring them all together.

C. Into this situation came the First World War, with its brutality and tremendous sacrifices, which undermined what support was left for the tsar.

II. Revolution began in February 1917, set off by women rioting about food shortages.

A. After the tsar abdicated on March 17, the Duma was reestablished and a provisional government took the reigns.

B. The provisional government was dominated by the middle classes and intellectuals and their program was classically liberal: universal suffrage, civil rights, a new constitution.

C. From the outset, however, the liberal government was disadvantaged by the social and economic conditions of the country.
   1. Because the middle classes were only a small proportion of the population, they did not represent a broad interest group.
   2. The majority peasant population desperately wanted land reform, which went beyond a basic liberal platform and even threatened the fundamental liberal principle of private property.
   3. Added to existing social problems was the continuation of the war, in which Russian soldiers were still dying in droves.

III. With all these problems, there was a clear space for an alternative, and it was the Bolsheviks that were able to fill it.

A. Bolshevik power after February 1917 was concentrated, not in the Duma, but in local soldiers’ and workers’ councils, or soviets, which had sprung up spontaneously after the revolution.

B. This situation came to be called dual power, or the coexistence of parallel authorities.
C. The soviets were controlled by socialists of various kinds, but all except the Bolsheviks were traditional Marxists who thought Russia was not ready for the socialist revolution.

D. Thus, the Bolsheviks were the only group with a plan for seizing power, based on the simple but powerful platform of immediate peace, land to the peasants, and food for the cities, as stated in Lenin’s “April Theses.”

E. With this platform, the Bolsheviks spoke more directly to the needs of the urban working classes, the peasants, and the soldiers, most of whom were from poor peasant families.

IV. The opportunity for the second revolution of October 1917 came with the growing polarization of forces and the eroding support for the provisional government.

A. Peasants were seizing their own land and soldiers were deserting the front, while on the other side of the spectrum, forces loyal to the tsar staged their own coup in July, which failed.

B. By October 1917, when the Bolsheviks staged the second revolution, they were rising against a political vacuum, not a functioning government.

C. However, October 1917 was planned, not spontaneous, as was February 1917.
   1. This fact led some Western historians to argue that the Bolsheviks took power only because they were willing to use force.
   2. Although it is true that the Bolsheviks’ “vanguard party” mentality gave them the discipline necessary to plan the seizure of power, the conspiracy theory ignored the widespread popularity of the Bolsheviks among people who wanted bread, land, and peace more than universal suffrage, civil rights, and a constitution.
   3. On the other hand, the Bolsheviks justified their minority coup by claiming to speak for the future working-class majority that would be created once Russia was fully industrialized. Through this logic, they could reject the basic liberal democratic principles of majority government.

V. The impact of the Bolshevik Revolution outside Russia was enormous. For workers around the world, it became the model to emulate, while the propertied classes were so terrified that the fear of Bolshevism would define liberal politics for the next generation.

Essential Reading:
V. I. Lenin, “April Theses.”

Supplementary Reading:
John Reed, Ten Days That Shook the World.

Questions to Consider:
1. Scholars still argue today about whether certain socioeconomic conditions, such as a strong middle class, need to be in place for liberal democracy to succeed. What do you think?

2. They also still debate whether the later totalitarian horrors of the Stalinist regime grew naturally out of the Bolshevik ideology, or whether there were other more democratic paths the regime could have taken. What position would you take in this debate?
Timeline

1903.............................. Establishment of the Ford Motor Company
February 1909 .................... Futurist Manifesto published in Paris
November 1910 ................... Mexican Revolution begins
1910................................. Japanese annexation of Korea
February 1912 ..................... Chinese emperor abdicates
June 28, 1914 ..................... Assassination of Archduke Ferdinand, heir to the Hungarian throne
August 4, 1914 ..................... World War I breaks out
September 1914 ................... Battle of the Marne
February–September 1916...... Ten-month Battle of Verdun, Germans against French
July 1916 ............................. Battle of the Somme, the British offensive, begins
February 1917 ..................... First Russian Revolution
October 1917 ....................... Bolshevist Revolution
November 1917 ................... Balfour Declaration
1917................................. Mexican Constitution is signed
1918................................. Dada Manifesto is published in Zurich
March 1918 ......................... Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which closed the eastern front when the Bolsheviks
sign a separate peace
November 11, 1918.............. Armistice
March 1919 ......................... Mussolini’s speech that launched the fascist movement
April 1919 ......................... Amritsar massacre
May 4, 1919 ....................... May 4th Movement, China
1919................................. Gandhi’s first satyagraha campaign in Ahmedabad
June 28, 1919 ..................... Paris peace settlement signed after four months of labor
1921................................. Mao helps found the Chinese Communist Party
1924................................. Surrealist Manifesto published in Paris
1924................................. Hitler writes Mein Kampf
1927................................. First national radio networks are established in the United States
October 1929 ..................... Crash of the New York stock market
1929................................. Ortega y Gasset publishes The Revolt of the Masses
1929................................. Stalin consolidates his dictatorship of the USSR and launches the First Five-Year Plan
1930................................. Gandhi’s Salt March (India)
1930................................. Freud publishes Civilization and Its Discontents
1931................................. Japan invades Manchuria
January 1933 ..................... Hitler is appointed chancellor in Germany
August 1934 ...................... Hitler inaugurates the Third Reich
October 1934 Long March begins
1934 Lazaro Cardenas is elected president of Mexico
March 1936 German troops march into the Rhineland
1937 Japanese occupation of Nanking, the official start of the Pacific war
September 1938 Munich Agreement, which gave Hitler parts of Czechoslovakia
September 1939 Hitler invades Poland, the start of the European war
1941 Japanese incursion into Southeast Asia
December 1941 Pearl Harbor, which leads to U.S. entry into the war
May 7, 1945 Germany surrenders, a week after Hitler’s suicide on April 30
August 6 and 9, 1945 Atom bombs are dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, ending the war in the Pacific
1947 Marshall Plan
1947 Indian and Pakistani Independence
May 14, 1948 State of Israel is declared and resisted in the first Arab-Israeli war
1949 Mao inaugurates the People’s Republic of China
1949 Indonesia wins independence
February 1950 McCarthy’s speech that unleashes the Red Scare
1954 Brown v. Board of Education, Supreme Court ruling on “separate but equal”
1954 CIA-backed force invades Guatemala
December 1955 Montgomery bus boycott, first major action of the civil rights movement
1955 The Bandung Conference of Ex-Colonial Nations
1956 Britain and France invade Egypt over the Suez Canal
1956 Khrushchev’s speech to the Communist Party Congress admitting Stalin’s mistakes
1957 Ghana becomes the first sub-Saharan African colony to win independence
1959 Cuban Revolution
1960 Nigerian independence
1962 Algerian independence
1963 Organization for African Unity is formed
1964 President Johnson announces the War on Poverty in the United States
1965 Military coup in Indonesia by General Suharto
1965 U.S. troops invade the Dominican Republic
1965 Civil Rights Act in the United States
January 1968 Tet offensive in Vietnam
1972 First International Conference on the Environment, Stockholm
1973 CIA-supported military coup in Chile
1973 Oil crisis
April 1976....................................... Portugal receives a new democratic constitution
April 1977....................................... Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo hold their first march in Argentina
December 1978............................... Spain adopts a democratic constitution
1979................................................ Iranian Revolution
1979................................................ China’s first new “economic zones” are established
1979................................................ Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua
1980................................................ Zimbabwe becomes the last African colony to gain its independence
1983................................................ Democratic elections in Argentina start a trend toward democratization in the region
April 1985....................................... Gorbachev’s speech to the Central Committee in which he declares a crisis in the USSR
1988................................................ USSR withdraws its troops from Eastern Europe
November 11, 1989 ....................... Berlin Wall comes down, beginning the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe over the next few months
1990................................................ Civil war breaks out in Yugoslavia
January 1993................................. Czechoslovakia splits into the Czech Republic and Slovakia
1994................................................ NAFTA and Chiapas
1994................................................ Multi-racial democratic elections in South Africa
1994................................................ Half a million Tutsis are massacred in Rwanda
1999................................................ Third democratic transition in Nigeria
1999................................................ UN bombs Kosovo to try to end the latest phase of the Yugoslav civil war
Pamela Radcliff, Ph.D.
Associate Professor, Department of History,
University of California, San Diego

Pamela Radcliff was born in Passaic, New Jersey, and grew up in Clifton, New Jersey, and Escondido, California. She received her B.A. in history, with membership in Phi Beta Kappa, from Scripps College, one of the five Claremont Colleges, then spent a couple of years traveling around the world before beginning graduate education at Columbia University. She studied modern European history at Columbia, where she received her M.A. and Ph.D. degrees, completed in 1990.

Since the conclusion of her graduate work, Professor Radcliff has been teaching at the University of California, San Diego, in the Department of History. She teaches undergraduate courses on 20th-century European history, modern Spanish history, the history of women and gender in modern Europe, and 20th-century world history. She has received two awards for undergraduate teaching, one granted by the university faculty and another by the students of her world history course.

Professor Radcliff’s historical research has focused on Spanish history in the 20th century, with particular emphasis on popular mobilization and the long-term struggle to establish a democratic system of government. She has published articles and books on these issues, including From Mobilization to Civil War: The Politics of Polarization in the Spanish City of Gijón, 1900–1937, which received the Sierra Book Award from the Western Association of Women’s Historians in 1998. She also co-edited (with Victoria Enders) a collection of articles on the history of women in modern Spain, Constructing Spanish Womanhood: Female Identity in Modern Spain. Her current book project focuses on the construction of democratic citizenship during the transition from an authoritarian to a democratic regime in Spain in the 1970s, and her latest article on this topic is “Citizens and Housewives: The Problem of Female Citizenship in Spain’s Transition to Democracy,” appearing in the fall 2002 issue of the Journal of Social History.

Professor Radcliff also served as an associate editor for the recent multivolume Encyclopedia of European Social History and belongs to a number of professional associations, including the American Historical Association and the Society for Spanish and Portuguese Historical Studies.

Professor Radcliff lives in Solana Beach, California, with her husband, Bill Perry, and their two children.
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Interpreting the 20th Century:
The Struggle Over Democracy

Scope:
The 20th century transformed the world in ways few could have imagined in 1900. Making sense of this transformation is the challenge of this 48-lecture course. Because one course could never provide a history of every corner of the globe, our focus will be on how the different regions and countries interacted with each other. It is through this interaction that we can discern the common themes that allow us to talk about the history of the world.

One of the key themes was precisely how the growing interaction between regions would operate. By 1900, the process of Western expansion and imperialism had created a level of global interdependence that would only get stronger as the century progressed. But the interdependent world order created by Western imperialism was a fundamentally hierarchical one, based on Western leadership or domination of the non-Western world. The 20th century was defined by the various efforts to transform this connection into a more democratic relationship between Western nations and the rest of the world, or between the developed and less developed regions of the northern and southern hemispheres. In the first two-thirds of the century, these efforts focused on the struggle for independence from colonialism, while in the latter part, Third World nations pursued the more complex search for prosperity and stability.

The struggle over democracy was also a key theme in the Western, or developed, world. Most Western nations had some form of representational political systems in 1914, but they were not democratic. Furthermore, the process of democratization was neither automatic nor harmonious. Until almost the end of the century, the democratic ideal had to compete with powerful challengers, especially fascism and communism. The fascist alternative was defeated with the Second World War, while the communist challenge lasted until 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet bloc. Parallel to these challenges, there were ongoing debates about the nature and practice of democracy that did not end in 1989. Although democracy emerged at the end of the century as the unquestioned political ideal, the parameters of a truly democratic world order are still vigorously contested. Thus, the struggle over democracy frames the end, as well the beginning, of the 20th century.

The first lecture in this course sets up the framework of struggle over liberal democracy and a broader set of ideas associated with it, what we will call the “Enlightenment project.” The remaining two lectures in Section 1 explain why this new era began in 1914 rather than 1900, with the outbreak of the First World War and the “crisis of meaning” it precipitated.

Section 2 explores in more detail this “crisis of meaning” of the interwar years, in which a generation of Western artists and intellectuals questioned all the certainties of the Enlightenment project and the cultural and social order in which they lived. Section 3 focuses on the political manifestation of the interwar crisis, in the form of alternative political ideologies and regimes that challenged liberal democracy’s claim to offer the best form of government and society. In Lectures Twelve through Fourteen, we will look at what these ideologies promised and why they attracted so many people; in Lectures Fifteen and Sixteen, we will focus on what happened to communism and fascism in power in the USSR and Germany.

Section 4 shifts the locus of struggle to the non-Western world, where the competition among liberal democracy, communism, and fascism took shape in the first serious anti-imperialist movements of the century. Each of the four case studies, China, India, Mexico, and Japan, illustrates a different kind of imperialist influence and a distinct path to national independence in the decades leading up to World War II. Section 5 analyzes the Second World War as a mid-century watershed that marked the culmination and defeat of the fascist challenge but also the end of an imperialist world order based on European domination. Section 6 explores the new world order that emerges out of the Second World War, one dominated by the clash between democratic and communist systems and by the stalemate, that is, the Cold War, between two new superpowers. In particular, we will look at the contested origins of the Cold War and its impact on American society and its democratic system.

Section 7 shifts again to the non-Western world, where the Cold War realignment helped set the stage for the process of decolonization. Although this process created dozens of independent nations, it also generated a new set of problems and challenges for the developing world, or what became known as the Third World. Through the use of case studies once again, these lectures will chart alternative paths to development and the successes and pitfalls of communist, liberal democratic, and mixed models. Section 8 looks at a series of challenges that undermined the
Cold War order, from Western-based social movements that questioned the democratic credentials of the “free world,” to Eastern-bloc dissidents who cast doubt on the socialist credentials of the USSR, to a new political movement based on religious fundamentalism that rejected many of the values on both sides. The section ends with a lecture on the demise of the Soviet bloc after 1989, which analyzes how and why the communist challenge finally collapsed. The final lectures of Section 9 will speculate on the post-Cold War world since 1989 and the prospects and challenges for a democratic world order in the 21st century.
Scope: Although fascist and communist theories set out very different goals, some scholars have argued that, in practice, they created similar totalitarian regimes. This lecture evaluates the concept of totalitarianism as one way of understanding a style of political organization that combined mass mobilization and dictatorial power in new ways. From this perspective, we examine the Nazi regime in Germany and how it was constructed through a mixture of widespread consent and terrorism. The Nazis were masters at using propaganda to win over the masses, but they also employed intimidation, mass arrests, and finally, mass murder to carry out an ambitious social transformation of German society.

Outline

I. We have already discussed how fascism and communism posed theoretical challenges to liberal democracy. The next two lectures examine the totalitarian style of rule as a practical challenge to majoritarian representative government.
   A. The common style of rule evolving in both Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia in the 1930s combined dictatorial power with broad mass participation in previously unthinkable ways.
      1. In contrast to more traditional authoritarianism, totalitarianism provided a way to mobilize the masses, to get them involved in politics, but without giving them any power.
      2. In contrast to liberalism, which seeks maximum power for the individual, the totalitarian state seeks to extinguish individual freedom by channeling individual energies into a single goal.
      3. Achieving such a goal would require, not simply control, but consent; that is, each individual must surrender his or her will to the dictatorial power.
      4. One of the best images of a perfect totalitarian state was given by Orwell in 1984.
      5. While such a perfect totalitarian state has never existed, only in the 20th century has such a project been even possible.
      6. Why is this the case? The mass society critics would argue that the homogenizing effects of mass culture and mass media created the conditions that made total control possible.
   B. Both Stalin and Hitler were master manipulators and used these tools effectively. One major difference, however, was that Stalin first had to create the economic and social conditions for modern mass society in undeveloped Russia.

II. Let’s look at the example of Nazi Germany and how Hitler and his men used totalitarian methods to build a racist, nationalist state.
   A. One of the most frightening aspects of the Nazis’ rise to power was that it involved not only violence and intimidation but also the consent or complicity of millions of Germans. It is this combination of coercion and consent that provided the framework for totalitarian mobilization.
      1. On the one hand, the Nazis were masters of mass propaganda.
      2. On the other hand, they used mass arrests, intimidation, and murder to silence opponents.
   B. If we turn to specific examples, the Nazi road to power was a delicate balance of legal electioneering and intimidation by paramilitary troops.
      1. Thus, in the last major elections, the combination of Hitler’s electrifying speeches, the mass rallies, and the meticulous grassroots organizing had made the Nazis the largest party in the Parliament, with 30 percent of the vote.
      2. At the same time, Hitler’s storm troopers were breaking up opponents’ political meetings, threatening candidates, and so on.
   C. After Hitler was appointed chancellor in January 1933, he consolidated power using the same mix of tactics that required mass acclamation, as well as force.
      1. Key to the process was the Enabling Law, passed in early 1933, in which an overwhelming majority of the German Parliament freely voted to transfer all power to the executive branch.
2. Also important were the Nazis’ successful efforts to have opposition parties outlawed or dissolved one by one, with the complicity of the remaining parties, which never realized that they were next.

D. Once power was consolidated, the Nazis could embark on their larger goal of transforming the nation.
   1. To carry out a major social revolution, millions of people had to change the way they lived, thought, and acted, which once again, required active mobilization—people had to be convinced.
   2. To reach those millions of people, the Nazis had to restructure social life so that it could be brought under state control.
   3. Part of this campaign was a process called Gleichshaltung, or “coordination,” which involved combining all clubs and voluntary associations into single Nazi-controlled organizations.
   4. Once again, this coordination process required that millions of members of bicycle clubs, women’s groups, professional associations, singing societies, and so on had to vote to join an umbrella Nazi organization.
   5. This reorganization of social life allowed the Nazis to deliver a single message to everyone. But it also meant that the government had asserted its right to take apart existing social relationships and put them together in a new way. This was the nightmare potential of mass society that the Frankfurt school was witnessing firsthand in the 1930s.

E. What was the goal of this reconstruction of society?
   1. What the Nazis sought was the creation of a racially pure German nation, as laid out in Hitler’s Mein Kampf.
   2. To do this, they needed to convince millions of Germans that their first loyalty was to the race and the nation, and Gleichshaltung helped to create a common mass culture based on the concept of a strong racial community.
   3. The flip side of creating racial loyalty was, of course, isolating outsiders. The “coordinated” associations were forced to expel Jewish members if they wanted to remain intact, which the majority agreed to do. This small step was actually a crucial part of the process of social isolation, of the attempt to break all social bonds between Germans and Jews.
   4. The Nazis tried to go even deeper into private relationships to create racial purity. Coercive measures included sterilization of “unfit” Germans, euthanasia, and of course, laws forbidding German and Jewish marriages. Consensual measures included incentives for “Aryan” women to bear more children and even plans for breeding camps.

F. The attempts to regulate sexual behavior tell us that the Nazis’ goal of transforming German society along racial lines required massive participation by ordinary Germans for it to succeed, as well as massive repression of those who were expected not to participate. Channeling the energies of millions of Germans toward a single goal was an essentially totalitarian project, and although it was not entirely successful, it illustrated the potential dangers of this new style of rule.

Essential Reading:
Michael Burleigh, The Third Reich: A New History.

Supplementary Reading:
George Orwell, 1984.
Moshe Lewin and Ian Kershaw, eds., Stalinism and Nazism: Dictatorships in Comparison.
Questions to Consider:

1. One of the most contested questions about the Nazi regime is how and why millions of Germans supported Hitler: Were they seduced, terrorized, or brainwashed, or did they simply agree with his fanatical racism?

2. Consider the fact that many studies of everyday life in Nazi Germany acknowledge the high degree of social and political control, but also argue that there was still space for individuals to live private lives as long as they did not actively oppose the regime.
Lecture Fourteen
The Totalitarian State? The Soviet Union

Scope: In this lecture, we apply the totalitarian framework to the Soviet Union under Stalin. Thus, we focus on Stalinism as a method of political organization that used a similar combination of consent and terror. Like the Nazis, Stalin and his party sought to mobilize all of society’s resources toward a single goal, in this case, the economic modernization of Russia, in both industrial and agricultural sectors. However, while the Nazis were master manipulators of the tools of mass society, Stalin and his party used consent and terror to create the conditions of mass society in an underdeveloped country. The lecture ends by considering the debate over the degree to which Stalinism was “applied communism” or “communism betrayed.”

Outline

I. The totalitarian framework affords an understanding of how the Soviet Union under Stalin operated as a massively repressive regime that used a combination of terror and consent similar to that of Nazism.
   A. One of the first questions to ask is why two regimes with such dissimilar goals used comparable methods of rule.
   B. Although their specific goals were distinct, they both shared the notion that individuals were important only insofar as they participated in broader collective goals.
   C. In both cases, the state defined those collective goals; thus, a theory is created in which individuals exist to serve the state, the exact reverse of the liberal idea that the state exists to serve the individual.
      1. While this does not mean that all collective goals lead to totalitarianism, in certain situations, such goals make it easier to justify the extinction of individual liberties.
      2. What is the relation, then, between goals and methods?

II. How did Stalin use totalitarian methods to pursue his vision of the communist revolution, a process that has been labeled Stalinization.
   A. Answering this question is more controversial than for Nazism, because not all scholars have agreed on the origins of the totalitarian project.
   B. Some scholars argue that totalitarianism was inherent from the moment of the October Revolution.
   C. Others argue that Stalin made certain choices, based on the conflicting legacy of the earlier period, so that Stalinization was neither a new departure nor a seamless continuity.
   D. Those who have argued that communism and totalitarianism are not the same thing, and that communism was betrayed, have focused on the ruptures between the period 1917–1923 (the First Revolution) and the period after Stalin consolidated his power, from 1927 to his death in 1953.
      1. The First Revolution was a period of experimentation, from which two different models emerged.
      2. The first, from 1918–1921, initiated a period of rapid and forced change, which required totalitarian methods.
      3. Between 1921 and 1924, the year of Lenin’s death, a new model was tried—the National Economic Policy (NEP)—in which the Bolsheviks tried gradual change, focusing on educating the masses to accept communism.
   E. Either way, everyone agrees that totalitarianism reached its peak under Stalin.

III. When Stalin consolidated his power, he initiated a new period of rapid transformation that required massive social and economic upheavals to achieve. During this period, called the Second Revolution, Stalin and his supporters demonstrated a willingness to sacrifice individual welfare to the greater collective cause to complete the transformation as rapidly as possible, no matter what the cost.
   A. What this massive transformation of society did, among other things, was create the conditions of a mass society that Stalin could then manipulate and channel into supporting his project.
B. Stalin and his supporters argued that the rapid transition to communism required completing the economic transition to socialism.

C. The first part of this process was to speed up the process of forced industrialization, owned and controlled by the state.

D. The second part of the process was to complete the transfer of ownership from private hands to the state, especially in the countryside, where peasants had taken land and were farming it. Instead of private farming, Stalin undertook a massive collectivization project.

E. To carry out these ambitious projects, Stalin justified an even greater concentration of power in his hands by effectively acting as though he alone embodied the communist revolution. The third pillar of Stalinism was, thus, a second political revolution, the so-called great purge of the mid-1930s, to turn the state and the Communist Party into the direct arm of Stalin himself.

IV. What were the results of these projects?

A. The rapidity of the USSR’s industrial transformation was unparalleled, but the result was a powerful state, not dramatically increased living standards.
   1. The Five-Year Plan set unreachable goals for industrial growth, then urged their completion within four years.
   2. Workers were made to feel that if they reached their goals, they were furthering the communist revolution, and if they failed, they were enemies of the state.
   3. The growth in industrial production was directed toward the needs of the state and concentrated largely in military technology and defense. The benefits of massive industrialization did not reach most people.

B. Likewise, the collectivization of agriculture entailed the most massive demographic shift the world had ever seen, but at the cost of millions of lives.
   1. In the process of rural reorganization, the old peasant communities were destroyed, and millions of independent peasants identified as “enemies” of the working class were left to starve.
   2. Stalin accused the independent peasants (kulaks) of hoarding and hiding food from the government. He organized collective farms, supervised by the state, and replaced the traditional village (mir) with soviet communes (kolkhozy), controlled by government officials.

C. In both transformations, the collective goals were achieved.
   1. By the end of the 1930s, 90 percent of the peasants left on the land worked and lived in these communes. Millions of other peasants were forced to emigrate to the cities after their land was taken from them.
   2. In 1920, only 15 percent of the Soviet population lived in cities, but by 1940, 55 percent of the population was urban.
   3. The human cost was staggering: Millions of people were displaced and millions died in the war against the so-called “class enemy.” An estimated 5 million kulaks died of hunger and disease.
   4. This was partly the result of the chaos of the transition. It was also partly because Stalin requisitioned more grain than the peasants had, then refused to supply food to them on the grounds that they were hoarding grain.
   5. Stalin managed to convince those living in the cities that the kulaks were sabotaging the revolution and that their suffering was justified in terms of the larger goal that he had impressed on them.
   6. The regime’s ability to whip up mass enthusiasm for the goal of building a socialist society at the same time that it ruthlessly expelled those who stood in its way, again, illustrates the totalitarian state in action.

D. The same calculus operated in the political revolution.
   1. Stalin sought to make the Bolshevik Party a more efficient and single-minded tool of revolution, but again, at the cost of millions of individuals imprisoned or executed.
   2. He purged the Communist Party of millions to create a homogenous tool that was completely submissive to his will.
3. The purges were legitimized through public trials in which officials signed confessions of their guilt.
4. By 1939, 1 million Party members had been exiled in labor camps or executed; by 1941, the labor camp population had reached 3.5 million.
5. At the same time, millions of old and new Party members collaborated and consented to become part of the Stalinist machine; once again, consent and coercion went hand in hand.

V. One of the most poignant expressions of the totalitarian extremes reached by the regime is Alexander Solzhenitsyn’s writings about the gulag prison camps. In *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*, life in the camps becomes an exaggerated version of the imposed conformity of life under Stalinism.

VI. One of the ironies of the Stalinist regime is that the totalitarian methods worked so well that the original goals of the revolution became lost and totalitarian power became the end in itself. Whether this was an inevitable outcome of communism or not, Stalinism certainly posed one of the greatest threats to democratic development in the 20th century.

**Essential Reading:**

**Supplementary Reading:**

**Questions to Consider:**
1. One of the hotly debated scholarly questions has been whether Stalinism was communism fulfilled or communism betrayed. What position would you take?
2. The scholarly debates are also interesting because they reveal how deeply politicized scholarly debates can be—do you think it is possible to take a position on this debate without carrying political assumptions into it?
Lecture Fifteen
China—The Legacy of Imperialism

Scope: The next group of lectures shifts from the internal crisis of the dominant European civilization to challenges launched from the non-Western world that questioned the West’s political and moral leadership. In each of the cases considered, non-Western nations struggled to define a path to independence that rejected the imperial hierarchy of nations as seen from the center of world power, even as the imperial legacy shaped each of these paths. This lecture begins with the Chinese case, focusing on the particularities of Western imperialism in China from the early 19th century and its impact in shaping the nationalist revolution that started in 1911.

Outline

I. Challenges launched from the non-Western world questioned the West’s political and moral leadership.
   A. In each of the cases considered, non-Western nations struggled to define a path to independence that rejected the imperial hierarchy of nations as seen from the center of world power, even as the imperial legacy shaped each of these paths.
      1. At the same time, each country pursued independence in a different way and sought to replace Western domination with varying political and economic structures.
      2. What we can isolate, then, are a variety of oppositional models that will set the parameters for Third World independence in the first half of the century.
   B. Why is this rejection of Western leadership significant?
      1. First, it signified the loss of Western prestige, which resulted from the war and, later, the Depression.
      2. Second, it implied that the West had nothing more to offer the world, that after a century of being the great creative force of human progress, it had now retreated to the defensive.
      3. Of course, the situation was not that simple. Even though colonies sought independence, they did so through the lens of their imperial experience. In simple terms, it was Western imperialism that created the 20th-century agenda for non-Western peoples.
      4. Moreover, it was Western political ideas, whether communism, democracy, or nationalism, that non-Western peoples looked to in order to empower themselves.

II. The first case study we will look at is China, which rebelled against the West both by asserting its national independence and by rejecting a liberal democratic system. As in Russia, the victory of communism over liberal democracy was the result of struggle, although in China, it took almost 40 years to come to a resolution. Once again, we will explore the reason for this outcome.
   A. Because the roots of Chinese nationalism lie in its imperialist experience, we have to go back in time to set the scene.
      1. China had been a strong unified state from the 13th through the 18th centuries and had considered itself the center of the civilized world.
      2. Until the 19th century, Western incursions into China had been limited and on China’s own terms, partly because there was no market for Western goods in China.
      3. What changed this limited trade relationship was the discovery of a product the Chinese would buy: opium.
      4. After 1815, British and American companies began smuggling in opium.
      5. When the Chinese government tried to suppress the trade, the British asked their government to protect their rights to free trade, which led to the Opium War of 1842.
      6. The result was the first in a series of “unequal treaties” signed with industrial powers, including France in the 1880s and Japan in the 1890s.
      7. The increasing role played by the foreign powers in Chinese affairs was demonstrated in the bloody Taiping Rebellion of the 1850s.
8. By 1900, China was divided up, through these treaties, into economic spheres of influence rather than formal colonies.

9. The reason these spheres did not evolve into colonies was because the United States pushed what it called the *Open Door policy* to preserve its access to Chinese markets.

B. What was the legacy of this imperial experience by the early 20th century?
   1. Despite no formal takeover, imperialism had undermined traditional authority so badly that the empire collapsed in 1911.
   2. First, it destroyed the Chinese sense of cultural superiority.
   3. Second, it undermined the political order by interfering with national sovereignty.

C. After China’s defeat to Japan in 1895, the Qing dynasty made a last effort to reform itself by partially adapting a Western model of state-building and modernization.
   1. However, the Qing was unequipped to for this challenge.
   2. Its inability to remake itself as a modern nationalist regime was exemplified by the Boxer Rebellion and its repression by foreign troops.

**Essential Reading:**

**Supplementary Reading:**
Christopher Hibbert, *The Dragon Wakes: China and the West, 1793–1911*.
James Polachek, *The Inner Opium War*.

**Questions to Consider:**
1. The issue of whether equally beneficial trade relationships can be established between industrial and non-industrial nations is still hotly contested today, as evidenced by the noisy World Trade Organization meetings. Do you think such relationships possible?

2. A minority of scholars have argued that Western imperialism was beneficial for colonial nations, in that it drew them into the international market and forced a degree of modernization, but the majority emphasize the negative impact. Do you agree with the majority opinion?
Lecture Sixteen
The Chinese Revolution

Scope: This lecture picks up the story in 1911, following the two major strands of Chinese nationalism, the liberal nationalists of Sun Yat Sen and the communists, led by Mao Tse Tung. In this lecture, we ask the fundamental question of why the revolutionary, or communist, version of nationalism won out over liberal nationalism. The lecture argues that the Communist Party was able to offer (in theory, at least) more convincing solutions to China’s two major problems—imperialism and land hunger. Although the liberal nationalists had a strong anti-imperialist rhetoric, they had little to offer the large, illiterate, and landless peasant population. In contrast, Mao led his party into adopting a peasant-centered program based on land redistribution and demonstrated anti-imperialist credentials through a successful guerilla war against the Japanese during World War II.

Outline

I. In 1911, the first revolution of the 20th century easily toppled the emperor, who resigned in February of 1912.
   A. The problem was that getting rid of the old regime was much easier than establishing a legitimate new authority.
      1. Soon after abdication, the country was plunged into more than a decade of political disorder, in which local warlords fought among one another and the central government barely existed.
      2. The two political forces that emerged out of this vacuum were the liberal nationalists and the communists.
      3. The next year began another set of civil wars between communists and nationalists that were not resolved until 1949.
   B. The nationalist alternative took shape during the first phase of the revolution in 1911 and was based on a Western liberal model.
      1. Its leader was Sun Yat Sen, who absorbed Western political ideas through his education in Hawaii and British Hong Kong. When he died in 1925, Chiang Kai-shek, a military officer, took his place.
      2. At the same time, like many colonialist intellectuals, Sun Yat Sen developed a fervent anti-Western nationalism. In his own account, it was the unequal treaty with France in the 1880s that was the turning point for him.
      3. His movement, the Guomindang (G.M.D.), was based on his three “principles of the people”: (1) democracy, (2) nationalism, and (3) economic independence.
   C. Although the movement was strongly nationalist, it also tended to reject Chinese tradition as a basis for national identity, because Chinese tradition, embodied in the emperor, had been humiliated by the West.
      1. This paradox created a complex nationalism that was both anti-Western and aping of Western values at the same time.
      2. This nationalist profile would occur elsewhere in the colonial world and distinguished Third World nationalism from European nationalism, which looked to a shared past to justify their nations.
      3. For ex-colonial nations, their shared past was a colonial one, in which traditional authorities had been defeated and de-legitimized by Western powers.
      4. Thus, the future nation required a new social order, a revolution not only against the foreign powers but against its own past.
   D. Who joined the G.M.D.?
      1. Sun Yat Sen was the prototypical nationalist, a member of the radicalized intelligentsia, often educated abroad and living in coastal cities open to external influences.
      2. Other than this small group, there was not a large constituency for the “three principles.” The business middle class was largely foreign and the traditional elites were landowners tied to a traditional agrarian economy.
3. As in Russia, the vast majority of the population was made up of poor peasants who were illiterate, isolated, and with no tradition of political participation.

4. For these peasants, the major problem was the unequal rural land distribution and the great power of the big landowners. While the nationalists offered democracy and national independence, the peasants wanted land.

5. With no land reform program, the nationalists basically ignored one of China’s two major problems.

E. In contrast, the communists shared the nationalists’ anti-Western nationalism but put land reform at the center of their program. Instead of aping Western liberalism, they aped Western communism, which created a nationalism that was revolutionary both in its desire to destroy the Chinese past and in its pursuit of social and economic revolution.

1. Because this communist program did not take shape immediately, we need to explain its evolution.

2. There was no separate communist movement until after the First World War.

3. The turning point came with news of the terms of the Paris peace treaty, which treated China like a colony, not an independent country.

4. Three days after the news hit, a massive anti-imperialist demonstration took place, known as the May 4th Movement.

5. One of the participants was a 26-year-old student with no political experience, whose name was Mao Tse Tung.

6. The “betrayal” of Western liberal democracies helped turn him and others against liberalism and the G.M.D.; by 1921, Mao helped to found the Chinese Communist Party (C.C.P.).

F. In this first phase, the C.C.P. had more weaknesses than strengths.

1. Its main strength was theoretical, because Marxist theory was able to link and explain China’s two problems of imperialism and rural poverty; that is, Lenin had formulated a theory that linked colonial poverty with capitalist exploitation.

2. Its main weakness was, as in Russia, the small size of the industrial working class, which was supposed to be the vanguard of the socialist revolution.

3. Although Lenin had accepted the involvement of peasants, the Russian Revolution was still led by workers in the major cities, with peasants playing a supporting role.

4. In the early 1920s, the C.C.P. was working with this same model, organizing students and workers in the cities.

5. But after a series of revolutionary uprisings in 1925–1926 staged by the C.C.P., the nationalists launched a war against it, crushing the small and isolated urban party.

II. After 1927, the C.C.P. was forced to adopt a new strategy that focused on the peasants if it wanted to survive.

A. One of the foremost supporters of this new strategy was the director of the peasant department of the Party after 1926, Mao Tse Tung.

B. Thus, in the years after 1927, the Party worked to establish rural strongholds based on a radical land redistribution program and local self-government institutions that brought peasants into politics for the first time.

C. By the early 1930s, the C.C.P. had established a dozen “Peoples’ Republics” in remote rural areas.

D. These rural experiments gave the communists a significant popular following but still wouldn’t have been enough to take power.

E. In 1934, the nationalists again defeated the communists, pushing them out of their stronghold and sending them on a retreating expedition that became known as the “Long March.”

F. After a year’s journey, in which 100,000 dwindled to 8,000, the communists settled in the northwest province of Yanan, apparently back to square one in organizational terms.

III. What shifted the balance of power once again was the Japanese invasion of China in 1937.

A. Although both communists and nationalists had strong anti-imperialist rhetoric, the C.C.P. organized more successful resistance against the Japanese and, thus, proved its anti-imperialist credentials.

B. The C.C.P. successfully employed guerilla tactics, while the nationalist regular armies were no match for the Japanese.
C. The C.C.P.’s resistance inspired a new wave of recruits, so that by the end of the war, the Red Army had ballooned to 1 million men.

D. By the end of the war, then, the C.C.P. had demonstrated that it had a plan to solve both of the country’s major problems, while the G.M.D. had lost much of its prestige. The victory of the C.C.P. in 1949 provided a powerful new model of revolutionary anti-imperialism, inspired by Western communism but adapted for use by poor agrarian countries, such as Cuba, Angola, or Vietnam.

Essential Reading:
Sun Yat-Sen, “Fundamentals of National Reconstruction.”
Jonathan Spence, The Search for Modern China, chapters 12–18, pp. 265–488.

Supplementary Reading:
Edgar Snow, Red Star over China, part 4, “Genesis of a Communist.”

Questions to Consider:
1. Knowing what we do about how repressive communist regimes turned out to be, what is the value of looking back and trying to understand why communism seemed like an attractive option to many people?

2. What are the strengths and weaknesses of a nationalism formed in opposition to imperialism, as opposed to claiming to build on a shared past?
Lecture Seventeen
India—The Legacy of Imperialism

Scope: In contrast to China’s revolutionary path, Indian nationalism took a different form. This lecture introduces the Indian model of nonviolent anti-imperialism and looks at how the imperialist experience and its legacy shaped India’s nationalist movement. It discusses the evolution and nature of British rule in India from the 18th century and its contradictory impact on the emergence of nationalism. Although colonialism had a negative economic impact, it also provided a common language, a unified administrative structure, and a Western-educated elite, which stood at the forefront of the independence movement.

Outline
I. India’s imperial experience was quite distinct from China’s.
   A. India was directly ruled by the British for about 200 years, the longest sustained relationship between an indigenous population and Europeans. (Spanish America was a longer colonial relationship, but much of the indigenous population died or intermarried.)
   B. Until the late 17th century, imperialist expansion in India looks similar to the Chinese case.
   C. Western traders had established posts, but a strong Indian state controlled the terms of trade.

II. What changed the picture was that the central Mughal Empire began to collapse after 1750, creating a vacuum of power that provided the opportunity for direct political intervention.
   A. The major actor until the mid-19th century was the East India Company.
      1. It expanded its influence through taking sides in local disputes between warring princes, on the condition that the prince would recognize the company as the “paramount power” in India.
      2. If the prince refused, in some cases, the company annexed the territory.
   B. By 1850, the British controlled virtually all of India, either through direct annexation or, indirectly, through agreements with princes.
   C. The last revolt of the old order was the Sepoy Rebellion in 1857, which symbolized the rejection of India to becoming British.
   D. The rebellion sparked the final dissolution of the East India Company in 1858, and India was made a formal possession of the Crown.

III. The British justified their rule by elaborating what became known as the “white man’s burden” argument: that they would bring superior Western culture to a backward continent.
   A. From the early 19th century, they established English schools and public administration and tried to convert the Indians to Christianity.
   B. Because of the duration of British occupation, India was one of the major testing grounds for a Westernization policy in the non-Western world.
   C. By the late 19th century, the British had lost confidence that they could turn Indians into British, but the attempt left an important legacy.

IV. What was the legacy of the imperialist experience in shaping Indian nationalism?
   A. The economic impact was similar to that seen in China, in the sense that imperialism did not help India establish a modern industrial economy.
   B. Scholars debate whether imperialism can be blamed for Indian poverty, which it did not create, but everyone agrees imperialism did not solve the problem.
   C. In fact, India was left less industrialized than before, because the import of cheap British textiles had destroyed what had been a thriving cloth-making industry in 1750.
D. Thus, India’s largest export in 1750 had been textiles, but in 1850, it was opium, grown in India for the China trade.

V. British imperialism had a more complex impact, however, than de-industrializing India. In some ways, it can be argued that imperialism created the contours of the Indian nation and gave Indians the tools with which to conceive of themselves as a nation.

A. First, it created a large Indian elite educated in Western values, and it was those British-educated elites who began to question why English political freedoms did not apply to them.
   1. Beyond creating the cohort of men who would become the leaders of Indian nationalism, the British Empire helped create the common ground for an Indian national identity.
   2. The British provided a common language in which these elites could communicate.
   3. They also provided a unified administrative and political unit, which had not existed before.
   4. Further, British racism helped create a bond between people of different castes or ethnic identities who had never considered themselves part of the same group, because they were all treated as part of the same inferior race.
   5. Finally, the British formed the common enemy that could unite Indians.

B. The best illustration of these tools is the first national conference, convoked—in English—by a group of Indian professionals in 1885.
   1. The agenda was not yet independence but greater access for Indian elites to the colonial administration.
   2. The conference led to the formation of a permanent organization, the Indian National Congress, which was dedicated to the reform of British rule.
   3. Although this organization was not pushing for independence, we should note its claim to speak for India as a whole, as well as the use of tools provided by the British—such as language, education, and the rhetoric of liberalism.

C. There was one nationalist tool, however, that did not come from the British.
   1. It was not Christianity, but traditional Indian religions, that mobilized the population against the British. Because conversion to Christianity generally failed, traditional religious identity became associated with resistance to British rule.
   2. The 19th century saw a cultural revival of Hinduism, with Indian writers, such as like the Nobel laureate Tagore, praising the superiority of Indian spirituality in the face of Western materialism. This cultural movement was not nationalist, but it provided a source of indigenous pride and identity that could be mobilized later on.
   3. Furthermore, religion was a form of identity that the millions of non-English-speaking, illiterate Indians could understand. As a result, it was the key to transforming Indian nationalism from an elite to a mass movement.

D. Why did Indian nationalists look to traditional religion, while in China, nationalists rejected Confucianism as part of the old imperial order? Perhaps in India, the British had become the old order, so that Indian tradition was not as linked with decay and failure as the Chinese Empire was by 1911.

VI. The upshot of this complex imperialist legacy is a nationalism quite different from the Chinese variety: on the one hand, infused with Western political values but on the other, with Indian spirituality. There is no one who better symbolizes the merging of these two characteristics than the lawyer and saint, Mohandas K. Gandhi.

Essential Reading:

Supplementary Reading:
Questions to Consider:
1. India was not the only colony in which the imperialist power created many of the structural preconditions for national unification—should we think of these as a positive legacy of imperialism, or is the issue more complicated?
2. Can you think of other reasons that might account for Indian nationalism’s embrace of religion and Chinese nationalism’s rejection of it?
Lecture Eighteen

India—The Road to Independence

Scope: In this lecture, we follow the nationalist movement from its origins in the late 19th century to independence in 1947. We discuss why the reformist Indian National Congress of 1885 turned to calls for independence after World War I and why Gandhi became the central figure in Indian nationalism after 1920. We explore his nationalist philosophy and his concept of satyagraha and how his influence shaped the direction of the movement. We end by considering the paradoxes of a nonviolent nationalist movement that climaxed in violence after the partition between India and Pakistan.

Outline

I. Now that we have established the context for Indian nationalism, we can talk about the development of the nationalist movement from 1885 to independence in 1947. There are several turning points that push the Indian National Congress from a reformist to an independence movement, all related to the sense that the British maintained a double standard in their colonial rule.

A. One of these turning points was the 1905 Partition of Bengal, which was carried out without any consultation with Bengalis.

B. The most important turning point was World War I. Indians fought in the British army but became increasingly unhappy with the sacrifices they were making.
   1. To quell anti-war sentiment, in 1917, the British took a fatal step: the promise of “progressive realization of responsible government in India.”
   2. After the war, however, the British showed no sign of following through and, in fact, seemed determined to suppress any political discussion in India.
   3. This was the context of the Amritsar massacre in April 1919.

II. In response to these developments, the Indian opposition moved toward nationalism in the postwar years. The crucial figure in this process was Gandhi.

A. A British-educated lawyer who had lived in South Africa for almost 20 years, Gandhi returned to India in 1915 and, by 1920, was the most important figure in what became known as the Indian freedom movement.

B. The reason Gandhi played such a crucial role was his ability to bridge the gap between the Western-educated elites and the illiterate masses.

C. He did this by mixing techniques derived from ancient Hindu teachings with a modern sense of nationalism based on liberal principles.

D. The consequences of this marriage of spiritualism and liberal nationalism were enormous.
   1. In schematic terms, it prevented a split between a populist and an elite nationalism, as had occurred in China.
   2. On the other hand, the price of unity was a more socially conservative nationalism, which relied on religion, rather than land reform or social or economic reform, to attract the peasant masses.
   3. Gandhi is a perfect example of this social conservatism. He preached respect for everyone but accepted the caste system and the vast economic inequalities of Indian society.
   4. The result was a very different kind of nationalism than in China.

III. Let’s look more closely at the foundations of Gandhi’s spiritual nationalism.

A. In a sense, Gandhi’s philosophy was exactly the opposite of Mao’s. For him, the political transformation of India had to begin with the spiritual transformation of the individual, while for Marxists, individuals could not be free until after the political revolution.

B. Gandhi argued that liberation came from within, that people had to respect themselves before demanding respect from others.

C. Thus, the freedom movement had to begin with what he called the preparation of the people.
D. Gandhi’s technique to prepare the people derived from Hinduism: satyagraha, literally, “the search for truth.”

E. The practice of satyagraha involved the readiness to suffer for one’s beliefs and the commitment not to hurt anyone in the pursuit of truth.

F. Thus, nonviolence was at the center of Gandhi’s philosophy.

G. Nonviolence did not mean passivity, but the willingness to accept punishment for acts of civil disobedience.

H. Satyagraha purified the souls of protesters, but it also was meant to touch the heart of the enemy, allowing him to see his own evil.

IV. How were these ideas put into practice?

A. Gandhi staged satyagraha campaigns that drew hundreds of thousands of people into a variety of nonviolent acts of protest, such as quitting government jobs, boycotting British goods and replacing them with Indian-made goods, closing shops, and not paying taxes.

B. Like Mao, then, Gandhi figured out how to politicize the illiterate masses in ways that liberalism could not.

C. The first satyagraha campaign took place during a mill strike in Ahmedabad in 1919.

D. The first nationwide satyagraha was called in 1920 after the Amritsar massacre.

E. The height of the campaigns was the 1930 Salt March, in which Gandhi led hundreds of thousands of Indians to illegally harvest salt and avoid paying taxes to the British government.

F. These campaigns were meant to do two things.
   1. First, to convince the British that it was not worth maintaining their evil rule.
   2. Second, to teach the Indians self-reliance.

G. Gandhi’s symbol of self-reliance was the spinning wheel, which symbolized India’s past (and, he hoped, future) economic independence.
   1. In 1921, Gandhi stopped wearing Western clothes and began wearing only white homespun peasant garb.
   2. He began to spend half an hour a day spinning thread for hand-woven cloth.

V. The impact of these campaigns was clearly crucial in getting the British to agree to negotiate independence with the Indian National Congress.

A. There was one major flaw in the Indian model, however. Using religion to “nationalize” the masses in a country with multiple religious traditions raised the danger of conflict and alienation of minority religions.

B. Gandhi himself preached tolerance, but distrust between religious groups overrode his message.

C. The tragic irony was that during the final stages of independence, it was religious violence instead of nonviolence that marked the establishment of the Indian nation.

Essential Reading:
Mohandas Gandhi, Autobiography.
Stanley Wolpert, A New History of India, chapters 17–22.

Supplementary Reading:
Judith Brown, Gandhi: Prisoner of Hope.

Questions to Consider:
I. The problematic relationship between religion and nationalism remains one of the significant political tensions in India today, as well as in numerous other countries, from Ireland to Israel to Bosnia. Are these conflicts inevitable?
2. Consider the fact that Gandhi’s philosophy of nonviolent protest has influenced other movements outside India, including Martin Luther King and the American civil rights movement.
Scope: Mexico provides yet another nationalist scenario: politically independent from Spanish rule since 1810, but subject, in the 19th century, to what has been called neo-colonialism, or a more informal relation of economic dependency with Britain and, later, the United States. This lecture explores the legacy of these two phases of imperialism and ends with a summary of the social, cultural, and economic problems that provoked a nationalist and social revolution after 1910, a century after formal independence.

Outline

I. In this lecture, we turn to the last of the great non-Western nationalist revolutions of the early 20th century. Mexico had been politically independent from Spanish rule since 1810, but subject, in the 19th century, to what has been called neo-colonialism.
   A. Latin America was, in a sense, the first region to experience this “dual” imperialism in the 19th century, but the sequence of formal empire followed by informal economic domination became a classic scenario in the later 20th century.
   B. The word invented to describe the formation of relations of economic domination and subordination that arise after formal independence is neo-colonialism.
   C. Thus, Latin America and, in particular, Mexico after the 1910 Revolution, was trying to confront the legacy of two different kinds of imperialism.

II. The particular legacy left by this “dual” imperialism prepared the ground for the Mexican Revolution that broke out in 1910.
   A. The legacy of Spanish colonialism was, in some ways, unique.
      1. Its 300-year duration was the longest colonial empire.
      2. In contrast to India, a significant number of Spaniards settled in Latin America, where they created a new class of elites.
      3. Through varieties of the plantation system used in the American south, this European elite established its domination based on race, ownership of land and resources, and control over indigenous labor through the hacienda system.
      4. Similar European immigration occurred in British North America, but the indigenous population was smaller, and most died or were pushed further west. This was also the case in some Latin American countries.
      5. However, in other countries, such as Peru and Mexico, the indigenous population remained as a permanent underclass.
      6. In other words, Spanish colonialism did not bring simply domination by foreigners but the imposition of a new social structure that would remain long after the foreigners had gone.
      7. In fact, the process of independence only cemented the colonial social structure, when the agrarian revolt of 1810 was suppressed.
      8. The result was a two-tiered social structure, of Spanish Creoles and Indian peasants, which is closely linked to status and poverty, that remains today.
   B. Furthermore, this two-tiered society made these countries vulnerable to the second stage of neo-colonialism.
      1. To resist the economic domination of powerful nations would have required a strong unified state, but such deeply divided societies could not find the glue to hold themselves together.
      2. Only 2 percent of the population owned all the land, and between 2 and 4 percent had the right to vote; thus, power was held on a very narrow base.
      3. In this situation, it was difficult to find the key to mobilize the masses and make them part of these new nations, to find some common patriotic themes to bind people together.
4. All of the Latin American regimes adopted versions of liberal constitutions, but as in other countries with deep social and economic divisions, this elitist liberalism had little appeal beyond the 2 to 4 percent.

5. The consequence was a set of weak nation-states, replete with military coups, political instability, and surly indigenous populations that were always being repressed.

6. These weak nation-states were, then, vulnerable to the neo-colonial dependence of the second stage of imperialism.

III. In the early 19th century, the Western powers began the familiar process of opening up Latin America to free trade, as was happening in China around the Opium War.

A. Britain was the first country to penetrate the Latin American market, flooding it with cheap industrial products and extracting raw materials.

B. The influence of foreign capital is exemplified in the construction of railway networks.

C. What made Latin America different from China, however, is the cooperation of Creole-governing elites, which partially explains why these countries were not absorbed into new colonial empires.

D. In the later 19th century, the United States replaced Britain as a major economic presence.

E. However, the relationship between European powers, the United States, and Latin America was not one of simple free trade.

F. Foreign intervention took different forms, from the American annexation of disputed Mexican territory in 1845 to the invasion of Mexico by European troops in 1861.

G. In 1904, U.S. President Teddy Roosevelt adds a corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, asserting the U.S.’ right to intervene in Latin America’s internal affairs in cases of “chronic wrongdoing.”

G. What did economic dependency look like in Mexico? Most of Mexico’s industries were owned by foreigners, and the country was already deeply in debt to American banks.

IV. By the early 20th century, then, the region faced its version of China’s land and imperialism problems. The first phase of imperialism had created its vastly unequal social structure and the land hunger of a majority of peasants, while the second phase of imperialism had created foreign economic domination.

A. In this context, the Mexican Revolution was the first serious attempt in Latin America to address both of these problems.

B. The process began in 1910 when Francisco Madero, an associate of President Porfirio Diaz, sounded the call for electoral reform and, then, revolution.

C. Diaz had run a corrupt regime that had alienated both popular and elite sectors of the population.

D. Thus, it took little to overthrow Diaz, who fled in May of 1912 after a few sporadic uprisings.

E. As with the Chinese Revolution, however, it took years of civil war and political struggle to resolve what began as the fairly painless overthrow of a hated regime.

F. Also as in China, there was no united opposition with a clear agenda.

G. Likewise, the divisions in Mexico were between elite and populist nationalists, who in rough terms, defended the interests of each of Mexico’s two tiers.

H. In contrast to China, however, the outcome was an attempt to compromise between the elite and populist vision of Mexico. In the next lecture, we’ll talk about the terms of this compromise and how well it worked in practice.

Essential Reading:

Supplementary Reading:
Mark Burkholder and Lyman Johnson, Colonial Latin America.
David Bushnell and Neil Macaulay, The Emergence of Latin America in the 19th Century.
Questions to Consider:

1. A different colonial legacy was created in such countries as Brazil, Cuba or the United States, which had small indigenous populations and where African slaves were imported as a labor force. How has this model created different kinds of social tensions?

2. Ironically, in both China and Mexico, the ease with which the old regime was overthrown was matched by the difficulty of establishing a replacement, while in India, a protracted transition process brought a fairly peaceful transfer of power. Are there general rules to be extracted from these cases?
Lecture Twenty
The Mexican Revolution and Its Consequences

Scope: As in China, the revolution in Mexico entailed a struggle for control between different nationalist visions, the liberal Constitutionalists and the populist Zapatistas and their supporters. This lecture defines the position of each faction and argues that the eventual settlement of the revolution was an attempt to compromise between the two visions of Mexico. While the compromise took shape in the 1917 constitution, it was only in the 1930s, under the Cardenas presidency, that it was at least partially implemented, thus marking the end of the revolutionary period. Although it falls beyond the chronological scope of this section, we will conclude by jumping forward to present-day Mexico, using NAFTA and the Chiapas rebellion to provide a long-term perspective on the outcome of the revolution.

Outline

I. This lecture looks more closely at the different visions of the Mexican Revolution and how the constitution of 1917 attempted to find a compromise between them. It follows the revolution into the 1930s, when Cardenas tried to implement some of the important terms of the constitution and, finally, briefly evaluates the status of the revolutionary compromise in present-day Mexico.

II. The brief unity that followed the ouster of Diaz was broken by the assassination of Francisco Madero in 1913, which unleashed an open struggle for power between groups representing the two tiers of Mexican society.

A. On the one hand were the Constitutionalists, under the leadership of a wealthy landowner, Venustiano Carranza.
   1. In general terms, this group represented elite interests, especially in the economically developed northern regions.
   2. Similar to Sun Yat Sen’s nationalists in China, they espoused a program that combined basic liberal principles with an anti-imperialist nationalism. In Mexico, this meant supporting the reduction of the American economic presence in favor of a local middle class.

B. The other side the main force was known as the Zapatistas, named after their peasant leader. Their strength was in the southern agrarian provinces, especially among poor Indian peasants.
   1. Zapata’s “Plan de Ayala” called for the expropriation of large farms, or haciendas, and their return to Indian communities.
   2. There were similarities between the Zapatistas and the Chinese communists, but the former justified their demands on traditional Indian rights, not the class struggle.
   3. At the movement’s peak in 1915, Zapata’s army included 70,000 peasants and their families.
   4. Clearly, this movement reflected the interests of the bottom tier of the society created by the Spanish Empire.

C. After several years of fighting, in which neither side was strong enough to defeat the other, each of the parties agreed at the end of 1916 to sit down at the negotiating table.
   1. Out of this negotiation process emerged the constitution of 1917, a model of compromise between the social and economic needs of workers and peasants and a basic liberal capitalist structure.
   2. Two important articles were the lynchpin of the compromise.
      3. First was Article 123, the most progressive piece of labor legislation passed in a liberal democratic constitution to date, which included such clauses as the right to strike, the right to a living wage, and the right of the government to take the workers’ side in disputes.
   4. Article 27 had an even more sweeping agenda of land reform by giving the government the right to expropriate agricultural property in pursuit of the public interest.
   5. These two articles defined a social order in which private property and capitalism were retained but limited by the parameters of social justice.

III. But the constitution still did not end the revolution; after it was signed, Carranza’s forces took power and
ignored the “social justice” side of the constitution for the next two decades.

A. Zapata continued to protest, but his voice was silenced by assassination in 1919.

B. Following Carranza, a series of landowner presidents, the “Northern Dynasty,” continued his policies.

IV. What changed this situation was the election in 1934 of a new president, Lazaro Cardenas, who came to power with the promise to apply the full terms of the revolutionary compromise.

A. Although Cardenas was in power for only six years, his administration did more than any government before or since to implement Articles 123 and 27. As a result, many people have looked at this period as the true culmination of the Mexican Revolution.

B. First, Cardenas undertook a massive land redistribution program.

C. Second, he attempted to give a political voice to the marginalized peasants and workers by giving them group representation in the official revolutionary party (renamed the Partido Revolucionario Institucional, or PRI, in 1946).

D. The idea of group representation, a version of political affirmative action, was to create a political system in which both tiers of society would have to be recognized.

E. This was not full democracy, of course, because all representation occurred in a single party, but it was considered a compromise between real democracy, which was thought to be unreachable, and the elite dictatorships that dominated most Latin American countries.

F. The last pillar of Cardenas’s program was the pursuit of greater economic independence from the United States.
   1. In 1938, Cardenas announced the expropriation of all foreign oil companies.
   2. The decision mobilized nationalist support in Mexico and created a furor among U.S. business interests.
   3. Once again, a compromise was reached, whereby Cardenas refused to reverse the expropriation of oil companies but promised that it would not establish a general precedent. He tried to set a path that kept Mexico in the capitalist world economy while carving out an independent role.

G. How successful in the long run was the compromise model of Mexican nationalism?
   1. Although Mexico’s record of political stability has been greater than that of any other Latin American country, the compromise hasn’t completely solved the major problems that the revolution set out to deal with.
   2. The two tiers of Mexican society reemerged in recent years in the competing images of Chiapas and NAFTA.
   3. NAFTA has been supported by the northern economic interests that want to make Mexico a full and equal partner in the global capitalist economy.
   4. The Chiapas Rebellion, which broke out on January 1, 1994, the day that NAFTA went into effect, has become the voice of poor southern peasants, many of them of Mayan descent.
   5. NAFTA and Chiapas represent the two sides of the revolution: its successes and unfulfilled promises.
   6. The tension between these two Mexicos perhaps contributed to the final collapse of the ruling party’s political monopoly in the last presidential election.

Essential Reading:
Emiliano Zapata, “Plan de Ayala” and “Agrarian Program.”

Supplementary Reading:
Neil Harvey, The Chiapas Rebellion.
Jan Bazant, A Concise History of Mexico from Hidalgo to Cardenas, 1805–1940.

Questions to Consider:
1. Considered in the context of the Chinese communist revolution, did the Mexican compromise represent a positive achievement or a hindrance to democratic development?

2. What kinds of political, social, and economic policies are necessary to bring the Mexico of Chiapas and NAFTA together?
Lecture Twenty-One
Japan—The Path to Modernization

Scope: In contrast to the three previous cases, Japan represents a nearly unique instance of a non-Western country that resisted Western imperialism and followed an independent path to economic and political modernization and empowerment. This lecture explores the preconditions and roots of this process. First, it examines the limited but important impact of imperialism in Japan in the mid-19th century; then, it analyzes the internal variables, from population size to geography, that laid the groundwork for the industrialization of the late 19th century. Finally, the lecture looks at the nature of the dramatic economic and political transformation of the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

Outline

I. Japan followed an independent path to economic and political modernization and empowerment in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. As with the other cases we have talked about, the story begins with the impact of imperialism in Japan.

A. To sum up the impact, we might argue that there was enough Western presence to get Japan’s attention but not enough to bring the country under Western control.
   1. Like the Chinese government, the governments of Japan had pursued a closed-door policy with the West in the early modern period.
   2. The first foothold came in 1853 when a U.S. warship arrived in Japan with the familiar demand that the country open itself to foreign trade.
   3. Japan, like China a decade earlier, was forced to sign a series of unequal treaties.

B. At this point, the similarities with China end, because this opening did not lead to Japan’s division into economic spheres of interest. Why not?
   1. First was the accident of timing: The outbreak of civil war in the United States distracted America from following up the 1853 challenge.
   2. Second, Japan realized the seriousness of the challenge, having watched the impact of the Opium War on China.
   3. The combination of a breathing space and the fact that the threat was taken seriously created an opportunity for Japan to modernize on its own steam.

C. But this is only half the story. Even with these external motives for Japan’s modernization, it wouldn’t have succeeded without the existence of certain economic, social, and political preconditions that put Japan in a better position to industrialize than China, India, or Mexico.
   1. First, in economic terms, by the time the United States arrived in 1853, Japan had already completed most of the stages of pre-industrial development that the West had undergone.
   2. These stages included the development of a commercialized market, agricultural surplus, and a large base of urban consumers.
   3. Socially, the population was fairly homogeneous, compact, and relatively literate. Thus, it didn’t have the extremes of wealth and poverty that created such problems in other countries.
   4. Finally, and in contrast to China, Japan had a strong tradition of cultural borrowing that made it easy to adopt Western techniques and ideas when the country wanted to modernize.
   5. In political terms, also unlike China, Japan was able to turn the humiliation of the unequal treaties into a constructive self-critique and reform of its political system.
   6. At first, 1853 opened a political crisis that culminated in civil war in the mid-1860s, between the feudal shogunate and its daimyo (feudal lords) and groups of samurai warriors who appealed to the emperor.
   7. The crisis was resolved with the so-called Meiji restoration in 1868, which carried out the kinds of political reforms the Ching dynasty never did.

II. Building on these favorable circumstances, Japan underwent a dramatic transformation between the 1860s and
the 1920s.

A. This transformation was designed partly with an eye to Western models, following Japan’s tradition of cultural borrowing, but never with a wholesale Westernization.
1. The first part of the transformation was the replacement of an essentially feudal regime with a modern, bureaucratized central state.
2. Following the lead of the European countries, the Japanese established a state that operated according to a uniform set of rules, instead of the feudal regime that operated according to a complex set of privileges and personal loyalties.
3. The new regime abolished fiefs, replaced the *daimyo*, or “feudal lords,” with a governor, and replaced local samurai armies with a national army.
4. It also issued a constitution and reorganized the bureaucracy.

B. This political modernization had important consequences for Japan’s economic modernization.
1. First, it created the basic conditions for secure private property, which encourages investment.
2. Second, in the Japanese case, the strong government played an active role in encouraging industrial development, through subsidies, incentives, and some state-owned industries, organized through the creation of a Ministry of Industry.

C. As a result of state promotion of industrialization, Japan’s economy underwent a rapid transformation, from an agrarian economy in the 1850s to an industrial economy that exported industrial goods and imported raw materials in 1914.
1. Japan, along with Germany in the late 19th century, had developed a new model of industrialization, based on cooperation between state and private enterprise.
2. In contrast, the first industrial power, England, had industrialized almost completely through the decentralized decisions of private entrepreneurs.
3. What second-wave industrializers, such as Japan and Germany, realized was that they would never catch up to the early industrializers if they relied on private business.
4. Thus, Japan and Germany pioneered what would become the classic *late-industrialization* model of development: a proactive government working with private capital.

D. There was also a dark side to this late-industrialization model. The flip side of promoting development was higher levels of repression and less tolerance for political pluralism.
1. In the service of more efficient modernization, the Japanese government did not follow the democratic expansion of liberalism that took place in the late 19th and early 20th centuries in Western Europe and the United States.
2. The precedent set by Germany and Japan was a model of modernization that followed liberal economic principles but was divorced from the growth of functioning democratic institutions.
3. What Japan demonstrated was that liberal democracy was not necessary to create a powerful capitalist economy, and this is a lesson that many developing nations followed in the 20th century.
4. With the similar lesson provided by Stalin and the USSR in the 1930s, combined with the impact of the Depression, this message was only strengthened.

**Essential Reading:**

**Supplementary Reading:**

**Questions to Consider:**
1. The nature of the links among industrialization, capitalism, and liberal democracy is still a matter for debate. Some insist that they are necessarily linked, while on the other extreme are those who see them as incompatible. Most would probably agree that they are contingently linked. What kinds of factors do you think affect this relationship?
2. The tensions between early and late industrializers still exist today, and many wonder if the classic model of English industrialization, based on private enterprise and a laissez-faire state, is still applicable today. What do you think?
Lecture Twenty-Two
Japan—a New Imperial Power

Scope: Japan’s new economic and political power allowed it to demand a very different relationship with the Western imperial countries. This lecture explains how Japan became the first non-Western country to compete directly with the Western powers in the imperial arena and charts its colonialist expansion in Asia from the late 19th century through the 1930s. We ask the fundamental question of why this imperialist expansion came into increasing conflict with the West, in particular the United States, leading eventually, to Pearl Harbor and the outbreak of the Second World War in the Pacific.

Outline

I. The first step on Japan’s road to world power was to transform its relationship with the West.
   A. From the unequal treaties of 1853, Japan became the first non-Western nation to conclude a military alliance with a Western nation—Britain—in 1902.
   B. Then, in 1905, it became the first “non-white” nation to win a major military victory over a “white” nation in the Russo-Japanese war.
   C. Finally, during World War I, Japan joined the side of the Allies and was included as a major partner in the treaty talks.
   D. As the rest of the non-Western world fumed at being left out of the talks, Japan had moved into the privileged camp.
   E. Japan’s transformation into a great power was further advanced by its pursuit of the same path of foreign expansion established by the West since the 16th century.
      1. The logic of this expansion was partly rooted in the general model of capitalist development followed in Europe, in which the search for bigger markets was pursued at least partly through colonialism. In other words, in Europe, imperialism was seen at the time as a normal route to economic expansion.
      2. But there were also indigenous reasons that explain why Japan’s economic expansion became imperialist.
      3. First, it was a small island with a small population. Thus, like England, it was highly dependent on foreign markets.
      4. Second, and unlike England, Japan had few of the natural resources necessary to industrial production, making it dependent on foreign suppliers of raw materials.
      5. The need to protect foreign markets, then, became one of the cornerstones of Japan’s foreign policy, and in the age of empire, protecting markets often meant imperialism.
   F. Through this logic of expansion, Japan began to move into East Asia.
      1. In 1895, Japan forced China out of Taiwan.
      2. In 1905, with the defeat of Russia, Japan gained economic interests in Manchuria.
      3. In 1910, Korea was annexed, again on the pretext of protecting economic interests.
      4. After World War I, the peace settlement granted Japan economic rights over former German “spheres of influence” in China.
      5. By the 1920s, Japan’s economic system was closely linked with empire, and in particular, China had become a major supplier of natural resources.
   G. So far, Japan was doing nothing more than following the pattern set by Western imperialist countries. Why, then, did it end up on a collision course with the West?
      1. Increasingly, Japan refused to play by the imperialist rules set up by the West, especially the Open Door policy in China.
      2. The question of why Japan followed this aggressive path is obviously an important one, because it led to Pearl Harbor and the Pacific war.
3. If we look back to Japan in the 1920s, it had two choices in pursuing an imperialist policy: It could have followed the Western rules and remained a secondary player, or it could strike out on its own by declaring a kind of “Asian Monroe Doctrine,” asserting its rights to dominant power in the region.

4. Before the Depression, Japanese foreign policy wavered between these two visions, but in the 1930s, it committed to the second path.

II. Why did Japan commit to this more aggressive path in the 1930s?

A. In some ways, it was pushed in this direction by the Western imperialist powers, especially the United States.
   1. Historians have argued that when the Depression hit, the United States began to feel threatened by Japan’s domination in the Pacific and undertook a policy to undermine its power.
   2. Thus, the United States put limits on the sale of strategic items to Japan, from oil to metal, and convinced its allies to join it.
   3. Because Japan was completely dependent on foreign imports of raw materials, this put the Japanese economy in a difficult position.

B. But there were also internal factors that help explain the aggressive foreign policy.
   1. The militant nationalism of the 1930s was also a response to the broader devastation of the Depression, similar to the appeal of Nazism in Germany.
   2. The West became a convenient scapegoat for economic disaster.
   3. Economic panic was funneled into a militant anti-Western nationalism.
   4. Ultra-nationalist ideals took root in the 1920s in the writings of Kita Ikki and in groups of young army officers, while in the 1930s, these ideals were more widely supported by generals, politicians, and the public.
   5. Whether or not we can define this situation as “fascist” is a matter of historical debate.

III. Within this framework of aggressive nationalism, whether fascist or not, we can trace the road to Pearl Harbor.

A. In 1931, Japan invaded and conquered Manchuria, then withdrew from the League of Nations when it protested.

B. In 1937, the Japanese army conquered Nanking in a brutal siege that became known as the Rape of Nanking.

C. Japan had been increasing its incursions into China since 1931, but 1937 marked a major turning point, when Japan’s intention to dismantle the Chinese state became clear.

D. By March of 1940, Japan had set up a puppet government in Peking.

E. In July, the Japanese government outlined a more ambitious policy of regional domination, what would later be called the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.”

F. Under the guise of helping other East Asian peoples gain independence from Western rule, Japan set out the parameters of a new imperialist order: an anti-imperialist imperialism. The pamphlet “The Way of Subjects,” written by the Japanese Ministry of Education, makes this mission clear.

G. Following this plan, in late 1940, Japan moved into French Indochina and the Dutch East Indies, which had been occupied by the summer of 1941.

H. The United States responded with an oil embargo, which cut off 85 percent of Japan’s oil imports.

I. During the last months of 1941, the United States and Japan engaged in negotiations, but neither country would give up its primary demand: the Open Door policy on one side and the right to expand into China on the other.

J. The stalemate was resolved on December 1, 1941, when the decision was made to declare war on the United States, turning a regional war into the Pacific theatre of the World War.

K. The origins of the Pacific war thus emerge out of a contradictory set of long- and short-term causes: the paradox of imperialist anti-imperialism.
Essential Reading:


Supplementary Reading:


Questions to Consider:

1. Does the paradox of *anti-imperialist imperialism* make sense as a way to describe Japanese foreign policy?

2. Scholars are divided about whether the term *fascism* applies to the Japanese ultra-nationalist movement of the 1930s. Do you think it applies?
Lecture Twenty-Three
The Pacific War

Scope: Like the First World War, the Second World War was one of the major breakpoints of the century. It marked the culmination of the interwar crisis and the defeat of fascism but also served as the final nail in the coffin of a declining 19th-century world order. This lecture focuses on the Pacific war, as it evolved from a regional to a global conflict with the bombing of Pearl Harbor, and charts the course of the war from December 1941 to Hiroshima and Nagasaki. While the Pacific war was partly an extension of the struggle against fascism, it was also a battle over the imperialist world order, which meant that race was a fundamental element. We will conclude with a discussion of the role of race in defining the war, as exemplified both in Japan’s occupation policies in Asia and in the internment of Japanese-Americans in the United States.

Outline

I. After December 1941, the regional war in Asia became absorbed into another global war.
   A. Like the First World War, the Second World War was one of the major breakpoints of the century.
   B. The war marked the culmination of the interwar crisis and the defeat of fascism but also served as the final nail in the coffin of a declining 19th-century world order.
   C. The incorporation of the Asian theater expanded the scope of the war to include every continent except Latin America.
   D. The war marked a breakpoint in another way. Like the First World War, it represented a new level of “total war,” but this time, it was the extension of war into the civilian population that was the innovation.

II. How did the two theaters of the war become linked into a single global phenomenon?
   A. With the bombing of Pearl Harbor and the German declaration of war on the United States, also in December 1941, the wars became linked, largely through the involvement of America in a two-front war.
   B. At this point, the United States linked the wars ideologically, as well, with the declaration that the war was being fought to defend democracy against “totalitarian aggression,” in the words of Roosevelt.
   C. Even after the wars became linked, they still played out a different set of dynamics, which is why it makes sense to treat each theater separately.
   D. Thus, although the war in Europe represented a culmination of the internal challenge to democracy that was mounted by fascist regimes, the war in Asia was as much about redefining the problematic relationship between the Western and non-Western worlds. This is not to deny that Japanese imperialism was anti-democratic, but to recognize that its expansion exchanged one form of imperialism for another.

III. At the heart of the problematic relationship between the West and the non-Western world were ideas about race that made it difficult for Western states to conceive of equal relationships with non-white peoples.
   A. Thus, one of the subtexts of the war in the Pacific was that Japan was a non-white power and that its aggression was threatening not only Chinese independence but also Western racial prestige.
      1. A variety of sources point to the racialization of the Japanese enemy, from cartoons depicting the Japanese as apes to the comments of Western officials.
      2. Significantly, propaganda about the war in Europe tended to focus on Hitler and Mussolini, rather than on the German or Italian people.
   B. One of the major consequences of this racialization of the Japanese enemy was the internment policy of the U.S. and Canadian governments, which rounded up 140,000 Japanese Canadians and Americans.
      1. In the United States, the Japanese were evacuated from the West Coast and relocated to isolated camps.
      2. It is important to emphasize that these camps were in no way equivalent to those of the Nazis or to the Japanese treatment of their enemies.
3. The point of juxtaposing these racial policies is not to equate their impact but simply to acknowledge the common racialized assumptions they shared.

4. No attempt was made to identify actual traitors, which means that race was the only qualification for internment, even for the two-thirds of those in the camps who had been born in the United States.

5. A few Italian and German Americans were interned, but this action was taken on the basis of political evaluations, not racial identity.

C. However, the racialization of the war was not confined to the Western powers.

1. In Japan, the ultra-nationalist reaction to Western racism had been the assertion of a different racial hierarchy, with Japan at the top.

2. Although there was not the same developed racial theory that existed in Nazi Germany, Japan’s brutal treatment of other Asian peoples provided evidence for an implicit hierarchy.

3. The irony was that, in the guise of “liberating” Asian peoples from Western imperialism, Japan imposed an even more brutal form of domination.

4. After decades of denial and suppression, the string of revelations about slave labor, forced prostitution, and even biological experiments against Chinese, Koreans and Indonesians leaves no doubt that racism was fundamental to the Japanese world order.

5. The point is that on one level, the war in the Pacific can be seen as a battle for racial domination in Asia. The West had justified its imperialism in racial terms, and Japan defined its own imperialist response in similarly racial terms.

6. Thus, the war brought the contradictions between the Enlightenment project and Western racism to a head.

IV. On another level, of course, the war became a struggle for domination between two different kinds of military powers.

A. Japan’s strength, like Germany’s, lay in a highly militarized society that was prepared for an immediate frontal assault.

B. To take advantage of its strengths, the Japanese army planned a blinding series of initial attacks that were meant to demoralize the United States and force it to the negotiating table before its greater long-term resources could be mobilized.

C. At first, the strategy worked well. The Japanese army built a defense perimeter that ran from the Aleutian Islands to Indonesia, all by the spring of 1942; the army then dug in for the American counterattack.

D. But by the summer of 1942, the tide was turning with the Battle of Midway, the first major U.S. battle.

E. This battle began the U.S. counteroffensive, which chipped slowly away at the perimeter, moving from island to island.

F. By the summer of 1944, the United States was close enough to the mainland to begin bombing raids, which culminated with the firebombing of Tokyo in March 1945.

G. It was clear by this time that the Japanese could not win the war, but they refused to surrender; it was at this point that the United States made the choice to use a new weapon recently developed: the atom bomb.

H. The first bomb was dropped on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, and the second, on Nagasaki three days later.

1. The number of civilian casualties was already high, but the destructive capacity of the bomb was unprecedented.

2. At the time, few Americans had a full picture of this capacity, and most supported the decision and Truman’s justification of saving American lives.

3. In later years, however, the decision has become, perhaps, the most controversial act of the American government and has spawned broad debates based on military and moral criteria.
I. Whichever position one takes about the bombs, they ended the war and, thus, the threat of non-Western world order. Ironically, as brutal as Japan’s own occupation of its Asian neighbors was, the war unleashed a new era of national liberation that could not be reversed. In this sense, Japan’s anti-imperialist imperialism had been more successful than anyone realized in 1945, even when the country had been brought to its knees.

Essential Reading:
John Dower, *War without Mercy.*

Supplementary Reading:
Ronald Spector, *Eagle against the Sun.*

Questions to Consider:
1. Why do you think the debate over the atom bomb has remained such a live issue, decades after the event?
2. Viewing the war in the Pacific from the perspective of race is likely to provoke different personal reactions about an event that plays an important role in American history—what do you think?
Lecture Twenty-Four
The European War

Scope: This lecture turns to the European theater of the war and represents it as a showdown between competing visions of a Western world order, the liberal democratic and the fascist. It follows the course of the war from the invasion of Poland in 1939 to its end in 1945 and analyzes why Germany and its allies lost. The second part of the lecture focuses on the outlines of an emerging fascist world order as they took shape in German occupation policies, which included forced labor, the expropriation of land and its resettlement by Germans, and the deliberate neglect of occupied populations. Although these policies were not always consistent or coordinated, they served as an indication of the scope of Nazi ambitions for a new world order based on nationalist and racist hierarchies.

Outline

I. As in the Pacific, the Second World War in Europe had its origins in a regional conflict that took on broader dimensions after war broke out.
   A. In both the Pacific and European wars, conflict was rooted in the emergence of a powerful nation that refused to play by the rules of the game in the existing European world order.
      1. In this lecture, we will talk about the origins of the war and why the fascist powers lost.
      2. We will also look at the outlines of a fascist world order and its implications.
   B. While the Pacific war symbolized a direct challenge to the Western imperial order from the periphery of power, the European war symbolized a direct challenge against the political order from the center of Europe. It was the culmination of the growing tension between fascism and liberalism, which would decide the political future of the region.
   C. The main protagonist of the challenge was Hitler, who began to pursue a more aggressive foreign policy, especially after 1936.
      1. Germany withdrew from the League of Nations in 1933, but most of Hitler’s energy in the first few years was devoted to the domestic Nazi revolution.
      2. In preparation for the turn toward foreign policy, Hitler announced the rebuilding of the German armed forces in 1935, in direct violation of the Versailles treaty.
      3. Then, in March 1936, German troops reentered the Rhineland, which had been set up as a buffer zone with France after World War I.
      4. There has been much debate about whether this was the “lost opportunity” to stop Hitler or whether resistance would simply have hastened war.
      5. Although the acts of 1935–1936 broke the Versailles treaty, it was only in 1938 that Hitler began to expand beyond Germany’s existing borders.
      6. Thus, in March 1938, German troops marched into Austria and announced its unification with Germany: the Anschluss.
      7. In September came the famous Munich Agreement, in which the Western powers agreed to the transfer of Czechoslovak Sudetenland to Germany.
      8. The “appeasement” policy failed to avoid war and has been the object of heated criticism, but it also reflected the mainstream of European sentiment at the time.

II. Up to this point, German expansion had been accomplished without war, but this changed with the invasion of Poland in September 1939.
   A. Hitler’s demands were similar to earlier ones, focused on the annexation of territories with large ethnic German populations.
      1. What changed was that the Allied powers decided to commit themselves to fighting continued German expansion.
      2. After French and British declarations that they would defend Poland, Germany declared its readiness to fight for expansion by sending in troops.
B. Once it was clear that a European war had begun, Hitler pursued a war plan similar to that of the Japanese in Asia: that is, to launch a lightening attack, a blitzkrieg, that would force its enemies to their knees before they had time to launch a counterattack.

1. This was similar to the German plan in World War I, with one important difference: the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 saved Germany from a “two-front” war.
2. As in Asia, the blitzkrieg worked brilliantly at first, because no other army had the kind of stockpiled military machine ready to strike.
3. By July 1940, the only major enemy left was Britain, and that summer Britain was subject to a fierce aerial bombardment, the Battle of Britain, that Hitler expected would lead to surrender.

C. Why did Hitler’s war fail? Was this a pure military defeat or the defeat of fascism?

1. As in the Pacific, military factors played a major role.
2. Over the long run, especially after the American and Soviet entry into the war, the balance of resources shifted dramatically.
3. The Germans, like the Japanese in their island bases, were stretched thinly over a huge territory that required massive supply operations.
4. In military terms, then, early dramatic successes were slowly reversed by attacking overextended German armies and pushing them back.
5. The key theater for German military defeat was the Soviet Union, which absorbed 80 percent of all Allied casualties.

D. Beyond military factors, however, Hitler’s war plan was defeated by his own ideologically motivated decisions.

1. Increasingly, important military decisions were based on his revolutionary vision of a new racial world order.
2. The biggest mistake on a military level was the invasion of the USSR in July of 1941, which was part of Hitler’s plan to settle ethnic Germans in the rich farmland of the Ukraine.
3. Another policy that made no military—or, of course, moral—sense was the genocidal campaign against the Jews, which increasingly diverted resources from the war effort.
4. The combination of military and ideological disadvantages made victory in the long run unlikely, although this was not at all clear as late as 1942.

III. If the Nazis had won the war, what kind of alternative world order would they have imposed?

A. We can infer the outlines of a fascist world order in the policies adopted in German-occupied territory, which covered most of continental Europe, but particularly in the East, where Slavic peoples were considered inferior.

1. Occupation policies had three basic components, linked by Nazi ideas of racial hierarchy.
2. The first was the conscription of slave labor.
3. The second was the extraction of everything possible from the economy at the expense of the local population.
4. Finally, the lynchpin of occupation policy in the East was Lebensraum, or the expropriation of land and its resettlement with ethnic German farmers.
5. Grander visions of a German-led “Aryan” civilization dominating the world’s inferior races were articulated by Nazi officials.

B. It’s important to see the broad scope of Hitler’s new order, because only then can we see how it challenged the existing liberal, imperialist world order.

1. Hitler didn’t challenge the view that the West should rule the world, and even the idea of a racial hierarchy was not an innovation.
2. What was new was the brutality of domination, in which lower races were not only inferior but had no independent right to exist.
3. Furthermore, that racial hierarchy was brutally imposed at home in Europe, not on the other side of the world.
4. It is in this larger context that we can talk about the extermination of the Jews, not as a way of minimizing it, but of understanding how it was part of a larger plan to reorder Europe and the world along racial lines.

5. Although Europeans confronting this brutal racial world order did not save the Jews, Hitler’s vision discredited the formal racist assumptions on which Europeans had justified colonial rule.

**Essential Reading:**

**Supplementary Reading:**
Richard Overy, *Why the Allies Won*.

**Questions to Consider:**
1. After the 1930s, “appeasement” became a discredited concept in world affairs. While it clearly failed to stop Hitler, some historians have argued that this case should not be used to establish a general rule, given its special characteristics. What do you think?

2. Would you emphasize the similarities or the differences between Hitler’s world order and the European imperialist world order it sought to replace?
Glossary

Civil society: This concept has been used in recent debates about the conditions that favor transitions to democracy. It defines the independent space between private family life and the state, where citizens interact with each other and form associations that can pressure the state to make changes in public policy.

Cold War: Situation of permanent tension between two superpowers, defined by the existence of nuclear weapons and the clash of opposing world missions.

Command economy: In the socialist states, the government dictated what products were made and how many were produced by setting quotas and fixing prices, rather than by allowing the market to determine these things.

Communism: Although this term was used in the 19th century to denote egalitarian communitarianism, in the 20th century, it was used to identify the political movement that emerged from the Russian Revolution and divided the European left into socialist and communist parties. The ideological distinction was not entirely clear at the outset, given that both parties pursued an eventual transformation to an egalitarian society, but by the post-World War II period, socialist parties had fully integrated into democratic parliamentary systems, while communist parties adhered to the Soviet model.

Dada: Nonsense word adopted to define an art movement; its basic principle was to tear down the false facade of rational order and expose the irrationality beneath. Its manifesto was written in 1917 by Tristan Tzara.

Democracy: On a basic level, democracy represents the “rule of all,” but in practice, not everyone agrees as to what that means. Liberal democracy has tended to mean that all individuals in society have the same political rights, while social democracy includes social rights, as well.

Enlightenment project: Set of principles linked by the conviction that the social, political, and economic order should be organized around the rational individual.

Existentialism: Philosophy that emphasizes the responsibility of each individual to create meaning for his or her own life, often summed up as “existence precedes essence.”

Fascism: New political movement that emerged after World War I; scholars disagree on how to define it. It was a revolutionary movement that sought to replace liberalism and prevent communism, and it adopted a number of new mass mobilizing techniques that helped transform mass politics. Between 1919 and 1945, it threatened the liberal democratic order in Europe.

Feminism: Movement aiming to empower women; it can be defined narrowly as the particular brand of equal-rights feminism that has fought for women’s equal treatment in liberal democratic societies. Alternatively, it can be defined broadly as any movement, whatever it calls itself, that organizes women for the sake of improving their status and condition in life.

Futurism: One of the avant-garde artistic movements of the post-war period, although the manifesto was written in 1909 by F. T. Marinetti, who later became involved in the Italian fascist movement.

Gender crisis: This term describes the loss of certainty about the prescribed roles for men and women in society or its gender system.

Glasnost: The other key concept in Gorbachev’s plan to reform socialism. Literally “openness,” it signified the decentralization of power structures and the lifting of deadening bureaucratic controls.

Gleichshaltung: In German, this word means “coordination,” and it describes the process by which all independent associations and groups were to be brought under the direct supervision of the Nazi regime.

Globalization: In simple terms, globalization describes the expanding nature and impact of interaction across national borders, whether through trade, cultural exchange, or other types of political and social relationships. Scholars disagree about whether this is a good or a bad thing in the form it is following, and some even reject the term itself.

Global village: Term coined to describe the consequences of global interdependence at the end of the 20th century, in which peoples’ destinies are as intertwined as if they lived in the same village.
**Green Revolution:** In the 1960s, the development of new strains of wheat and fertilizers dramatically increased agricultural productivity and allowed, on a global level, the food supply to keep pace with population growth up to the 1990s.

**Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle:** In scientific terms, Heisenberg argued that because it is impossible to measure the location of an object without distorting its speed and vice versa, it is impossible to know the exact location of a particle in motion. For postwar non-scientific culture, this idea reinforced a new skepticism about objective truth.

**Imperialism:** System of relationships of domination that is based on the establishment of formal colonial empires. Scholars have debated whether imperialism was primarily an economic phenomenon, a product of the desire to secure markets and raw materials, or whether it resulted from other types of motives. In either case, it was one of the key characteristics of the world order in 1900.

**Keynsianism:** Named after the British economist John Maynard Keynes, this theory challenged prewar laissez-faire economic assumptions and promoted an increased role for the government in both protecting citizens from economic downturns and in stimulating economic growth and employment through public spending. After World War II, it provided the ideological underpinnings of the welfare state.

**Laissez-faire:** Classical economic philosophy of Adam Smith, 19th-century liberals and now late-20th-century neo-conservatives, which argues that an “invisible hand” operates to make the economy function most efficiently and that government intervention in the economy only disturbs this self-regulatory process.

**Liberalism:** Philosophy that is the cornerstone of the Enlightenment project, based on a contract theory of government that recognizes the sovereign rights of individuals. In the economic sphere, it favors individual private property and an unfettered market and, in the political sphere, some sort of representative government.

**Mass society:** Concept that came into use in the 1920s and 1930s to express concerns over the reduction of individual differences between people and their submersion into an increasingly undifferentiated mass. In particular, the Frankfurt school of German philosophers theorized about its potentially dangerous links to totalitarianism.

**McCarthyism:** Named after Wisconsin Senator Joseph McCarthy, this phenomenon brought the Cold War home to American society by shifting the fear of communism abroad to the fear of communism at home. Specifically, it unleashed a “hunt” for communists in government positions in the mid-1950s.

**Modernization:** Concept used to define a series of transformations that have occurred at various speeds in different parts of the world, including the transition from agrarian to industrial economies, the growth of urbanization, and the establishment of a unified state that applies a uniform set of rules to its population.

**Nationalism:** Organization of a people around the claim for nationhood. It asserts the basic principle that the only way a “people” can fulfill its true destiny is through its own political unit, a nation-state. While scholars argue about whether nations are old or new, nationalism as a mobilizing concept is a product of the modern world, particularly the 19th and 20th centuries.

**National self-determination:** Principle embraced in the Paris peace treaties that recognizes the right of each people to have its own political unit through which it can guide its collective destiny.

**Neo-colonialism:** Concept invented to describe relationships of dependence, usually related to economic power, between First and Third World countries after the latter had achieved formal independence.

**Perestroika:** Concept, literally “restructuring,” which was formulated by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev to define the need for less government control of the economy and more room for private initiative.

**Religious fundamentalism:** The call to return to religious values is not new, but in the 1970s, this concept was drawn on to describe the global rise in movements that criticize the process of secularization and advocate the application of sacred laws to society at large.

**Satyagraha:** Gandhi’s concept of satyagraha was drawn from Hinduism and was adapted by him for the purpose of preparing and mobilizing the Indian people against British rule. Literally, the “search for truth,” satyagraha was meant to purify the practitioner through the willingness to suffer for one’s beliefs and, at the same time, to convince the enemy of the evil of his position.
**Stalinization:** This word describes the “second revolution” or the “revolution from above” that Stalin carried out after securing power in the late 1920s. What scholars have debated is the relationship between Stalinization and the first Bolshevik Revolution.

**Surrealism:** Post-World War I artistic movement influenced by Freud, which sought to explore the unconscious through artistic experimentation and discover a new reality behind the surface, a *sur-reality*. Its manifesto was written in 1924 by Andre Breton, a psychiatrist.

**Totalitarianism:** Concept coined by Mussolini to describe the Italian fascist regime, but it later became a term of scholarship defining a modern style of authoritarian rule that went beyond political control to pursue a “total” control of all social, economic, cultural, and even private functions.

**Transvaluation of values:** Nietzsche’s term is a perfect illustration of the “crisis of meaning” opening up in Western civilization. By advocating that what was good should be considered evil and vice versa, this concept helped set the pace for a general questioning of accepted values.

**Unconscious:** Freud’s life work was devoted to mapping this part of the brain, which was inaccessible to direct rational consciousness but was the repository for repressed memories. Instead, the unconscious had to be accessed indirectly, through dreams, free associations, and other techniques.

**Welfare state:** New conception of the state’s responsibility for the welfare of the population, based on the expansion of citizenship rights into the social realm.

**Woman question:** Used to define the problem of women’s exclusion from political citizenship in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

**World order:** General rules and practices that guide the interaction between countries and that order their behavior in a particular time period. Rules can be informal or formal (the UN), and they are not necessarily consistently applied, but as the level of global interaction has increased, so has concern about the shape of the “world order.”
Interpreting the 20th Century:
The Struggle Over Democracy
Part III
Professor Pamela Radcliff

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Pamela Radcliff was born in Passaic, New Jersey, and grew up in Clifton, New Jersey, and Escondido, California. She received her B.A. in history, with membership in Phi Beta Kappa, from Scripps College, one of the five Claremont Colleges, then spent a couple of years traveling around the world before beginning graduate education at Columbia University. She studied modern European history at Columbia, where she received her M.A. and Ph.D. degrees, completed in 1990.

Since the conclusion of her graduate work, Professor Radcliff has been teaching at the University of California, San Diego, in the Department of History. She teaches undergraduate courses on 20th-century European history, modern Spanish history, the history of women and gender in modern Europe, and 20th-century world history. She has received two awards for undergraduate teaching, one granted by the university faculty and another by the students of her world history course.

Professor Radcliff’s historical research has focused on Spanish history in the 20th century, with particular emphasis on popular mobilization and the long-term struggle to establish a democratic system of government. She has published articles and books on these issues, including *From Mobilization to Civil War: The Politics of Polarization in the Spanish City of Gijón, 1900–1937*, which received the Sierra Book Award from the Western Association of Women’s Historians in 1998. She also co-edited (with Victoria Enders) *Constructing Spanish Womanhood: Female Identity in Modern Spain*. Her current book project focuses on the construction of democratic citizenship during the transition from an authoritarian to a democratic regime in Spain in the 1970s, and her latest article on this topic is “Citizens and Housewives: The Problem of Female Citizenship in Spain’s Transition to Democracy,” appearing in the fall 2002 issue of the *Journal of Social History*.

Professor Radcliff also served as an associate editor for the recent multivolume *Encyclopedia of European Social History* and belongs to a number of professional associations, including the American Historical Association and the Society for Spanish and Portuguese Historical Studies.

Professor Radcliff lives in Solana Beach, California, with her husband, Bill Perry, and their two children.
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Interpreting the 20th Century: The Struggle Over Democracy

Scope:
The 20th century transformed the world in ways few could have imagined in 1900. Making sense of this transformation is the challenge of this 48-lecture course. Because one course could never provide a history of every corner of the globe, our focus will be on how the different regions and countries interacted with each other. It is through this interaction that we can discern the common themes that allow us to talk about the history of the world.

One of the key themes was precisely how the growing interaction between regions would operate. By 1900, the process of Western expansion and imperialism had created a level of global interdependence that would only get stronger as the century progressed. But the interdependent world order created by Western imperialism was a fundamentally hierarchical one, based on Western leadership or domination of the non-Western world. The 20th century was defined by the various efforts to transform this connection into a more democratic relationship between Western nations and the rest of the world, or between the developed and less developed regions of the northern and southern hemispheres. In the first two-thirds of the century, these efforts focused on the struggle for independence from colonialism, while in the latter part, Third World nations pursued the more complex search for prosperity and stability.

The struggle over democracy was also a key theme in the Western, or developed, world. Most Western nations had some form of representational political systems in 1914, but they were not democratic. Furthermore, the process of democratization was neither automatic nor harmonious. Until almost the end of the century, the democratic ideal had to compete with powerful challengers, especially fascism and communism. The fascist alternative was defeated with the Second World War, while the communist challenge lasted until 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet bloc. Parallel to these challenges, there were ongoing debates about the nature and practice of democracy that did not end in 1989. Although democracy emerged at the end of the century as the unquestioned political ideal, the parameters of a truly democratic world order are still vigorously contested. Thus, the struggle over democracy frames the end, as well the beginning, of the 20th century.

The first lecture in this course sets up the framework of struggle over liberal democracy and a broader set of ideas associated with it, what we will call the “Enlightenment project.” The remaining two lectures in Section 1 explain why this new era began in 1914 rather than 1900, with the outbreak of the First World War and the “crisis of meaning” it precipitated.

Section 2 explores in more detail this “crisis of meaning” of the interwar years, in which a generation of Western artists and intellectuals questioned all the certainties of the Enlightenment project and the cultural and social order in which they lived. Section 3 focuses on the political manifestation of the interwar crisis, in the form of alternative political ideologies and regimes that challenged liberal democracy’s claim to offer the best form of government and society. In Lectures Twelve through Fourteen, we will look at what these ideologies promised and why they attracted so many people; in Lectures Fifteen and Sixteen, we will focus on what happened to communism and fascism in power in the USSR and Germany.

Section 4 shifts the locus of struggle to the non-Western world, where the competition among liberal democracy, communism, and fascism took shape in the first serious anti-imperialist movements of the century. Each of the four case studies, China, India, Mexico, and Japan, illustrates a different kind of imperialist influence and a distinct path to national independence in the decades leading up to World War II. Section 5 analyzes the Second World War as a mid-century watershed that marked the culmination and defeat of the fascist challenge but also the end of an imperialist world order based on European domination. Section 6 explores the new world order that emerges out of the Second World War, one dominated by the clash between democratic and communist systems and by the stalemate, that is, the Cold War, between two new superpowers. In particular, we will look at the contested origins of the Cold War and its impact on American society and its democratic system.

Section 7 shifts again to the non-Western world, where the Cold War realignment helped set the stage for the process of decolonization. Although this process created dozens of independent nations, it also generated a new set of problems and challenges for the developing world, or what became known as the Third World. Through the use of case studies once again, these lectures will chart alternative paths to development and the successes and pitfalls of communist, liberal democratic, and mixed models. Section 8 looks at a series of challenges that undermined the
Cold War order, from Western-based social movements that questioned the democratic credentials of the “free world,” to Eastern-bloc dissidents who cast doubt on the socialist credentials of the USSR, to a new political movement based on religious fundamentalism that rejected many of the values on both sides. The section ends with a lecture on the demise of the Soviet bloc after 1989, which analyzes how and why the communist challenge finally collapsed. The final lectures of Section 9 will speculate on the post-Cold War world since 1989 and the prospects and challenges for a democratic world order in the 21st century.
Lecture Twenty-Five
The Holocaust

Scope: The scope of Nazi ambitions provides a context for analyzing the extermination of Jews carried out by the regime, although the genocidal program deserves independent analysis. This lecture describes the implementation of the “final solution,” then reviews and evaluates some of the debates over why and how the Jews were exterminated. It considers the argument between so-called intentionalists and functionalists over how the “final solution” was arrived at, as well as the debates over why “ordinary” Germans collaborated in such a horrific process. Finally, the lecture considers the broader international failure to stop the genocide as a culmination of the crisis of meaning that erupted with the First World War.

Outline

I. Even within the context of Hitler’s racial world order, the Holocaust was a unique horror that deserves special attention.
   A. As a case of genocide, it was not, unfortunately, unique. From the Turkish campaign against Armenians in the early 20th century to the more recent killings of Tutsis in Rwanda and of Croats and Muslims in Bosnia, some historians have argued that genocide has become one of the marks of the 20th century.
   B. The reason we remember the Holocaust as a unique horror is not simply the deaths of 6 million people, but the way in which they were killed.
      1. Never had there been such a lethal combination of technology, science, and bureaucratic efficiency, three of the modern achievements of Western civilization.
      2. The gas chamber and all it symbolized made it impossible to return to naïve links among “modernization,” “progress,” and Western civilization.
      3. Following so closely on the First World War, the Holocaust made it clear that “progress” had a dark side that couldn’t simply be explained away by blaming the actions on one evil man.

II. But why were the Jews exterminated and how did the process unfold?
   A. The question of why and how has occupied many scholars, who have formed diverging schools of thought.
      1. On one side are the intentionalists, who focus on Hitler as the main “perpetrator.”
      2. The other school, the functionalists, see the “final solution” as part of an evolving and incoherent Jewish policy that turned to genocide only when other expulsion options fell through.
      3. Why is this debate interesting? It connects directly to larger debates about the nature of the Nazi regime.
      4. For intentionalists, the Holocaust was a perfect example of a totalitarian system in action, where all policies were the expression of a single will.
      5. For functionalists, the Nazi state was a more complex arena of actors, institutions, and changing circumstances.
      6. In recent years, some scholars have made convincing efforts to bring both models together.
   B. Whether the decision was made in 1924 in Mein Kampf or in the summer of 1941 after the invasion of the Soviet Union, the facts of extermination are the same.
      1. After years of escalating harassment, expropriation, terror, and isolation, systematic killing began in the summer of 1941, when the infamous memo sent from Field Marshall Goering called for a “final solution” to the Jewish problem.
      2. The killings in Soviet territory were carried out “on the ground,” that is, by military units called Einsatzkommandos following behind the advancing front lines, but with varying amounts of local collaboration.
      3. At this point, the method of killing was not institutionalized and there were a number of local variations, but most Russian Jews were killed where they lived.
      4. In 1942, the first extermination camps were built, partly because existing methods “wasted” too many bullets and partly because of the reported strain on the executioners of killing people one by one.
      5. Nevertheless, some 40 percent of the total killings occurred before the first camp was built.
C. The six death camps were built between December 1941 and June 1942, and their operation opened a new phase in the organization and method of killing, what one historian called the “bureaucratization of mass murder.”

1. The fact that Jews needed to be shipped from all over Europe to camps in Poland required an elaborate transportation network.
2. Planning for this task took place at the Wannsee Conference in January 1942, at which officials made a list of 11 million Jews from 20 European countries slated for eventual evacuation and murder.
3. Once Jews were shipped to the camps, the technology of mass murder had to be perfected.
4. After trying various methods of mass asphyxiation, a product called Zyklon B, which contained enough gas in a hand-sized canister to kill a large room of people, became the standard.
5. The final numbers of dead are staggering: 67 percent of the almost 9 million Jews in Europe perished.
6. Furthermore, they perished in a system of mass murder that required 100,000 to 500,000 direct participants and many more who passively acquiesced.

III. One of the most debated questions has been why so many people collaborated and what their motives were.

A. One answer argues that the “bureaucracy of mass murder” kept the brutal reality hidden from the vast majority of actors, who could perform their discrete tasks but never had to pull the trigger, so to speak.

B. For those who did pull the trigger, there have been a number of other explanations, from fear to peer pressure, cowardice, conformity, or vicious anti-Semitism. It’s hard to know whether a banal motive or blinding racism is the more chilling explanation.

C. The active or passive collaboration of millions of Germans goes beyond individual motives to demonstrate the devastating success of Hitler’s “racial revolution.” By systematically breaking down the human bonds between Germans and Jews over the course of a decade, when Jews were finally carted off, it was something happening to “other” people.

D. Beyond German collaboration, why did no one else try to stop the mass murder, when Allied governments had information about the camps by at least June of 1942?

1. The official answer was that all resources were being put into defeating the Germans.
2. Whether this was a militarily sound response or not, it is devastatingly true that no other country focused the kind of energy on saving the Jews that the Nazis focused on killing them.

E. This broader failure to prevent the systematic, bureaucratized murder of six million people represented a larger indictment of European civilization: that at a crucial moment of crisis, all of its laws, religious institutions, great scientific knowledge, and political freedoms were either helpless or complicit.

1. These failures required not only a physical but a moral and political reconstruction of European society after the war.
2. At the same time, it was the challenge and horror of fascism that helped Western civilization regain the sense of good and evil lost in the First World War.
3. The combination of shame and a renewed moral purpose provoked a somber but ultimately creative effort to rebuild the Enlightenment project, but with important modifications.

Essential Reading:

Lucy Dawidowicz, ed., *A Holocaust Reader*, Goering’s memo, July 31, 1941; minutes of the Wannsee Conference, January 20, 1942; memos from Generals Gienanth and Himmler on the conflict between war aims and the final solution; memos from the death camps; pp. 72–82, 101–120.

Supplementary Reading:
Christopher Browning, *The Path to Genocide: Essays on Launching the Final Solution*.

———, *Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland*.
Questions to Consider:

1. In recent years, the debate over “German guilt” has increased following the publication of a high-profile book, Daniel Goldhagen’s *Hitler’s Willing Executioners*, which argued for the existence of a widespread “eliminationist” anti-Semitism in Germany that preceded the Nazi era. Do you think Goldhagen’s claim has merit?

2. Even after the experience of abandoning the Jews to their fate in the 1940s, the practice of genocide in the world seems to have increased rather than decreased. What factors can explain this shameful feature of 20th-century life?
Lecture Twenty-Six
Existentialism in Post-War Europe

Scope: Although the war marked the final defeat of the fascist challenge in Europe, it was also the final nail in the coffin of a world order based on European supremacy. For many Europeans, Auschwitz came to symbolize the end of this era, a devastating mark of failure that was now a part of European history. One of the best expressions of this pessimistic postwar mood was the popularity of the existentialist movement in the late 1940s and early 1950s, which offered a bleak but dignified way for individuals to survive in a post-Auschwitz world. We will discuss existentialist ideals, as articulated by Jean-Paul Sartre, and their expression in Samuel Beckett’s Waiting for Godot. By the late 1950s, economic and political recovery and the fading of war memories ended this period of intense self-reflection, but Europe never returned to its world power status.

Outline

I. Although Europe would rebuild itself along new lines, the “30 years war” had destroyed the 19th-century European world order for good.
   A. Why didn’t final victory over fascism bring a return to the old optimism?
   B. Partly, it was the impact of two devastating European civil wars.
   C. Partly, it was the special horror of the Holocaust and the Nazi system that produced it, both of them now a shameful addition to European history.
   D. More broadly, Auschwitz was both a symptom and a culmination of the larger process of European decline.
   E. The tide had begun to shift from Europe to other regions after World War I, but an apparent return to economic normalcy had hidden this reality.
   F. But in 1945, the empire was in a shambles, Europe was a wasteland, and the United States had emerged as the new leader of what will become known as the free world.

II. The postwar mood in Europe was nicely expressed in the popularity of existentialism in the late 1940s and early 1950s, while significantly, this movement never took root in a supremely optimistic America.
   A. Existentialism had long intellectual roots but became the dominant intellectual stance in the first postwar decade.
      1. Like some of the post-World War I movements, existentialism was an attempt to come to terms with an absurd world. Or, situated in the new context, how do we go on after Hiroshima and Auschwitz?
      2. Existentialism crystallized as a movement in the 1920s, but it was the war that popularized it.
      3. Its most famous proponent was Jean Paul Sartre, along with his companion, Simone de Beauvoir, and his friend Albert Camus.
   B. How do we define existentialism?
      1. It is not a set of doctrines but more an attitude toward coping with an uncertain world.
      2. Life, in simple terms, has no preexisting meaning or essence. Instead, the task for individuals is to create meaning for their own lives through their choices: Existence precedes essence, in shorthand.
      3. The notion of “no preexisting meaning” should sound familiar, from Nietzsche and the dadaists, who all rejected the idea of some objective “meaning” out there.
      4. Given the reality of disorder, the existentialists argued that man had to stop yearning for objective signposts: “nothing beyond…no need for more.”
      5. If there is no meaning “out there,” then the individual has no special role to play either. We were not placed on this earth for a purpose, as Christians would claim. Instead, we are another of the random accidents of the universe.
      6. How, then, do we find meaning in a universe indifferent to our existence?
      7. If we imagine each person as a blank canvas, then the person is not only the canvas but the painter. As Sartre said, “man exists, and only afterwards defines himself.”
8. Each individual is faced with the awesome responsibility of defining himself or herself through the accumulation of choices made. If this is true, the least we should expect of ourselves is to be fully aware and take those choices seriously.

9. If this is our life’s work, then it is something we must pursue alone, because no one else can provide meaning for us.

C. Although the image of solitary beings in a meaningless universe may sound bleak, the idea was to provide dignity in a post-Auschwitz world without falling into either despair or the nihilism of the dadaists.
   1. Instead of either extreme, humans could live serious lives in an absurd world.
   2. It was also a way to rescue the individual from the dangers of 20th-century life—the threat of totalitarianism or the homogenizing effects of mass society—by placing the highest value on individual choice.
   3. Thus, you are a product of all the choices you have made up to this moment, nothing more, nothing less. Instead of passively allowing unconscious choices to shape our lives, we should take an active role in shaping our destinies.
   4. The focus here is on choice itself, not on content: Existentialism does not clarify what is right and what is wrong, except for a general rule that each person should consider what would happen if everyone acted the same way.

D. One of the offshoots of existentialist thought was an artistic movement called the theater of the absurd, whose most eminent practitioner was Samuel Beckett.

E. To express the absurdity of the world in theater, the playwright put characters in implausible settings, wrote illogical plots, and left the audience with unresolved tensions.

F. Samuel Beckett lived the exemplary existentialist life.
   1. Like many existentialists, he worked for the Resistance during the war.
   2. He had an ambivalent attitude toward life but never gave in to despair; as one of his characters put it: “you must go on, I can’t go on, I’ll go on.”

G. The most famous play in the theater of the absurd genre is Waiting for Godot, written in the late 1940s.
   1. It is a play about two tramps waiting for a character named Godot, who never arrives.
   2. They (and we, the readers) don’t know why they’re waiting for him, but they have a vague sense that they will know what to do when he arrives.
   3. As they wait, the characters’ waiting turns into simply living, the petty existence of too small boots, carrots or turnips, and so on; all these are the stuff of life.
   4. Instead of waiting to be enlightened by some nonexistent savior, Beckett seems to be saying, we should focus on the daily struggle that is the essence of who we are.

H. Thus, in a European civilization that had reached rock bottom, existentialism offered a path for individuals to survive with dignity. Its popularity began to wane in the late 1950s as Europe recovered and the memory of war and Holocaust faded, but the movement serves as an elegiac swan song for a European civilization that would never again claim to lead the world.

Essential Reading:

Supplementary Reading:
Anthony Cronin, Samuel Beckett: The Last Modernist.
H. Stuart Hughes, The Obstructed Path.

Questions to Consider:
1. One of the criticisms against existentialism was that its focus on “choice” made no value judgements about the content of those choices, that is, about what is “right” and “wrong.” Would you agree with this criticism?
2. The only signpost the existentialists offered was the obligation to consider the consequences of your actions if everyone felt free to make the same choices. Do you think this a workable criterion for existence?
Lecture Twenty-Seven
Origins of the Cold War

Scope: With the end of the Second World War, a new world order took shape. Instead of a world united under European rule, it was a world separated into liberal democratic and communist spheres, each led by a new global power, the United States and the USSR. This lecture discusses how this new Cold War order emerged out of the rubble of World War II and what the conditions were that maintained it. It analyzes American and Soviet visions of their own national missions and of the nature of the enemy. Finally, we consider the contested question of responsibility, which continues to divide scholarly and popular opinion.

Outline

I. One of the consequences of the new, divided world order was an endemic conflict between the two spheres over which side would dominate world politics and the economy. This conflict came to be called the Cold War.

A. With this new world order, the struggles over democracy are put into a different context.
   1. Most obviously, the existence of a non-democratic superpower posed a constant military and ideological threat to the democratic world.
   2. The competition between superpowers also injected an added element of confusion in newly decolonized nations’ attempts to define their independence.
   3. But more subtly, the Cold War created a new struggle for democracy inside the heart of the democratic world.
   4. Critics of U.S. policy argued that, in the course of fighting the Cold War, America was sacrificing its own democratic ideals, while defenders argued that defeating the USSR was the most important democratic goal.

B. What were the origins of this dramatic transformation in world politics?
   1. In broad terms, the Cold War depended on three elements.
   2. First was the existence of two superpowers.
   3. Second was the reality of nuclear weapons on both sides after 1949, which made direct “hot” war between superpowers unthinkable.
   4. Third was each side’s claim to world domination, not in the older sense of empire, but in the sense of a mission to lead the world. Further, each side had to believe that its opponent had a mission to lead the world.
   5. Thus, nuclear weapons made real war unthinkable, but competing world missions made real peace impossible.
   6. It’s important to note that there were plenty of “hot” wars fomented by the Cold War standoff but not directly between the two superpowers.

C. How did the United States come to feel that it had a world mission?
   1. The mere existence of a “world mission” was a new development for a traditionally isolationist nation.
   2. U.S. intervention in both world wars was reluctant and occurred only after direct attacks on American interests.
   3. But by the Second World War, U.S. participation had begun to shift attitudes among the population and the political elites.
   4. As Europe fell into a postwar depression, the United States was flush with the victory of having saved the world from fascism, and many began to argue that America needed to take on a new world role befitting this status.

II. With this impetus, postwar leaders formulated a new vision of American leadership.

A. Henry Luce, in his 1941 book *The American Century*, made one of the earliest and strongest appeals for a move from isolationism to internationalism.

B. In his argument, America had four valuable things to bring to the world: free enterprise, technological expertise, good Samaritanism, and her devotion to the great principles of Western civilization.

C. What’s important to note is the sense of universalism about the American way of life.
D. In this sense (but not others, of course), American universalism was another version of the European “civilizing mission,” that is, the desire and confidence to transform the world in its own Western image.

III. This vision of American ideals and prosperity brought to the four corners of the earth was powerful enough, but what made it seem urgent was the existence of an enemy whose sole goal was to destroy this way of life.
A. The result was a powerful mix of idealism and fear, which was enough to mobilize a previously isolationist American public.
B. *What to Do When the Russians Come*, published as late as 1984, articulated the fearful consequences of what life under Soviet occupation would be like.

IV. How was the Soviet enemy defined?
A. During the first few years after the war, American policy makers shifted from defining the USSR as an enemy to being the major threat to what became known as the free world.
   1. In 1946, Soviet expert George Kennan wrote an influential report that called the USSR an irrational, sociopathic power.
   2. The most important document, however, was NSC-68, a National Security Council report written in 1950 by Paul Nitze, National Security Adviser for the Truman administration.
   3. In the memo, Nitze warned that this was a battle for the future of civilization.
   4. The adversary was a ruthless enemy pursuing worldwide totalitarian domination.
B. Was this a fair evaluation of the Soviet threat?
   1. Few questions have been more debated by historians than the origins of the Cold War and who was to blame. Even with the opening of Soviet archives, opposing opinions remain.
   2. However, the “revisionist” position that accused the United States of fabricating the threat seems untenable in the face of new archival sources.
   3. The most balanced position on Soviet motives in 1945 would be to see them as multifaceted.
   4. On the one hand, there is no doubt that the USSR supported and promoted worldwide communist revolution.
   5. On the other hand, it appeared to have had no master world revolutionary plan for invading either Western Europe or the United States.
   6. American policy makers assumed the existence of such a plan and, moreover, interpreted all Soviet actions through its lens.
   7. Instead, Soviet policy reflected a mixture of interests, including fears about the security of its own borders after the devastating impact of German invasion.
   8. Whatever the balance, it is clear that U.S. policymakers did not recognize the existence of multiple concerns.

V. At the same time, the USSR interpreted all American behavior through a single lens.
A. Thus, Stalin viewed all foreign economic aid as an attempt to spread the capitalist system and strangle the Soviet economy.
B. In Marxist ideology, it was capitalism that was inevitably warlike and destructive and controlled political decisions in supposedly democratic societies.
C. Soviet interpretation of the Marshall Plan provides a good example of these ideological blinders.
D. Was the Soviet view of the Marshall Plan total paranoia?
E. Partly, but not entirely. It did pursue a global free-market economy dominated by the dollar and anchored by the U.S. economy, and it was not unreasonable to see this as a threat to the closed spheres of a socialist economy.

VI. Why did both sides simplify the motives of the other side?
A. Partly, the answer is ideological blinders, simplistic notions about the inevitable course of warlike capitalism or world communism.
B. But partly, it suited each superpower to have a super-enemy to get their people behind the idea of a world mission.
C. Because scholars argue about origins, they also argue about what constituted the opening act of the Cold War and who was responsible.
   1. From the American point of view, it was the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe in 1945–1946.
   2. From the Soviet point of view, it was the Marshall Plan of 1947.
   3. What can we conclude about responsibility for starting the Cold War?
   4. While the opening acts are ambiguous, most historians today would place greater blame on the Soviets.
   5. By 1950, however, both sides are equally invested in maintaining the Cold War, and it becomes the central political reality of the new world order.

Essential Reading:

Supplementary Reading:
John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History*.
Melvin Leffler, *The Specter of Communism*.

Questions to Consider:
1. While our perspective on the Cold War is usually a critical one, it’s also important to understand why it “worked” on some level for such a long time, 43 years. What do you think explains such long-term popular support for maintaining the Cold War on both sides?
2. Do the continued debates over the Cold War’s origins have any relevance today outside of academic circles?
Lecture Twenty-Eight
The Cold War in American Society

Scope: More than a framework for international relations, the Cold War profoundly affected life at home. This lecture considers the impact of the Cold War on American domestic and foreign policy, especially in the 1950s and 1960s. It raises the question posed by scholars of whether the United States undermined its own liberal democratic principles in the course of waging the Cold War or whether the methods used to fight the communist enemy were justified by the nature of the threat. With this question in mind, we will focus on the domestic phenomenon of McCarthyism in the 1950s and on the international presence of the United States in a variety of conflicts, from Latin America to Asia, including Korea and Vietnam.

Outline

I. The challenge of fighting the Cold War presented the American government with certain moral dilemmas, articulated directly in Nitze’s NSC-68 memo.
   A. In the memo, he outlined two complementary strategies for defeating the enemy. The first was the power of American ideals to attract the rest of the world.
   B. If the USSR really was a sociopathic power, however, Nitze did not think this idealistic attraction was enough. If the Soviets could be expected to use dirty, underhanded methods, then the United States was obliged to respond in kind.
   C. What this two-pronged strategy created was a moral dilemma, in which national security could be used to justify the short-term practice of suspending American ideals, at home and abroad.

II. One of the best case studies of this moral dilemma in practice was the phenomenon of McCarthyism, which brought the fear of the Soviet threat to Americans’ own backyard.
   A. The context for this fear was a wave of spy cases and growing suspicion that the Soviets had access to American government documents.
   B. In response to this fear, the Truman administration passed the Federal Employees Loyalty Act in 1947.
   C. The most prominent spy cases were those of Alger Hiss and the Rosenbergs.
   D. Senator Joseph McCarthy entered the fray with a speech in February 1950, in which he argued that the United States was being undermined by communist sympathizers inside the country.
      1. Although his “list” of card-carrying communists in the State Department did not exist, his speech sparked a groundswell of anti-communist fear, a Red Scare.
      2. The Red Scare was certainly not caused by one man, but McCarthy clearly articulated the fears of many.
   E. Historians have argued about the truth of these accusations and the dangers of internal subversion, as well as the justification for the government’s response.
      1. Critics argue that even the existence of Soviet spies did not justify the broader violations of civil rights.
      2. The House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC) was set up to find and purge communists from prominent positions, and it called hundreds of suspects to testify on their own or others’ communist sympathies.
      3. Significantly, suspects were defined, not by criminal actions, but by beliefs and attitudes, which were supposed to be protected under the law.
      4. Historians have recently argued that, in addition, members of marginalized groups, such as racial minorities or homosexuals, were more likely to be targeted.
      5. The most famous HUAC investigations targeted Hollywood.
      6. HUAC was aided by the FBI and the CIA, which gathered thousands of secret files on Americans who had criticized government policy or engaged in other suspicious activities.
      7. Many institutions outside the federal government established loyalty acts, firing employees considered subversive and banning books considered “un-American.”
8. In 1950, Congress, over President Truman’s veto, permitted communists to be rounded up in concentration camps in a national emergency.

9. As a result, thousands of professors, government officials, and others lost their jobs and status, leading to professional ruin for many and social marginalization for all.

10. These civil rights violations in no way compared to the purges of the USSR, and defenders argue they were a necessary price to pay for protecting democracy, while critics argue that the United States failed to live up to its own democratic standards.

F. By the late 1950s, the Red Scare had died down and McCarthy fell out of political favor, but the underlying message shaped government policy into the next decade; that is, that the requirements of national security “containment” could override the right to political pluralism and individual freedom of belief.

III. A similar sort of moral dilemma shaped American foreign policy during the Cold War.

A. On the attraction side, the United States pursued a generous policy of foreign aid and strategic alliances that funneled billions into Third World nations’ coffers.

B. If nations refused to remain in the American sphere, however, the United States (like the USSR) adopted various coercive strategies to force them to do so.

C. These could include proxy wars, in which military aid was funneled into an opposition group, or direct intervention by U.S. armies.

D. This militarization of the Third World was apparent in the first non-European theater of the Cold War: Korea.

1. At times, American-supported forces were more anti-communist than democratic.

2. This put the United States in the position of supporting authoritarian regimes, from the Shah of Iran to Spain’s Franco.

3. For the same reason, it was difficult for the United States to understand popular revolutions in poor countries as something other than cogs in the Soviet’s world plan, that is, as expressions of local conflicts and grievances.

4. The United States explained its support for authoritarian regimes by arguing that they were a lesser evil than the alternative totalitarian Soviet system.

IV. Now that the Cold War is over, how do we come to terms with these contradictions? On the one hand are those who continue to defend the necessity of these morally ambivalent actions on the grounds that they, in fact, helped us to win the Cold War; in other words, the victory in the Cold War justified a temporary deviation from our principles. On the other hand are those who argue that the sacrifices were too great, that the end of making the world safe for democracy was lost in the undemocratic means with which the Cold War was fought.

Essential Reading:
Edward Pessen, Losing Our Souls: The American Experience in the Cold War.

Supplementary Reading:
Thomas Reeves, The Life and Times of Joe McCarthy.
Arthur Herman, Joseph McCarthy: Reexamining the Life of America’s Most Hated Senator.

Questions to Consider:
1. The continued relevance of this question is apparent in the similar debate opened up between the defenders and detractors of the Patriot Act. How would you frame the relationship between national security and civil rights?

2. The moral question of the “ends justifying the means” has a long and contested history, which makes it unlikely that the Cold War debates will be resolved in the near future. What is your position?
Lecture Twenty-Nine
Science and the State in Cold War America

Scope: This lecture continues to examine the impact of the Cold War on American society, through a close look at the transformation of scientific research and development. Beginning with the state-directed program to build the atom bomb in the 1940s, atomic physics evolved from an industry based on individual free enterprise to a government-run national science industry, similar in many ways to its counterpart in the USSR. We examine the nature of this evolution, from the Manhattan Project of the 1940s, and consider how massive federal funding, monopolization, and the channeling of research into government projects created a new relationship between the state and private industry that challenged classic liberal economic principles. Finally, we consider the implications of this new relationship in the context of the Cold War.

Outline

I. The result of having a government-run national science industry was that, once again, in fighting the Cold War, the United States ended up sacrificing some of the liberal ideas it was defending: in this case, the sacred principle of private free enterprise. To illustrate this point, we will focus on a single case study, that is, the development of the field of nuclear physics in the years during and after the war.

A. Historians have argued that the growing relationship between nuclear physics and the American government represent the extension of Cold War national security priorities over what had been a classic liberal enterprise of individual research programs.

B. Again, the question of whether this transformation was justified by a clear and present danger has been debated.

C. What did scientific research look like before the war?
   1. The central figure was the classic “lone scientist,” tinkering in the lab, designing his or her own research projects, and with little interest in government involvement.
   2. Funding came from a variety of sources, a small percent from the federal government.
   3. There were no government institutions to coordinate research and no national science research policy.
   4. In other words, scientific development operated according to a classic liberal laissez-faire model.

D. What changed this picture was the Second World War and the threat posed by fascism.
   1. This threat convinced many important scientists, even the pacifist and socialist Einstein, to collaborate with the government on weapons research for the war effort.
   2. The threat also began to push the government into considering new ways of harnessing civilian research toward military goals.
   3. In 1940, the first national institute, the Office of Scientific Research and Development, was established to coordinate defense-related projects.
   4. By 1941, 75 percent of the most eminent physicists in the United States were employed in defense work.
   5. The government also set up its own labs, defined specific research projects, and dramatically increased funding.

E. The most dramatic example of these wartime shifts was the successful project to build the atom bomb, the Manhattan Project.
   1. The initial discovery of nuclear fission was made before the war by individual scientists, but it was the federal government that brought the money and organization to produce the bomb.
   2. The project involved the coordination of research at existing university labs, as well as the construction of a special government-run lab at Los Alamos, New Mexico, which employed more than 2,000 scientific and technical staff.
   3. The intense concentration of resources produced results: only seven years after the discovery of nuclear fission, the first bomb was tested, on July 16, 1945.
   4. If we compare the machine gun with the atom bomb from an organizational perspective, the contrast is clear.
II. What made this new relationship between science and the state more than a temporary alliance was the Cold War, which turned the wartime sense of urgency into a permanent condition.

A. If technological superiority was essential to winning the Cold War, then research into nuclear physics was in the direct interest of the government and should be harnessed to national security imperatives.

B. What were the characteristics of a nuclear physics industry harnessed to national security?
1. The most obvious consequence was the domination of federal funding, most of it funneled through the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense.
2. A related consequence is that because the majority of this federal funding came from the Defense Department, the government took an active role in channeling research toward military applications.
3. Why did scientists agree to this new relationship with the state? The combination of money, prestige, and patriotism must have been a powerful attraction for young scientists.
4. As a result of this attraction, by 1951, two-thirds of all engineers and scientists in the United States worked in defense-related research.
5. Another characteristic was the concentration of research into large projects employing teams of researchers and costly equipment.
6. Finally, these large projects were more likely to focus on applied research rather than basic research, particularly applied weapons projects.
7. The result has been a range of impressive weapons projects, from ICBMs to smart bombs and thermonuclear warheads, which clearly advanced the overall goal of technological military superiority.

C. What are the broader consequences of the close relationship between science and the state during the Cold War period?
1. It seems clear that individual scientists working in this field had much less autonomy in 1960 than they did before the war; that is, the state had encroached further into the realm of individual choice.
2. However, the encroachment of the state into individual lives is not a product of the Cold War. Since the early 20th century, the state has increasingly made more demands of individuals at the same time that it has taken more responsibility for helping them.
3. The Cold War reinforced a tradeoff between individual autonomy and national security, which justified the expansion of state power into the realm of scientific research.

III. Once again, we are left with the same unresolved question of whether this process was ultimately necessary or even positive, justified by ultimate victory or criticized as imitating the enemy’s national defense industry. Whichever position is taken, it is important to recognize that a shift did take place as a result of the Cold War and that this shift involved a tradeoff between the practice of the “American way of life” and the goal of winning the war.

Essential Reading:
Dan Kevles, *The Physicists*.

Supplementary Reading:
Gregg Herken, “The University of California, the Federal Weapons Labs and the Founding of the Atomic West,” in Bruce Hevly and John Findley, eds., *The Atomic West*.

Questions to Consider:
1. While the percentage of scientists working in defense industries has dropped since the 1950s, the larger issue of federal funding and the way it shapes research priorities remains an important one. Would you agree?
2. It would be impossible to return to the old model of the lone scientist tinkering in his or her lab, but what role should the scientist play in a world in which science, money, and politics are inextricably linked?
Lecture Thirty
The Welfare State

Scope: Although the Cold War may have undermined liberal democratic practice in certain ways, it also provided the backdrop for a dramatic democratization of liberalism that came to be known as the welfare state. The postwar construction of the welfare state continued pre-World War II trends but also developed as an alternative to socialist economics, a democratic response to the communist critique of capitalist inequality. This lecture compares and contrasts the northern European welfare state, spearheaded by Social Democratic parties, and the American model, constructed on the foundations of Roosevelt’s New Deal in the 1930s. The lecture concludes with a consideration of the significance of this development in the expansion of democratic citizenship rights from the political to the social realm.

Outline

I. The postwar construction of the welfare state continued pre-World War II trends but further developed as an answer to the socialist critique of capitalist inequality and as an attempt to better integrate the masses into a liberal democratic system.

A. The welfare state that blossomed, first, in Western Europe during its reconstruction and, later, in the United States during the 1960s had its roots in prewar developments.
   1. As we discussed earlier, the Depression dealt a huge blow to the liberal confidence in a “self-regulating” market and a weak state presence in the economy, because millions were left unprotected by the crisis.
   2. In contrast, the states with booming economies during the Depression were fascist Nazi Germany and the communist USSR, both of which funneled massive state funds into production and exercised various levels of control over the economy.
   3. The case for state intervention was made in Western Europe, as well, by Social Democratic parties, which had been pushing for social security measures to protect workers from the vagaries of the capitalist market.

B. In more theoretical terms, the Depression had inspired a major rethinking of liberal economic ideas by British economist John Maynard Keynes.
   1. He argued that there was a middle ground between classic liberalism and a planned economy, where both government and private enterprise could work together.
   2. If leaders wanted to save capitalism from Bolshevism, they needed new more flexible strategies, Keynes argued.
   3. The key to flexibility was creating a greater role for government intervention, not simply to pursue development but to soften the impact of crises on individuals, what came to be known as a safety net.
   4. The two roles came together in Keynes’s analysis of unemployment.

C. In the 1930s, the only liberal country that began to adopt some of Keynes’s ideas was the United States, with its New Deal.
   1. The New Deal was a panoply of programs rather than a coherent scheme, but all programs shared the idea that government could help an ailing economy and that it should help people suffering its effects.
   2. One set of programs aimed to provide economic assistance for those who were unemployed and impoverished.
   3. The other set of programs aimed to jumpstart the economy through massive public spending, which was meant to put people back to work and boost consumer spending.
   4. The success of the New Deal continues to be controversial today; both Keynesians and neo-conservatives refer to it to provide evidence for their opposing views about welfare, but either way, it marked a dramatic new path that postwar European states continued to follow.

II. While the New Deal marked a departure, after 1945, it was Western Europe that was the major testing ground for these ideas.

A. One of the keywords of reconstruction was cooperation, between European countries and between formerly warring classes, as well as between business and labor.
B. The problem of class warfare, which had led to both communist revolution and fascist reaction, was to be diffused through a generous social welfare system that provided health care, unemployment insurance, pensions, subsidized housing, and education.

C. In postwar citizenship theory, the British sociologist T. H. Marshall defined three levels of citizenship that had been gradually achieved: in the 19th century, civil rights; in the early 20th century, political rights; and now, in the postwar world, social rights.

D. At the same time, labor unions were brought on board through the establishment of cooperative relationships with business that would reduce strikes and facilitate collective bargaining.

E. Scholars argue about where the major impetus for the welfare state lies.

F. There were significant differences between countries in terms of the degree of state involvement and the level of corporatist planning, with the Scandinavian countries on one end and West Germany on the other.

III. In the United States, it was not until the Democratic administrations of the 1960s and the War on Poverty that the basic foundations of the New Deal were expanded.

A. Even then, the different American context created a weaker version of state responsibility for individual welfare.

B. In the early 1960s, first Kennedy, then Johnson pursued ambitious programs to reduce poverty.

C. However, the targeting of specific groups was different from the European idea of universal social citizenship.

IV. In Europe, and to a lesser degree in the United States, the resulting welfare consensus worked spectacularly in the late 1950s and 1960s, until economic restructuring and the 1973 oil crisis undermined the dramatic growth that had fueled generous state programs.

A. Since the 1970s, politicians and economists have been arguing about the welfare state and dismantling parts of it, but no new consensus has emerged about the exact relationship between social rights and democratic stability.

B. Today, the future of the welfare state is subject both to theoretical and practical challenges. At stake is the question of what serves as the best basis for individuals to participate in a democratic society.

Essential Reading:
Donald Sassoon, One Hundred Years of Socialism, chapter 6, “Building Social Capitalism.”

Supplementary Reading:

Questions to Consider:
1. In the United States, the defenders of welfare capitalism have been considerably weaker than in Europe, especially in the last two decades, so much so that the word welfare is used differently on each side of the Atlantic. In the United States, welfare often refers to demeaning handouts, while in Europe, it refers to a broader system of social organization and rights. What are the implications of such different meanings?

2. What do you think about the debate between defenders and critics of social rights and their relationship to citizens’ ability to participate in their society?
Lecture Thirty-One
The Process of Decolonization

Scope: For the next eight lectures, we shift back to the non-Western world, which underwent a dramatic political transformation—that is, decolonization—in the first decades after the Second World War. This lecture introduces the phenomenon of decolonization and its symbolic importance in creating what became known as the Third World. It focuses on the mechanics of decolonization in Asia and Africa and tries to explain the diverse nature of the process, especially in terms of how early it happened and how peaceful the transition was. We compare the different policies of the major imperial powers, Britain and France, as well as those of the Netherlands, Belgium, and Portugal, and look at the difference between settler and non-settler colonies. Finally, we summarize the factors that explain the overall speed of the decolonization process, most of it concentrated in the 15 years following the Second World War.

Outline

I. Although the Cold War and the welfare state were crucial to defining the postwar world order, for the non-Western world, the fundamental transformation was the process of decolonization. Within 15 years after the Second World War, the majority of colonies had become independent nations, an extraordinarily rapid process that changed the face of what came to be known as the Third World, in contrast to the Western First World and the Soviet Second World.

A. What did decolonization mean for the new world order?
   1. On the one hand, it confirmed the decline of European power, while on the other hand, it signaled the demand of the non-Western world for more power.
   2. The big question was whether the non-Western countries could chart their own political and economic futures and become players in a new world order defined by opposing superpowers.
   3. In the 1950s and 1960s, when many of the new nations were created, there was a great deal of optimism that they could take a place as equals in a new global order defined by national independence.
   4. But for all but a few ex-colonial nations, the hopes of independence have not been realized. Over the next several lectures, we will look at the problems faced by decolonized nations, the ways they tried to overcome those problems, and the successes and failures that resulted.

B. To begin with, we need to understand how and why centuries of colonization were suddenly reversed.
   1. For decolonization to occur, two things had to happen.
   2. First, European countries had to relinquish control, and second, the colonies had to demand independence.
   3. Scholars argue about the balance of each force, but the overall interaction between “push” and “pull” was similar.

C. The degree to which the European countries were willing to give up their colonies varied widely.
   1. In 1945, there were five remaining colonial powers, two major (Britain and France) and three minor (Belgium, Portugal, and the Netherlands).
   2. Britain and France had extensive holdings in Asia and Africa.
   3. The other three had one or two important colonies, also in Asia or Africa.
   4. The British were the first and most accepting of decolonization, partly because of a plan to integrate ex-colonies into a federation called the Commonwealth and partly because the independence movement in India had been forcing them to face the issue for a longer time.
   5. The French took a longer time to accept independence as opposed to self-government, especially in such colonies as Algeria, which were considered part of France.
   6. Belgium, Portugal, and the Netherlands were the most uncompromising. As minor European powers, the stakes of remaining an “imperial” nation were greater for each of these countries.
   7. Where colonial power resisted, the level of violence was higher and the influence of communism tended to be greater.

D. Despite these differing levels of acceptance, all the countries eventually gave in. Why?
1. Partly this result was due to the external pressure of the United States and the USSR, both of which were against formal empires and criticized them as evil and exploitative.

2. Perhaps as important as these pressures were the financial reasons; in the 19th century, formal colonies anchored European power, but in the 20th century, they only weighed down the weaker European nations.

3. Simply the example of the two new superpowers, which maintained economic dominance without formal empires, set the pace for the future.

II. All the imperial powers finally acquiesced to decolonization, but the “push” from below was crucial in setting the process in motion, especially in Asia, where the combination of prewar movements and Japanese occupation created a strong momentum.

A. Some argue that the process should be described as national liberation to emphasize the active role of the colonized.

B. The independence of India and Pakistan in 1947 was the major turning point and is the best example of what became the British model of negotiated independence, propelled by a powerful nationalist movement. Following the same model, Britain gave up its other Asian colonies, Ceylon and Burma.

C. But a powerful nationalist movement could also lead to bloody conflict when the European power refused to negotiate, as occurred in Indonesia. When the Japanese left in 1945, Indonesian nationalists under Sukarno took power, but the Dutch fought for four years to retake their old colony before finally granting independence in 1949.

D. A similar but more protracted struggle occurred in French Indochina, where a strong nationalist movement declared independence in 1945 and fought France’s attempt to recover its colony until the French left in 1954.

E. What made Vietnam different than Indonesia or India was the division of the nationalist movement between communists and liberals, with the former, under Ho Chi Minh, in the strongest position in 1945. While the French began by resisting independence, they ended by fighting on the side of the liberals against the communists.

F. Thus, the struggle in Vietnam, later picked up by the United States, moved from the terrain of decolonization to that of the Cold War.

III. As decolonization in Asia was winding down, it was heating up in Africa. Between the mid-1950s and the mid-1960s, virtually the entire continent decolonized, with a few holdouts.

A. How do we explain the rapidity of the process in Africa, given the general lack of strong independence movements?

B. At this point, the issue was largely timing. A new generation of African leaders, politicized during the Second World War, was inspired by the decolonization in Asia. At the same time, the European countries were starting to accept the inevitability of the process.

C. Still, however, there were different paths to independence, largely depending on whether the colonies were settler or non-settler.

D. In most non-settler colonies, the process was peaceful and rapid, carried out through negotiations with African elites.

1. Perhaps the best example of this path was the independence of the Gold Coast, which became Ghana in 1957.

2. Kwame Nkrumah’s Convention People’s Party, inspired by Gandhi, organized a nationalist movement that negotiated a decade-long transfer of power.

3. There were exceptions to this rule of peaceful transfer, especially if no nationalist movement was able to accept power. In the Belgian Congo (Zaire), the combination of the lack of any educated elite and the Belgian decision to abruptly leave in 1960 opened a brutal civil war.

E. In settler colonies, it was the resistance of the local European settlers that made the process of independence more contentious, in most cases taking the form of guerrilla war.

1. In Kenya, 200,000 rebels joined the Land Freedom Army in the early 1950s, but it was not until 1963 that independence was achieved.
2. In Algeria, one million French settlers turned a guerrilla rebellion that began in the mid-1950s into a civil war, which finally ended with independence in 1962.
4. The most intractable settler colony was South Africa, with more than four million white settlers. It was the only case where power was transferred to a white-controlled government in 1962, until a guerrilla war by the African National Congress achieved a democratic transition in 1994.

F. With the exception of the last settler colonies, by the mid-1960s, the imperial world order of the 19th century had virtually vanished overnight as the result of a remarkable confluence of changing political, economic, and ideological realities.

Essential Reading:

Supplementary Reading:
M. E. Chamberlain, Decolonization: The Fall of the European Powers.

Questions to Consider:
1. It is difficult to absorb the magnitude of transformation that occurred in such a short time, especially given that it involved so many different actors in so many different regions at the same time. Can we really comprehend such a dramatic shift in the prevailing culture?
2. Ironically, after decolonization, the main region that experienced rapid economic growth was Europe, which seemed to demonstrate that colonies were economic liabilities more than assets. What implications can be drawn from this fact?
Lecture Thirty-Two

Challenges for Post-Colonial Societies

Scope: Decolonization raised tremendous economic and political hopes for dozens of new countries, but moving from formal independence to political stability and economic prosperity proved a daunting task that few achieved. This lecture examines, in general terms, the serious problems faced by these new post-colonial nations. It focuses on such issues as economic dependency and poverty and the debates over neo-colonialism, the conflicts provoked by ethnic and religious diversity, the lack of an experienced political elite, and the influence of Cold War politics.

Outline

I. The process of forming a politically and economically stable and independent state after decolonization was a daunting task, and there were a number of issues that were difficult for democratic governments to resolve.
   A. The combination of optimism and sobriety expressed by new leaders was well articulated by Indonesian President Sukarno at the 1955 conference organized for ex-colonial nations at Bandung.
   B. But most of the new states from this period did not gain self-reliance and prosperity.

II. The first general problem was the Cold War itself, which distracted the superpowers from real development needs and turned countries into pawns in larger global power games.
   A. In particular, as Ghana’s Nkrumah complained, the superpowers focused a great deal of aid on military equipment and weapons to wage their proxy wars, instead of on economic assistance.
   B. The militarization of Third World regimes helped fuel protracted civil wars that further devastated these states, physically, economically, and politically.
   C. The impact of the Cold War in Africa provides a good example of proxy wars in Somalia and Ethiopia, as well as Angola.

III. More endemic than the Cold War were the staggering economic problems faced by virtually all the new countries, partly as a result of colonialism and partly as a result of preexisting poverty, although scholars have argued about the weight of these two factors.
   A. As we discussed earlier in regard to China, colonial economic development focused on the export of raw materials and the import of European industrial goods. Thus, most new countries were left with little industrial base.
   B. Some scholars have argued that these countries were better off than before colonialism, which at least constructed the boundaries of a market economy.
   C. Critics of this proposition argue that simply citing statistics of increased import-export activity does not prove that the country was better off economically. The problem, these critics argue, is that these countries were pulled into a global market economy in which they could not compete.
   D. One of the most widely read critics of colonialism was Frantz Fanon, a French-trained psychiatrist and nationalist from colonial Martinique, who became involved in the Algerian struggle for independence. His book *The Wretched of the Earth* became a veritable handbook for Third World national liberation movements.

IV. The debates about economic dependence continued after political independence, and critics argued that the transition from economic dependence to independence was made more difficult by forms of neo-colonialist control.
   A. Ghana’s Nkrumah laid out this critique in a 1965 book.
   B. He argued that the methods of dependence could take different shapes.
   C. In extreme cases, direct military intervention could be used.
   D. The most endemic military control was established by the French government over their former African colonies.
E. Most often, more subtle limits on economic policy were placed by the terms of loans and the mounting
debt racked up through loans made for essential capital investments in infrastructure.

F. Thus, the European economic community set up special trade relationships with African nations that
reinforced dependency.

G. Alternatively, loan centers, such as the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund, imposed
unpopular domestic austerity programs as a condition of continued aid.

H. The necessity or efficacy of these economic limits is still hotly debated today by economists, politicians,
and Third World leaders. Whether we see them as a cause or a result of economic dependence, they
certainly demonstrate its existence.

V. Getting out of the cycle of dependency has been daunting, partly because of poverty and neo-colonialist
strictures, but also because of the inherent difficulty in catching up in a race that had started centuries before.

A. As Nkumah said, these nations must do in a generation what it took developed countries 300 years to
accomplish.

B. The problem is that the jet-propelled modernization that these countries wanted seemed easier to achieve
by the Soviet strong-state model than by the Western democratic model. Democracy and rapid
modernization did not always go hand-in-hand.

C. The “catch-up” challenge was reflected in the broader problem of trying to establish nation-states in places
where the nation had little historical or political meaning.

D. Beyond basic economic problems were other equally serious challenges, including the ethnic and religious
diversity of many of the new nations.

1. Scholars argue about whether ethnic diversity itself or simply the way diversity is deployed by
political groups undermines democratic stabilization. Either way, it certainly has. Around the world in
the 1990s, there were more than three dozen ongoing ethnic conflicts destabilizing nations, most of
them in the form of civil wars.

2. The problem of diversity has taken different forms. In India, the conflict has been between a majority
religion and a number of minority religions, especially Muslims but also Sikhs, who have been at
virtual war with the Indian government over the issue of Kashmir for the last two decades.

3. Despite the endemic nature of religious conflict in India, it has not destabilized democratic government
too badly, because the majority ethnic group is able to control the democratic institutions of
government.

4. In many African nations, on the other hand, the lack of a majority ethnic or religious group has helped
prevent democratic stabilization.

E. A final obstacle to political stability and economic prosperity was the lack of political experience,
education, and skills among the local population.

1. There was a huge variation between such countries as India, with a large educated elite, and the
Belgian Congo, which had 16 university graduates in 1960.

2. In general, this was a greater issue in Africa, where illiteracy rates were as high as 98 percent.

3. Even where the new political elites had good intentions to educate their populations, often, lack of
resources convinced them to fall back on more authoritarian colonial forms of rule.

VI. Not surprisingly, the combination of all these serious problems turned what began as an optimistic quest for
Third World political and economic stability into a quagmire from which few countries have successfully
emerged. Over the next few lectures, we will examine some case studies of at least partial successes, as well as
failures, before evaluating the prognosis for general democratic stabilization in the future.

Essential Reading:
Independence and Development.”

Supplementary Reading:
Tony Smith, ed., *The End of European Empire: Decolonization after World War II*, part 5, “The Question of Neo-
Colonialism.”

**Questions to Consider:**

1. Do you think decolonization could have had other, more positive, outcomes than the replacement of one form of dependency for another?

2. The debate over whether democratic government can successfully manage ethnic and religious diversity is one of the most pressing issues in the world today, not only in the Third World, but in post-communist Eastern Europe, Ireland, Spain (the Basque problem), and Israel, to name some of the prominent examples. Where do you stand on this question?
Lecture Thirty-Three
Competing Nationalisms—The Middle East

Scope: The issue of ethnic and religious diversity and the competing nationalisms inspired by it are nowhere more tragically apparent than in the Arab-Israeli conflict and the ongoing political tensions in the Middle East. This lecture charts the evolution of the conflict, focusing on the origins of the competing nationalist claims in the late 19th century and the escalating tensions that culminated in the creation of the state of Israel in 1948. It also examines the impact of imperialism and the Cold War in exacerbating existing tensions, instead of helping to resolve them. The lecture concludes by considering the broader issues of competing nationalist claims and the problematic intersection of nationalism, ethnic and religious diversity, and democracy.

Outline

I. The conflict generated by the competing Arab and Jewish nationalisms in the Middle East is one of the most tragic case studies of the challenge of managing ethnic and religious diversity in the framework of democratic nation-states. In addition, the conflict demonstrates how first imperialism, then the Cold War exacerbated rather than soothed existing tensions.
   A. How, as scholars, do we approach a case of competing nationalisms over the same territory?
   B. One expert has argued that we must accept the validity of each claim within that group’s cultural and historical context, without making judgments about the broader justice of those claims. This approach will help us to understand without taking sides.
   C. What was the origin of these competing nationalisms?
      1. For nationalists on both sides, the origins lay in antiquity, in the historical presence of the Jewish or Palestinian Arabs in the region.
      2. Both peoples entered the region in about the 12th century B.C., but political dominance shifted among Jewish, Christian, and Islamic forces until the 20th century.
      3. For scholars of modern nationalism, the origins of claims of nationalism have more modern roots, in the late 19th-century popularization of “nationalism” in European society.
      4. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the nationalist claim that every “people” should have its own political territory, that is, a nation-state, came to be a standard rallying cry.
   II. Both Jewish and Arab nationalism had their roots in this late-19th-century European culture; before that time, these identities were not linked to political units.
      A. Jewish nationalism, or Zionism, is most closely linked to Theodor Herzl, an assimilated European Jew.
         1. In 1896, Herzl wrote a book called the State of the Jews that called for the creation of a Jewish state, although not necessarily in Palestine.
         2. He organized the First Zionist Congress in 1897, which laid out the Zionist program, and helped form and lead the Jewish National Fund and the World Zionist Organization to promote this goal.
         3. His strategy was to gain international recognition for the idea of a Jewish state through diplomacy.
         4. Herzl’s major audience was among non-assimilated Eastern European Jews, who brought a different perspective to the movement.
         5. After Herzl’s death in 1904, their greater religious commitment to Palestine and their strategy of de facto settlement became the dominant position in Zionist organizations.
         6. This group used international Zionist organizations to raise money to buy land in Palestine and to recruit immigrants who would settle there in farming communities.
         7. By 1914, they had founded 14 agricultural settlements in Palestine, with another 30 populated by the small historical Jewish community and the trickle of individual immigrants, who came mostly from Russia after the start of the pogroms in the 1880s.
         8. The total number of Jews in Palestine by 1914 was about 60,000, or 1/10 of the population.
         9. The first outside recognition of Zionist claims came in 1917, when the British foreign secretary, Arthur Balfour, issued the Balfour Declaration, which made vague promises about supporting the aspirations for a Jewish homeland.
B. Like Zionism, Arab nationalism is a recent phenomenon.
   1. Throughout most of the Ottoman Empire, there was no demand for an independent Arab nation-state, but only for religious self-government within the empire.
   2. The first Arab nationalist tract was published in Europe, as was Herzl’s book, by a Maronite Christian Arab living in Paris in 1905. The author, Naguib Azoury, also formed the League of the Arab Fatherland.

III. It was the First World War and its aftermath that really propelled the expansion of Arab nationalist sentiment.
   A. The Arab countries of the Middle East experienced a similar sense of disillusionment as other regions, including India and China, which heard the proclamation of “national self-determination” in the Paris peace treaties and watched as they were treated differently.
      1. As in China, colonies taken from the defeated power (in this case, the Ottoman Empire) were transferred to the victorious colonial powers, rather than given independence.
      2. In the Middle East, this transfer was in the form of protectorates, which were supposed to be preparing for independence.
      3. This outcome was all the more humiliating because the British had encouraged Arab nationalism during the war as a way of getting Arabs to fight the Turks.
   B. As the British were supporting Arab nationalism publicly, secretly, they signed the Picot-Sykes Agreement in 1916, which carved up the Middle East into British and French spheres of influence.
      1. The anger created by the secret deal; the lack of progress toward independence, especially in French-controlled Lebanon and Syria; and the heavy-handed repression of Arab nationalism by both French and British fueled nationalist sentiment in the region before World War II.
      2. For Arab nationalists, Zionism was simply another form of European imperialism.

IV. Tensions between Jewish and Arab nationalism grew dramatically in the interwar period in British-controlled Palestine.
   A. Between 1914 and 1945, the immigration of European Jews to Palestine increased dramatically, jumping from 1/10 of the population in 1914 to 1/3 in 1939.
   B. More than simply numbers, the immigrants were constructing an entire economic and administrative infrastructure, as well as a thriving cultural and intellectual life in Hebrew.
   C. Moreover, following the socialist utopian principles of the Zionists, it was a society built on egalitarian relations but in an exclusively Jewish community.
   D. By the 1930s, conflicts between Jews and Palestinian Arabs over settlement expansion, Arab exclusion policies, and other issues had reached almost civil war proportions.
   E. The creation of the Israeli state in 1948 did nothing to resolve the tension.
      1. The creation of the state of Israel by the UN recognized both Arab and Jewish nationalist claims, but only the Zionists accepted the UN mandate.
      2. When the British rapidly withdrew in 1948, the first Arab-Israeli war over the contested territory followed.
      3. The UN finally brokered an armistice in 1949, but the two sides could not agree on terms to repatriate the 750,000 Palestinian refugees who had fled during the war.
      4. A series of wars in 1956, 1967, and 1973 were fought between Arab and Israeli forces over the Arabs’ refusal to recognize Zionist nationalist claims.

V. For both Israelis and Arabs, the constant pressure of competing nationalist claims has also exacerbated internal identity struggles.
   A. Particularly in recent years, the Arab-Israeli conflict has reached such a level of bitter contention that it is virtually impossible to predict when, if, and how it will be resolved.
   B. By looking back at the origins of the opposing nationalist claims, however, we could, perhaps, ask how and if they could have worked out in a way more conducive to democratic development in the region.

Essential Reading:

**Supplementary Reading:**

**Questions to Consider:**
1. When examining a historical subject so emotionally laden as this one, how would you frame the best scholarly approach?
2. The “two-state” solution would resolve some of the tension between ethnic nationalism and democracy by maintaining majority Jewish and Palestinian populations in their respective states. Are there other problems that the two-state solution does not resolve?
Lecture Thirty-Four
Development Models—Communist China

Scope: One of the fundamental challenges faced by all the Third World nations was economic development. In this lecture, we begin to look at different roads to development, using case studies to compare and contrast their successes and failures. First, we examine the evolution of the Chinese Peoples’ Republic, from 1949 through the 1970s, as an example of the communist development model that was adopted by a number of post-colonial nations. We examine the basic elements of this model, which included a strong state-directed economic policy, a plan to equalize income and wealth, and authoritarian limits on political expression. We conclude with an evaluation of the results of this model in terms of economic growth, the reduction of poverty, and political freedom.

Outline

I. Before evaluating the successes and failures of economic development in Third World nations, we need to define what success meant for newly emerging nations.

A. Most important for poor countries was to achieve economic modernization that would lead to self-sustaining growth.
   1. Essential to managing this modernization was a stable state.
   2. Finally, new countries wanted to raise the standard of living for their populations, providing literacy, education, health care, and other basic benefits.

B. While most nations agreed on these goals, they followed different political paths to pursue them.
   1. In general terms, the paths can be grouped into three categories: the communist, the democratic, and the authoritarian roads.
   2. In practice, the paths overlapped in certain areas, but we will look at each path, in turn, through specific case studies that achieved at least partial successes: China as the communist model, India as the democratic model, and Japan as the authoritarian model.
   3. Through the case studies, we will evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the different paths to development for Third World nations.

C. For comparing the socialist and democratic models, China and India are excellent case studies, because they shared many of the same problems when first established in the late 1940s. (Japan is quite a different case, neither a new nation nor poor.)
   1. Both were largely rural, poor societies, with high rates of illiteracy among the majority peasant populations.
   2. Both also had huge, diverse populations and land masses.
   3. Both had high rates of poverty and low rates of economic growth.
   4. On the other hand, they both had the advantage of new ruling elites with several decades of experience as an opposition movement before taking power.
   5. Finally, they both are relative success stories in the Third World, having made significant advances in economic development.

II. In the Chinese socialist model of development up to the 1980s, democracy and political freedoms were sacrificed in pursuit of economic equality. The tradeoff was that, before the changing economic policies of the 1980s, serious poverty had been virtually eliminated, but at the cost of a repressive society.

A. The question of why the pursuit of economic equality entailed repression lies at the heart of liberal criticisms of communism.
   1. To eliminate poverty, communists argued, private property had to be abolished and managed and distributed collectively.
   2. Furthermore, as a revolutionary movement, this process was to be rapid, not gradual.
   3. This process requires expropriation of individual property and, thus, sets up the parameters of a coercive state.
4. The coercive state was justified by the goal of “democratizing the life of the country,” as Deng Xiaoping put it in 1980, which referred not to political rights but to spreading education and material benefits.

B. With the coercive state as the arm of development and egalitarian prosperity as the goal, the Chinese government pursued a two-pronged policy of rapid growth and redistribution of resources.
   1. In promoting growth, China followed the Soviet command economy model, in which the state established and implemented a plan for industrialization and the collectivization of agriculture.
   2. Because the vast majority of the population was made up of peasants, it was in the agricultural communities that the egalitarian ideal was put into practice and that came to represent the heart of the Chinese communist society.

C. What were the results of the Chinese socialist development model up to the 1980s?
   1. China had some impressive growth statistics, but the success of a command economy in generating growth is more uneven than a market economy.
   2. As China has pursued more market-oriented policies in the 1980s and 1990s, growth rates have increased.
   3. On the other hand, earlier growth was achieved without major foreign loans, because the capitalist world ostracized China and capital had to be generated internally, largely from agricultural surplus.

D. The strengths and weaknesses of a command economy can be demonstrated by example.
   1. In the late 1950s, the Chinese government embarked on an agrarian experiment, the so-called Great Leap Forward, which moved peasants into large communes. The experiment disrupted production so severely that 30 to 50 million people died in a massive famine in 1960–1961.
   2. The problem with a centralized economic policy defined by bureaucrats in the capital is that it takes no account of local conditions, has no flexibility, and leaves no other options if it fails.
   3. On the other hand, when the government has a good idea, centralized planning can distribute its effects widely and rapidly.
   4. Thus, when the government broke up the communes in the 1960s and replaced them with smaller work brigades, it used this structure to disseminate the benefits of the “green revolution” and dramatically increase agricultural production.
   5. Overall, it seems clear that capitalism has proved the better model for growth.

E. If both China and India achieved impressive (but, for China, more uneven) economic growth, what about the reduction of poverty and rising living standards?
   1. It is in this area that the communist model in China was most successful.
   2. Rates of literacy, child mortality, malnutrition, and life expectancy were all significantly better than in India.
   3. Interestingly, since market reforms of the 1980s, the gap between rich and poor has been growing.

F. But the price to pay for a better fed and healthier population was a repressive enforced equality.
   1. The radical commitment to equality and its consequences culminated in the late 1960s and early 1970s with the Cultural Revolution’s attempt to impose absolute social and economic uniformity through various coercive methods.
   2. Millions of those accused of being “above” the masses were purged from their jobs and forced to do manual labor and learn “peasant values.”
   3. Mao’s fanatical Red Guard troops imposed this equalization policy through mass terror.
   4. When Mao died in 1976, a new leadership rejected this path and began to chart a more pragmatic course.

G. From the 1950s through the 1970s, though, the Chinese communist model demonstrates the dangers of enforcing equality through a tyrannical state; at the same time, it illustrates how a state committed to raising the living standard of its population can achieve dramatic results. The question raised by this unattractive tradeoff is about the balance between equality and freedom: What is the ideal balance, and what is the best path to achieve it in societies with large populations of the poor?

**Essential Reading:**
Supplementary Reading:
Anita Chan, Richard Madsen, and Jonathan Unger, *Chen Village: The Recent History of a Peasant Community in Mao's China*.
Elizabeth Perry and Li Xun, *Proletarian Power: Shanghai in the Cultural Revolution*.

Questions to Consider:
1. The tradeoff between “freedom” and “equality” is a complex one, depending on how one defines those terms, but it clearly has different implications, depending on the social and economic structure of a society. Discuss the factors involved.
2. Whatever the merits of the command economy in generating economic growth in the short term, in the long term, the model appears to be unsustainable, as witnessed by the collapse of the USSR and the economic reforms of China in recent decades. Would you agree?
Lecture Thirty-Five
Development Models—Democratic India

Scope: Turning to a different development case study, this lecture uses India as an example of the successes and limits of the capitalist democratic model in the Third World. Because China and India began the process of development with similar problems, they provide ideal points of comparison between the two development models. We begin by outlining the elements of India’s pluralist political system and its economic policy based on private property and a general adherence to the free market. The conclusion weighs the results of India’s development model, evaluating its accomplishments in the area of economic growth and political liberties and its limits in reducing levels of poverty.

Outline

I. The capitalist democratic model in the Third World, that is, in societies with serious economic inequalities, endemic poverty, and traditional economies, had its successes and limits.
   A. India provides an excellent case study for evaluating democratic development, because it is one of the first (and few) new post-colonial nations to establish a stable, functioning democratic system.
      1. In the 1950s constitution, India established a British-style parliamentary system along a federalist design modeled after the United States.
      2. Beyond formal structure, India generally functions as a democracy, with significant political pluralism.
      3. Despite the uninterrupted rule of a single party for 47 years, elections have been vigorously contested and generally honest.
      4. Furthermore, because of decentralization, there has been a good deal of independent political activity at the local and regional levels, where other parties have held power.
      5. Democratic practice is also clear in India’s vigorous pursuit of civil rights.
      6. In addition to the basic liberal freedoms of speech and association, India has pursued an active policy of legal anti-discrimination to counter the hierarchies of Hindu caste society.
      7. At the same time, India has pursued development through the democratic principle of gradual and consensual change, which is supported by the majority of the population.
      8. There have been exceptions to democratic rule, especially in the disputed province of Kashmir, which has been under military rule since 1989.
   B. In economic policy, India has tried to promote growth and prosperity in the framework of a capitalist model, that is, respecting private property and free enterprise.
      1. Within a basic free market system, India has followed what has become the “catch-up” version of development, which allows a larger role for the state than in classic laissez-faire models.
      2. Thus, the government set out national economic plans, created some state-owned businesses, and tried to coordinate private businesses behind a national development plan.
      3. Since 1991, India has moved away from this planning model toward a more American-style liberalization.
      4. In the 1950s, plans focused on improving agricultural yields and feeding the population.
      5. In the 1960s, industrialization was added.
      6. In the 1970s and 1980s, India entered the high-tech field.

II. What have been the successes of India’s democratic capitalist model of development?
   A. The most impressive results have been in the rates of growth.
   B. Propelling this growth was a virtual agricultural revolution, in which India tripled food production between 1947 and 1985.
   C. In terms of industrialization, India has managed to find a competitive niche for its manufactured and high-tech goods in Third World markets.
   D. Finally, in terms of social gains, India has one of the largest middle classes in the Third World and has improved health indicators, such as life expectancy and infant mortality.
III. On the other hand, there have been limits to the Indian model, as the Nobel prize-winning economist Amartya Sen has pointed out.

A. The key problem, he says, is that there has been no significant reduction in poverty, and in fact, the gap between rich and poor has widened.
   1. High rates of poverty have kept the life expectancy rate low compared to China, and endemic malnutrition is still a serious problem.
   2. How is it possible that India is technically self-sufficient in agriculture but suffers endemic malnutrition?
   3. In contrast to China, where the green revolution was made available to all farming communities, in India, the expensive fertilizers were accessible only to wealthy farmers.
   4. Further, as Sen has pointed out, self-sufficiency in a capitalist economy does not mean that everyone is adequately fed; it simply means that the market demand for food has been met.
   5. The gap between high growth and quality of life for the masses has been compounded by a limited program of welfare and social services, which has not made a major effort to redistribute wealth through entitlement programs.
   6. The assumption that growth would take care of poverty was further reflected in the liberalization plan of 1991, which focused on encouraging more foreign trade and investment to stimulate growth.

B. Why hasn’t India been able to reduce poverty more effectively?
   1. Sen uses a comparison with Sri Lanka to demonstrate that it is not simply a problem of more growth.
   2. Sen argues that this inability is the result of the elitist nature of Indian politics, controlled by the educated upper-caste minority.
   3. In other words, the roots of the problem go back to India’s socially conservative path to independence.
   4. One could also pose the broader question about the limits of a democratic capitalist model in reducing poverty in such a place as India.
   5. The capitalist system leaves in place the existing property structure, no matter how unequal, while a democratic polity makes it difficult to carry out serious voluntary reforms.

C. As in the Chinese case, we are left with a series of tradeoffs. India has created dramatic growth and a stable democratic government, but these achievements have been at the cost of reducing poverty. Given the contrasting tradeoffs of the Chinese and Indian models, the question is whether it is possible for democratic governments to address serious problems of economic inequality, or whether economic justice requires the sacrifice of political freedoms.

Essential Reading:

Supplementary Reading:

Questions to Consider:
1. In Amartya Sen’s evaluation of “how India is doing,” he thinks the negatives outweigh the positives: What should the criteria for “successful” development be?
2. Is there a way to imagine combining the benefits of the Indian and Chinese models, or would that involve too many contradictions?
Lecture Thirty-Six

The Authoritarian Development State—Japan

Scope: As was the case before World War II, Japan’s economic redevelopment was in a class of its own. This lecture examines the hybrid model used to achieve its spectacular prosperity, a model that has taken elements from both the classic liberal and the communist approaches to development. The components of what some scholars have called soft authoritarianism include a state economic policy but a capitalist market, a democratic constitution but an effectively one-party regime, and a collective mobilization of different sectors of the population behind development goals.

Outline

I. Although Japan was, in many ways, already a “developed” country in 1945, it was faced with the considerable challenge of rebuilding a shattered economy and reconstructing a political framework that had been discredited.

A. Furthermore, the Japanese model of (re)development served as a guide for other poor Third World countries in Southeast Asia that were developing for the first time; thus, it has some applicability in the non-Western world.
   1. What made Japan different from most of the Third World nations was that it retained many advantages despite economic devastation, such as an educated homogenous population, skills, technology, and so on.
   2. Nevertheless, it was faced with the common problem of quickly building a competitive industrial economy and a stable political system.
   3. It also still suffered from a lack of raw materials, energy sources, and farmland.

B. The model followed by Japan until the early 1990s exemplified what some scholars have called the authoritarian developmental model.
   1. In some ways, it combines aspects of the democratic/capitalist and socialist models.
   2. On the one hand, it relies on a strong state to push modernization from above and one-party rule to neutralize opposition and focus development.
   3. On the other hand, it respects free enterprise and private property.

C. On the surface, Japan’s American-designed constitutional system appears democratic, not authoritarian, especially compared to the regime it replaced.
   1. Despite the democratic framework, however, the regime has operated as what some political scientists have called a soft authoritarian state.
   2. Thus, despite the existence of several political parties, the Liberal Democratic Party held uninterrupted power until the 1990s, and even since then, it has been the dominant partner in many coalitions.
   3. De facto one-party rule in Japan differs from that in India because of the greater centralization of Japanese politics and the authoritarianism of non-elected institutions, such as the bureaucracy and the police.

II. Why did large majorities continue to vote for the same party over so many years?

A. At first, the government used heavy repression to control trade unions and communists, but by the 1960s, prosperity provided legitimization for many.

B. In other words, if a mildly authoritarian state can achieve economic development and prosperity for its population, people may be willing to make the tradeoff between economic well-being and lack of political choices.

C. What’s crucial here seems to be the minimum level of authoritarianism that guarantees stability and encourages economic growth without stifling it.

III. How did the soft authoritarian state encourage development?

A. The role of the state has been to help private business succeed in the free market, even more aggressively than in democratic “catch-up” states, such as India.

B. In political science lingo, the state has used market-conforming methods of intervention, as opposed to the socialist market suppression methods.
C. Thus, the government disseminates information to businessmen on market opportunities and provides incentives for certain kinds of economic activities.

D. Instead of leaving companies to figure out their own market niches (laissez-faire) or mandating what companies should produce (command economy), the government sets out collective goals and tries to convince people to follow them.

E. One of the main tasks of the government has been to mobilize people around these collective goals.
   1. One of the catchy phrases invented to express this collective ideal is “Japan, Inc.,” the idea that the entire country is an integrated corporation in which all members are making decisions to improve the well-being of the whole.
   2. In contrast to the American emphasis on individual initiative and profit and the fear that collectivism and self-sacrifice undermine capitalism, in Japan, workers and businessmen are called on to cooperate and sacrifice for the overall growth of the “company.”
   3. Workers are asked to work hard, and until the economic crisis of the late 1990s, many were rewarded with lifetime job security.
   4. The labor relations system set up by the government depends on enterprise unions, which negotiate with management for contracts but within a context of intense loyalty to the firm.
   5. Another ingredient to a self-sacrificing and hard-working workforce has been mobilizing Japanese women as housewives and mothers and valuing their contribution to caring for overworked husbands and children.
   6. A final group, mobilized behind national economic policy, has been consumers. To support the export-driven strategy, consumers are asked to limit consumption of luxury goods so as not to drive up the trade deficit.

F. The results of Japan’s development model are, of course, in a class by themselves.
   1. In the 1950s, Japan pursued a low-wage, labor-intensive strategy that undersold First World textiles and other light industry.
   2. In the 1960s, it moved to a capital-intensive strategy that began investing in automobiles, televisions, and later, high-tech industries.
   3. By 1968, Japan was the third largest industrial nation, and by the mid-1980s, it was the second.
   4. Without massive inequalities of wealth or high levels of poverty, Japan has excellent education and better social services than exist in the United States.

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Essential Reading:

Supplementary Reading:
Ronald Dore, *Taking Japan Seriously.*

Questions to Consider:
1. What do you think of the claim that authoritarian development is the model of the future, while democratic development is the model for the past? How would you support or contest this position?

2. Another possible scenario is that the authoritarian development model works for the initial stages of development, but that at some point, people are no longer willing to sacrifice political freedoms for economic comfort. What do you think is the most likely scenario?
Biographical Notes

Samuel Beckett (1906–1989). Arguably the most important dramatist of the 20th century, Beckett abandons traditional theatrical notions about language, plot, and characters in favor of creating a world that highlights the meaningless of existence. Before World War II, he was primarily a novelist and essayist, highly influenced by French surrealist authors and James Joyce. After the war (in which he served as a member of the French Resistance), he turned to drama. His masterwork Waiting for Godot was first produced in Paris in 1953 and was one of the first examples of theatre of the absurd. In Godot, nothing happens: Two tramps are waiting for Mr. Godot to save them from some unnamed situation or threat, but he never arrives. The work itself mixes together Nietzschean philosophy, allusions to Christianity, nihilistic violence, and music-hall humor to present a worldview that absolutely nothing is certain. Beckett further developed this theme (if one can speak of uncertainty as being a theme) in Endgame (1957) and Happy Days (1961). Although his work often baffled and infuriated conservative critics and audiences, his importance to world letters was formally recognized in 1969 when he was awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature.

Lázaro Cárdenas (1891–1970). Like Emiliano Zapata and many of the key players in the Mexican Revolution, Cárdenas came from a peasant family and spent most of the years between 1910 and 1920 serving in one or another of the various revolutionary armies. Cárdenas ultimately sided with Alvaro Obregón and was rewarded with high military posts, a provincial governorship, and various cabinet positions. This success, however, did not dim his leftist political views (as it did with many others), and he continued to support the need for land reform in Mexico. Cárdenas was elected president of Mexico in 1934 and instituted a series of reforms squarely based on revolutionary sentiments. He redistributed 45 million acres of land to the peasantry and instituted new communal holdings and doubled the number of schools throughout the country. He also nationalized the railways and the holdings of oil and gas companies in Mexico, most of which were owned and controlled by U.S. or British corporations. This move incensed the American government to the point that it withdrew all support from the Mexican economy, and although Cárdenas agreed to compensate the corporations who lost their holdings, he also proceeded to expropriate land belonging to U.S. agricultural concerns. Cárdenas opened the country to leftist refugees from Europe, and by the time he left office in 1940, Leon Trotsky and numerous Republican exiles from Spain had settled in Mexico. Cárdenas remained a controversial figure even after he left office: He accepted the Stalin Prize for Peace in 1955 and supported Fidel Castro’s regime in Cuba.

Frantz Fanon (1925–1961). Born in French Martinique, Fanon was, in many ways, the classic Western-educated nationalist intellectual. He studied medicine in France and served in the French Resistance during the Second World War. After the war, he became the chief psychiatrist at the state hospital in Algiers, Algeria, where he became drawn in to the nationalist movement, partly after witnessing the French repression of the Setif rebellion in 1945. He quit his post in 1956 to devote himself full time to the Algerian Liberation Front and died in exile in the United States in 1961. What made him more than a local nationalist activist were his extensive writings about the disastrous impact of colonialism in colonialized peoples. Black Skin, White Faces looked at the problem of a dual-race society in Martinique; Dying Colonialism (1957) argued that colonialism caused pathologies; and his most famous book, The Wretched of the Earth (1961), is an impassioned call for socialist anti-colonial revolution.

Sigmund Freud (1856–1939). Freud began as a practicing neurologist in Vienna in the 1880s. While treating illnesses of the nervous system, he became interested in cases of mental illness that seemed to have no physiological basis. Through experimenting with different techniques, from hypnosis to free association to the interpretation of dreams, he discovered that patients would recall painful repressed memories and that this recall had a cathartic effect. His two major conclusions were that the painful memories were largely connected to sex, specifically childhood sexual development, and that the place where these memories were stored was the unconscious, where they festered, giving rise in extreme cases to mental illness. His most important work from this formative period was the Interpretation of Dreams (1900). Freud was a scientist who dedicated himself to understanding the process of repression and how the problems arising from it could be treated. In his later life, he turned these insights to analyzing society at large. In the last year of his life, he was driven from Vienna by Nazi persecution and died in London.

Mohandas Gandhi (1869–1948). Gandhi came from a wealthy merchant family and studied law in England. Finding no work as a lawyer in India, he traveled to South Africa in 1893, where his encounters with racial discrimination prompted a campaign to improve the rights of Indians throughout the British Empire. It was during
these years that Gandhi developed his philosophy of nonviolent resistance and civil disobedience as a way of achieving his political goals; he was heavily influenced by the writings of Leo Tolstoy and named the farm he founded after the Russian author. Gandhi was accorded a hero’s welcome when he returned to India in 1915. Following World War I—as it became clear that the British government was not only going to ignore the faithful service of Indians in the British Army but was going to try to increase its control over India—Gandhi turned his attentions toward independence. He espoused a policy of economic self-sufficiency and instituted a boycott of all British goods. In addition, he traveled around India denouncing the rigid Hindu caste system and promoting friendship and cooperation between Hindus and Moslems. Gandhi was imprisoned several times during the 1920s and 1930s; he also spent most of World War II in jail for refusing to lend his support to the war effort, in spite of British promises of independence. Gandhi actively campaigned against the increasing levels of violence that led up to Indian independence in 1947; he also campaigned against the partition that split the subcontinent into Moslem and Hindu states. He was assassinated by a Hindu extremist on January 13, 1948.

Mikhail Gorbachev (b. 1931). Born to a peasant family in southern Russia, Gorbachev spent most of his youth working on a collective farm. He moved to Moscow in 1952 to study law and there joined the Communist Party. Gorbachev spent the next 30 years moving upward through the Soviet hierarchy, working with the communist youth movement and as an organizer of collective farms, eventually becoming the party secretary in charge of agriculture. In 1980, he became a member of the Politburo (the group of officials that ran the party and, thus, the Soviet Union) and was elected general secretary of the Communist Party in 1985. In foreign policy, he worked with U.S. President Ronald Regan toward reducing the chemical and nuclear weapons stockpiles of both nations. His domestic policies centered on the ideas of glasnost (“openness”) and perestroika (economic “restructuring”): Politically, he reduced state censorship and promoted toleration of dissenting political views and, economically, he introduced free-market reforms. However, Gorbachev’s policies managed to alienate both conservative communists (who felt he was undermining the system) and radical reformers (who felt he was not moving fast enough). Although these policies helped to accelerate the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, Gorbachev refused to countenance the breakup of the Soviet Union itself and cracked down on separatist movements in the Baltic states. He was elected president of the Soviet Union in 1990, but in August of 1991, he was arrested by a group of conservative communists attempting a coup against the government; the fact that the coup was defeated under the leadership of Russian President Boris Yeltsin—not Gorbachev—accelerated the disintegration of the USSR. Late that year, Gorbachev resigned his political offices and has since lived as a private citizen.

Theodor Herzl (1860–1904). Herzl came from the same milieu as his contemporary, Sigmund Freud: the assimilated Jewish middle class of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Trained as a lawyer, Herzl moved to Vienna in 1878 and became a journalist with that city’s leading newspapers; he also wrote several plays. His entry into the world of politics was caused by his reaction to the intense anti-Semitism aroused by the Dreyfus Affair in 1894 (which Herzl was covering as the Paris correspondent for the Neue Freie Presse). Herzl came to the conclusion that full assimilation into European society would never be possible for the Jewish people because of the intense prejudice against them; his solution was to be the foundation of a Jewish state where their security would not be in the hands of the Gentiles. His choice for the new state was Palestine, but the Ottoman sultan who ruled the region was cool toward the idea because it lacked financial backing. To promote his cause, Herzl organized the First Zionist Congress in 1897; however, its historical importance as the foundation of the modern Zionist movement was overshadowed by the lack of support for its aims by middle-class and wealthy Jews, who felt that Zionism had the power to destroy the progress made by assimilation. Herzl sought support for his movement from Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany, Czar Nicholas II of Russia, Pope Pius X, and Joseph Chamberlain, the British colonial secretary. Because the critical support of the Jewish financial families, such as the Rothschilds, was lacking, none of these men was willing to provide the political support needed to make the dream of Zionism a reality. (Chamberlain did offer Uganda as a potential location for the Jewish state, but this was rejected by the Sixth Zionist Congress in 1903.) Exhausted by his travels, Herzl died in July 1904. When the state of Israel was finally founded in 1949, his body was disinterred and his remains were reburied in Jerusalem.

Adolf Hitler (1889–1945). Few individuals have been subject to such intense scrutiny as Adolf Hitler. Born in an Austrian town across the border of southern Germany, he epitomizes the image of evil incarnate. Historians and biographers have struggled to find some theory to explain what happened to turn him from a failed artist living in Vienna before the war to a mass murderer and fanatical German nationalist, but there seems to be no “smoking gun.” His marginal and alienated existence made him, in a sense, the prototypical fascist recruit. He joined the German army during the First World War, was profoundly disillusioned by Germany’s surrender and humiliation,
and like many disgruntled veterans, he joined one of the anti-democratic societies that proliferated, the German Workers’ Party. His oratorical and organizational skills pushed him to the front of the party, and he turned it into a paramilitary fighting force, similar to Mussolini’s squadristi in Italy. In contrast to Italy, however, the new Weimar democracy stabilized and Hitler was arrested in 1923 after his failed Beer Hall Putsch. He wrote Mein Kampf while in jail, but most agree that without the Depression and the crisis it opened up in German society, Hitler would have remained a footnote.

John Maynard Keynes (1883–1946). Born the son of a Cambridge don, this British economist discarded the classical economic theory of Adam Smith and developed the ideas that form the basis of the modern welfare state. Keynes began his career as a civil servant but rose to public notoriety in 1919 with the publication of The Economic Consequences of the Peace. He had attended the Versailles Peace Conference but disagreed with the harsh financial reparations the Allies imposed on Germany, which he felt were unjust and would ultimately make economic recovery from the devastation of the war virtually impossible—an argument that infuriated many people who were more concerned with punishing the defeated than helping them. Keynes spent the following years developing his economic theories, which were given their fullest and most lucid explanation in General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (1936). At the core of his theory is the idea that the capitalist economic system does not have the potential to generate employment for everybody, as classical economists believed. Thus, states must incur deficit spending during economic downturns to stimulate employment and limit their spending during periods of prosperity to avoid inflation. Although these ideas caused intense debate, they were increasingly accepted by governments after World War II that sought to prevent a reoccurrence of the economic and social dislocations of the Great Depression. For his work and his public service during both world wars, Keynes was elevated to the British peerage in 1942.

Martin Luther King, Jr. (1929–1968). King came from a well-respected family in Atlanta’s African American community—both his father and grandfather were Baptist ministers. He studied sociology and theology, eventually earning a doctorate in theology from Boston University in 1955. During this time, he developed views that were distinctly more liberal than those of traditional Baptist doctrine. That same year, King became pastor of a church in Montgomery, Alabama and became involved in the civil rights movement following the arrest of Rosa Parks for refusing to surrender her bus seat to a white man. It was during this time that King began to develop a philosophy of nonviolent resistance, influenced by Gandhi and traditional Christian principles. King was the founder of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, which became one of the primary coordinators of the civil rights movement in the South. He was arrested in 1963 in Birmingham, and his “Letter from a Birmingham Jail” is the key document to understanding his philosophy. King’s influence on the civil rights movement waned in later years as younger African Americans became more militant. King himself began to speak out on a wider range of issues, including the Vietnam War and poverty. He was assassinated in Memphis on April 4, 1969.

Aleksandra Kollontai (1872–1952). Although her father was a member of the officer corps of the Russian army, Kollontai received a liberal—almost radical—education that helped to shape her life. She developed a strong independent streak that first manifested itself when she married against her parent’s wishes; later, she left her husband in order to study at the University of Zurich, where she read deeply in Marxist theory and philosophy. Kollontai witnessed the Bloody Sunday massacre of 1905. and this seems to have influenced her radicalism: During the next few years, she forcibly argued that the only road to feminine equality was through Marxist revolution, which would eliminate the traditional family structure, and not through bourgeois tactics, such as emancipation. She traveled widely through Europe before World War I, lecturing on her philosophy; during the war, she returned to Russia and actively participated in the 1917 Revolution. By 1921, she headed the Women’s Section of the Bolshevik Party, but her support for the idea of free love scandalized party leaders, who sent her abroad. Kollontai spent the years from 1922 to 1945 in the Soviet diplomatic corps, serving as ambassador to Norway, Mexico, and Finland. Her focus on feminist issues rather than party politics may have contributed to the fact that she survived Stalin’s purges.

Vladimir Ilich Lenin (1870–1924). Lenin’s early life is, in many ways, the prototypical story of the 19th-century Russian intelligentsia. He was the son of a provincial bureaucrat and trained as a lawyer but was inclined toward radical politics—a process accelerated by the execution of his brother in 1887 for involvement in an assassination plot against the czar. Lenin moved to St. Petersburg in 1893 and became a leading figure in revolutionary circles; he was arrested and exiled to Siberia as a result. After 1900, he lived in Western Europe and devoted his energies to
promoting the revolutionary consciousness of the working classes. He concluded that a Marxist revolution could occur only if it was headed by a vanguard of intellectuals leading the proletariat. His stance that revolution must take precedence over all other forms of action split the Russian Marxists, and Lenin’s faction adopted the name Bolshevik to distinguish itself. Lenin returned to Russia when the czar abdicated in 1917 and led the October Revolution, which overthrew the bourgeois provisional government. He used the resulting civil war to turn the Bolshevik Party into a dictatorship that ruled the country, but the chaos that resulted from the unrest forced him to allow a mixture of capitalist and socialist economic measures (known as the New Economic Policy) in order to regain political control. Lenin suffered a stroke in 1922 and was a virtual invalid until his death two years later. He was subsequently embalmed and put on public display at the Kremlin in Moscow, attesting to his enormous historical and political importance in the Soviet Union.

Nelson Mandela (b. 1918). Mandela was the child of a Xhosa tribal chieftain; he began his career studying law at Witwatersrand University and, subsequently, set up the first black law practice in South Africa. In 1944, he joined the African National Congress (ANC), a group dedicated to ending white-minority rule in South Africa. Although the ANC originally espoused a philosophy of nonviolence, Mandela and other younger members increasingly came to the conclusion that passive resistance only encouraged violence by the white population and that violent tactics would be necessary to achieve their aims. Mandela was charged with treason in 1956 but was acquitted. The ANC was banned in 1960, and Mandela turned to underground organization for the movement; in 1962, he was arrested for leaving South Africa illegally and sentenced to five years in prison—a sentence that was expanded to life in prison the following year, when he was found guilty of sabotage and conspiracy to commit guerrilla warfare. In the years that followed, Mandela increasingly became a symbol of the oppression of white rule in South Africa. In fact, he became an embarrassment to the government: He refused one chance for release because it would have meant cooperating with the regime, and his health grew increasingly fragile. He was released in 1990 and became president of the ANC the following year. Mandela now embraced an idea of cooperation with the white population, and he shared the 1993 Nobel Peace Prize with South African President F. W. de Klerk for his work. Mandela was elected president of South Africa in that country’s first free elections in 1994, and he has since focused on healing the racial divide and rebuilding the economy of that nation.

Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900). The most important German philosopher of the late 19th century, Nietzsche erupted on the scene with a challenging series of books in the 1880s that expressed his contempt for traditional assumptions in a flashy language that quickly caught the attention of intellectual circles. He began his academic career at age 24, with a Ph.D. in classical philology, becoming a professor at the University of Basel. But his academic colleagues saw his work as too speculative and reckless, and he soon resigned from his post, writing books from his position as alienated intellectual. Although his ideas were not always well developed, their explosive nature gave them a wide-reaching impact. He was born in Prussia, the son of a Lutheran minister. Plagued by ill health his entire life, in 1889, Nietzsche had a mental breakdown from which he never recovered his mental faculties.

Kwame Nkrumah (1909–1972). Although he is arguably the most important and influential of the African nationalists who freed the continent from the European imperial powers, Nkrumah’s important legacy has been clouded by his actions as the first president of Ghana. He was born to a humble family and first educated by Catholic missionaries; in 1935, he traveled to the United States, where he studied sociology, theology, and education, eventually earning a graduate degree in philosophy from the University of Pennsylvania. His political thinking was influenced primarily by Lenin, Gandhi, and Marcus Garvey, whose notion of pan-Africanism was crucial in shaping Nkrumah’s political goals. Nkrumah moved to England to study law in 1945 and returned to Ghana two years later to take part in the nationalist movement seeking independence from Britain. He soon headed the most radical nationalist faction, actively agitating for independence; he became prime minister under the British governor in 1952, a post that he retained when Ghana gained its independence in 1957. Elections in 1960 turned the country into a republic, and Nkrumah became president. His political ambition now turned to uniting the African continent under the banner of pan-Africanism, a goal that became increasingly tenuous as each newly independent country tasted the fruits of its struggle for freedom. Meanwhile, Nkrumah’s attempts to build a quasi-Marxist state in Ghana mired the country in corruption and economic decay; Nkrumah himself became increasingly repressive—instituting censorship, outlawing trade unions and opposition political parties, and building a Stalinistic cult of personality. He declared himself president-for-life in 1964 and was ousted in a military coup two years later, spending the rest of his life in exile.
Olusegun Obasanjo (b. 1937). It may be significant that Obasanjo entered the military as a last desperate means to finance his education when he failed to gain a scholarship to the University of Ibadan; his behavior has certainly been more enlightened than the stereotype of generals involved in African politics. He first came to prominence in 1975, when Nigeria’s longtime military ruler reneged on his promise to return the country to civilian rule; Obasanjo became the chief of staff to the new military government, which promised a return to civilian rule within four years. The following year, the head of the government, General Murtala Muhammad, was assassinated and Obasanjo took his place. His government focused on creating economic stability for the region, mending the tribal and religious rifts that plagued the country, and opposing the white-controlled governments in South Africa and Rhodesia. Obasanjo kept his word and returned Nigeria to civilian rule in 1979, retiring to the country to live as a farmer. He continued to speak out against apartheid and the increasing problems in Nigeria’s economic and political situation; in 1995, he was imprisoned by the military government of General Sani Abacha for his outspoken criticisms. Obasanjo was released in 1998 and was elected president of Nigeria for a second time the following year.

Josef Stalin (1879–1953). As in the case of Hitler, Stalin’s enormous personal influence on larger historical events has made him a subject of frequent biographies that try to unlock the key to his personality. Like Hitler, Stalin seemed an unlikely leader, born the son of a shoemaker and the grandson of serfs, a Georgian who became a fervent Russian nationalist. He dropped out of theological seminary and joined the Bolshevik movement in 1900, when he changed his name from Josef Djugashvili to Stalin, which meant “man of steel.” Like Hitler, as well, Stalin was no intellectual, not a great mind with original ideas, nor a cultured man, educated in the West, as were most of his Bolshevik contemporaries. He seemed to be the consummate bureaucrat, taking on the job of party secretary in 1922 and maneuvering among different factions of the party after Lenin’s death until he was able to assert his leadership in 1928–1929. After this point, he developed an increasingly megalomaniacal view of his relationship to the revolution, the Russian state, and the Bolshevik Party, but it was perhaps his simple understanding of the world that allowed him to stay so brutally focused.

Mao Tse-tung (1893–1976). Like many 20th-century revolutionaries, Mao came from peasant origins; unlike many revolutionaries, Mao made his humble past an integral component of his political philosophy and his personal style. His first encounter with Marxism came at Peking University, and he was one of the founding members of the Chinese Communist Party in 1921. His ideology rapidly alienated him from more traditional Chinese nationalists; he also became increasingly alienated from mainline communism as he developed the idea that it was the peasantry—not the urban proletariat—that needed to be the revolutionary vanguard in overthrowing the capitalist system. By 1934, the nationalist forces under Chiang Kai-Shek were overthrowing the communist bases of power in southern China; Mao assembled his forces and led them on a year-long, 6,000-mile Long March to a remote northern stronghold. Although the majority of those who began the journey never completed it, the Long March solidified the party and made Mao the undisputed leader of the Chinese communists. Mao fought against the Japanese in World War II and resumed his struggle with the nationalists after that, taking full control of China in 1949. Mao’s ideology paid little attention to industrialization, and his first attempt to modernize China—the Great Leap Forward of 1958—failed, weakening his power. He re-solidified his control under the Cultural Revolution (1966–1969), which purged Mao’s opponents and attacked all nonconformist elements in society. Mao’s final major initiative was to reopen ties with the United States, a move that helped China’s subsequent modernization.

Emiliano Zapata (c. 1879–1919). Zapata’s social origin was in the relatively narrow band of the Mexican peasantry that owned some land, and part of the explanation for his later revolutionary activity may arise from the confiscation of his family’s orchards while he was still quite young. It was the plight of similar peasants, forced off their subsistence holdings and into working for large landowners, that prompted Zapata’s initial foray into local politics. His opposition to the policies of the Porfirio Diaz regime prompted the government to draft him into the army in 1910. Zapata returned to politics the following year, siding with Francisco Madero’s challenge to the Diaz government; however, when Madero gained power, he ignored Zapata’s call to confiscate the holdings of large landowners and redistribute them more equitably among the peasants. By 1912, Zapata was in revolt against all the various political factions in Mexico as a way of accomplishing his land reforms (the Plan de Ayala). In 1914, Zapata joined forces with Pancho Villa and occupied Mexico City in order to force acceptance of his plan across the country. But by the following year, the forces of Alvaro Obregón had forced him out of the capital and into a guerrilla revolt based in northern Mexico that lasted until Zapata’s assassination in an ambush in 1919. This did not end his influence, however, and the Obregón government used the ideas in the Plan de Ayala to institute its own agrarian reforms.
Interpreting the 20\textsuperscript{th} Century: The Struggle Over Democracy
Part IV
Professor Pamela Radcliff
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Pamela Radcliff was born in Passaic, New Jersey, and grew up in Clifton, New Jersey, and Escondido, California. She received her B.A. in history, with membership in Phi Beta Kappa, from Scripps College, one of the five Claremont Colleges, then spent a couple of years traveling around the world before beginning graduate education at Columbia University. She studied modern European history at Columbia, where she received her M.A. and Ph.D. degrees, completed in 1990.

Since the conclusion of her graduate work, Professor Radcliff has been teaching at the University of California, San Diego, in the Department of History. She teaches undergraduate courses on 20th-century European history, modern Spanish history, the history of women and gender in modern Europe, and 20th-century world history. She has received two awards for undergraduate teaching, one granted by the university faculty and another by the students of her world history course.

Professor Radcliff’s historical research has focused on Spanish history in the 20th century, with particular emphasis on popular mobilization and the long-term struggle to establish a democratic system of government. She has published articles and books on these issues, including From Mobilization to Civil War: The Politics of Polarization in the Spanish City of Gijón, 1900–1937, which received the Sierra Book Award from the Western Association of Women’s Historians in 1998. She also co-edited (with Victoria Enders) a collection of articles on the history of women in modern Spain, Constructing Spanish Womanhood: Female Identity in Modern Spain. Her current book project focuses on the construction of democratic citizenship during the transition from an authoritarian to a democratic regime in Spain in the 1970s, and her latest article on this topic is “Citizens and Housewives: The Problem of Female Citizenship in Spain’s Transition to Democracy,” appearing in the fall 2002 issue of the Journal of Social History.

Professor Radcliff also served as an associate editor for the recent multivolume Encyclopedia of European Social History and belongs to a number of professional associations, including the American Historical Association and the Society for Spanish and Portuguese Historical Studies.

Professor Radcliff lives in Solana Beach, California, with her husband, Bill Perry, and their two children.
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Interpreting the 20th Century: The Struggle Over Democracy

Scope:

The 20th century transformed the world in ways few could have imagined in 1900. Making sense of this transformation is the challenge of this 48-lecture course. Because one course could never provide a history of every corner of the globe, our focus will be on how the different regions and countries interacted with each other. It is through this interaction that we can discern the common themes that allow us to talk about the history of the world.

One of the key themes was precisely how the growing interaction between regions would operate. By 1900, the process of Western expansion and imperialism had created a level of global interdependence that would only get stronger as the century progressed. But the interdependent world order created by Western imperialism was a fundamentally hierarchical one, based on Western leadership or domination of the non-Western world. The 20th century was defined by the various efforts to transform this connection into a more democratic relationship between Western nations and the rest of the world, or between the developed and less developed regions of the northern and southern hemispheres. In the first two-thirds of the century, these efforts focused on the struggle for independence from colonialism, while in the latter part, Third World nations pursued the more complex search for prosperity and stability.

The struggle over democracy was also a key theme in the Western, or developed, world. Most Western nations had some form of representational political systems in 1914, but they were not democratic. Furthermore, the process of democratization was neither automatic nor harmonious. Until almost the end of the century, the democratic ideal had to compete with powerful challengers, especially fascism and communism. The fascist alternative was defeated with the Second World War, while the communist challenge lasted until 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet bloc. Parallel to these challenges, there were ongoing debates about the nature and practice of democracy that did not end in 1989. Although democracy emerged at the end of the century as the unquestioned political ideal, the parameters of a truly democratic world order are still vigorously contested. Thus, the struggle over democracy frames the end, as well the beginning, of the 20th century.

The first lecture in this course sets up the framework of struggle over liberal democracy and a broader set of ideas associated with it, what we will call the “Enlightenment project.” The remaining two lectures in Section 1 explain why this new era began in 1914 rather than 1900, with the outbreak of the First World War and the “crisis of meaning” it precipitated.

Section 2 explores in more detail this “crisis of meaning” of the interwar years, in which a generation of Western artists and intellectuals questioned all the certainties of the Enlightenment project and the cultural and social order in which they lived. Section 3 focuses on the political manifestation of the interwar crisis, in the form of alternative political ideologies and regimes that challenged liberal democracy’s claim to offer the best form of government and society. In Lectures Twelve through Fourteen, we will look at what these ideologies promised and why they attracted so many people; in Lectures Fifteen and Sixteen, we will focus on what happened to communism and fascism in power in the USSR and Germany.

Section 4 shifts the locus of struggle to the non-Western world, where the competition among liberal democracy, communism, and fascism took shape in the first serious anti-imperialist movements of the century. Each of the four case studies, China, India, Mexico, and Japan, illustrates a different kind of imperialist influence and a distinct path to national independence in the decades leading up to World War II. Section 5 analyzes the Second World War as a mid-century watershed that marked the culmination and defeat of the fascist challenge but also the end of an imperialist world order based on European domination. Section 6 explores the new world order that emerges out of the Second World War, one dominated by the clash between democratic and communist systems and by the stalemate, that is, the Cold War, between two new superpowers. In particular, we will look at the contested origins of the Cold War and its impact on American society and its democratic system.

Section 7 shifts again to the non-Western world, where the Cold War realignment helped set the stage for the process of decolonization. Although this process created dozens of independent nations, it also generated a new set of problems and challenges for the developing world, or what became known as the Third World. Through the use of case studies once again, these lectures will chart alternative paths to development and the successes and pitfalls of communist, liberal democratic, and mixed models. Section 8 looks at a series of challenges that undermined the...
Cold War order, from Western-based social movements that questioned the democratic credentials of the “free world,” to Eastern-bloc dissidents who cast doubt on the socialist credentials of the USSR, to a new political movement based on religious fundamentalism that rejected many of the values on both sides. The section ends with a lecture on the demise of the Soviet bloc after 1989, which analyzes how and why the communist challenge finally collapsed. The final lectures of Section 9 will speculate on the post-Cold War world since 1989 and the prospects and challenges for a democratic world order in the 21st century.
Lecture Thirty-Seven

The Japanese Model—Available for Export?

Scope: Is the Japanese development model its most valuable export? This lecture analyzes why and how Japan’s soft authoritarianism has been adopted in a variety of neighboring countries; first, the so-called “Asian Tigers” of South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong, and later, the member countries of ASEAN, which together have established a regional sphere of prosperity in East Asia, unparalleled in the rest of the non-Western world. The lecture also considers the partial addition of China to this developmental model after the economic reforms of the 1980s, when the country pursued a new combination of authoritarian politics and private economic initiative. Finally, we conclude by speculating on the general applicability of the Japanese model for the rest of the Third World.

Outline

I. Japan’s development model has transformed not only its own economy but that of the entire region, both through example and through its economic relationships. Does all this evidence demonstrate that the Japanese development model is the best one available for Third World nations?
   
   A. The transformation of the region began in the 1960s, when Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea followed a Japanese-style development model.
      1. All four countries, which became known as the “Asian Tigers” or the “Gang of Four,” had endemic problems similar to those of Japan: that is, a lack of natural resources and farming land.
      2. In 1945, they were also overpopulated and poor and lacked capital resources for development.
      3. As a result of these conditions, they could not follow the customary Third World development pattern of expanding farming and mining activities.
      4. Like Japan, then, these countries embarked on a strategy to build cheap export manufactures using low-wage labor that could undersell First World products.
      5. In the 1960s, they started in textiles, just as Japan was moving out of that market.
      6. In the 1970s, they moved from labor-intensive to capital-intensive industry, just as Japan was moving into high technology.
      7. By 1976, the Asian Tigers were producing 60 percent of the Third World’s manufactured exports (radios, televisions, sewing machines, and so on), with 3 percent of its population.
      8. By the 1980s, they were encroaching on Japan’s high-tech domain, with the production of computers and biotechnology.
      9. The economic transformation of the region has been dramatic.

   B. In the late 1960s, another group of Asian nations, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Thailand, formed the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to promote development, and by the early 1970s, they were drawn into the region’s trading network.
      1. These countries differed from the Asian Tigers, because they were rich in natural resources.
      2. It was this complementarity that first drew Japan and the Tigers into building trading relationships with the member countries of ASEAN.
      3. At first, trading relationships between ASEAN countries and the Tigers centered on a classic neocolonialist exchange between raw materials and manufactures.
      4. But by the late 1970s, the ASEAN nations also began to industrialize using the same low-wage, labor-intensive strategy used by Japan in the 1950s and the Gang of Four in the 1960s.
      5. Just as the Tigers had displaced Japan’s low-wage advantage in the 1960s, the ASEAN nations began to displace the Tigers’ low-wage advantage in the late 1970s.
      6. In the 1980s, these newly industrialized countries began to capture the market for cheaply made textiles, but because they also continued to export commodities, their economies did not make the full transition to intensive production.
      7. Nevertheless, during this period, they experienced growth rates of 6–8 percent.

   C. One of the keys to the success of this development strategy was the ability to repress labor unrest arising from low wages, especially in Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines in the 1980s; here, the authoritarian state played a crucial role.
1. All the countries in this region had some form of authoritarian or soft authoritarian state that could perform this function.
2. Korea, like Japan, had a democratic constitution, but it had a military-dominated, one-party system since 1961.
3. Taiwan had an openly undemocratic one-party system until 1986, when it began a slow transition to a freer electoral system.
4. Hong Kong was a special case, a British colony scheduled to be returned to China in an agreement signed in 1984 and implemented in 1997.
5. The Philippines and Indonesia began with an open political system but fell into dictatorship between 1965 and 1986.

D. The state in these other countries also played a similar activist role:
1. In planning development strategies.
2. By providing subsidies for private businesses.
3. In some cases, by operating limited state industries, all in the context of “market-conforming” rather than “market-suppression” strategies.
4. There was, however, some variation in the level of state intervention.

E. The booming regional economy received another dramatic boost in the early 1980s, when China decided to embark on the same development model.
1. China’s position was somewhat different than that of the Asian Tigers in the 1960s, because it had developed its own heavy industry base in metallurgy, chemicals, and defense.
2. The problem was that China’s industrial products were noncompetitive in the global market, because they had been produced in accordance with bureaucratic dictates, not market demand.
3. The new development strategy was designed by Deng Xiaoping, who shifted to textiles and light industry, such as sewing machines and bicycles oriented for export.
4. Although modeling the broader Asian model, this strategy targeted only certain coastal “economic zones” for integration into the capitalist world market.
5. Deng hoped that China would receive from abroad foreign loans, investment, technology, and technical expertise, which had been decimated during China’s Cultural Revolution.
6. In the 1980s, then, it was China that was undercutting prices through its lowest wages, around 60¢ versus $12 per hour in Japan and $20 per hour in the United States.
7. By the end of the 1980s, such cities as Shanghai had reached per capita income levels of Taiwan and South Korea.
8. In the early 1990s, China experienced record growth rates of up to 13 percent a year.
9. On the other hand, income fell in the rural hinterland, which remained isolated from the new economy, leading to widening gaps in income and standards of living.

F. Included in the new Chinese development model was the authoritarian state.
1. That is, the model combined greater economic freedoms with continued repression of opposition.
2. In 1989, with the repression of student protests in Tiananmen Square, China made it clear that it was not pursuing a transition to capitalist democracy, but instead, some harsher version of Japan’s authoritarian development model.

II. How do we evaluate the applicability of the Japanese model for the Third World as a whole?

A. Some people have argued that the authoritarian development model is best suited for societies trying to “catch up,” while democracy worked better for the early industrializers, such as Europe and the United States.

B. However, it is important to note that not all authoritarian states have become economic successes; too much authoritarian control can stifle growth.

C. Another scenario, bolstered by struggling democratization in Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Indonesia, is that authoritarian development could emerge as a stage out of which democracy could still develop.

D. Political changes in Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, and the Philippines in the 1990s demonstrated that many people in those countries reevaluated elements of their systems, particularly one-party rule.
E. Likewise, Japan’s economic recession led to questioning the continued efficacy of the development state; critics have argued that the government-led model is too inflexible to adapt to new conditions and called for a shift to more American-style liberalism.

F. The authoritarian development model could emerge as a temporary stage, acceptable only during a period of rapid growth.

G. If Japan’s authoritarian state stabilizes, however, it could be argued that it is Japan rather than the Soviet Union that posed the most powerful challenge to the “American century.”

Essential Reading:

Supplementary Reading:
David Wurfel and Bruce Burton, eds., *Southeast Asia in the New World Order: The Political Economy of a Dynamic Region*, chapter 8, “China and Southeast Asia”; chapter 9, “Japan and Southeast Asia.”

Questions to Consider:
1. The West has sought to convince developing countries of the necessary links among democracy, capitalism, and economic growth, but it is not always easy to make the case: Can convincing arguments be mustered to support the existence of these links?
2. The success of East Asian economic development has sometimes been attributed to cultural factors, such as a shared Confucian-based work ethic that encourages self-sacrifice, discipline, and respect for authority. If such cultural values are indeed part of the model, then it is less easily exportable to other regions. Could it still be useful for other regions?
Lecture Thirty-Eight
Latin America—Dictatorship and Democracy

Scope: Unlike China, India, and Japan, which followed fairly stable development models, the Latin American countries fluctuated along several paths in their efforts to resolve longstanding economic and social problems. The Latin American case was complicated by a more intense U.S. involvement in the region, which was exacerbated by the Cold War. This lecture surveys the attempted social revolutions, the development dictatorships of the 1970s, and the democratic transitions of the 1980s and 1990s, with an evaluation of the prospects for democracy in the future.

Outline

I. In contrast to the three developmental case studies we have examined thus far, the Latin American countries followed no single stable model but fluctuated among dictatorships, democracies, and social revolution. In the post-World War II world, the Latin American countries tried different routes to resolving these issues, complicated, in particular, by the Cold War.
   A. It is difficult to treat Latin America as a whole, given the different socioeconomic structures, especially between countries with a large Indian or African-descended population, such as Bolivia, Peru, or Brazil, and those with a predominantly European-descended population, such as Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile.
   B. Three different demographic patterns can be identified:
      1. Such countries as Haiti, Bolivia, and the Dominican Republic are undeveloped, with high birth rates and low life expectancy.
      2. Semi-developed countries, such as Mexico, Brazil, Colombia, and Venezuela, have falling birth rates and rising life expectancy.
      3. Such countries as Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay have the low birth rates and high life expectancy of Western developed countries.
   C. Despite this variety among Latin American countries, they are tied together by a particular combination of underdevelopment, economic dependency, and the impact of the Cold War.
   D. In the 1950s, these issues prevented virtually any progress toward either prosperity or political stability.
   E. The United States established a series of security agreements but offered little in the way of economic assistance, that is, a version of the Marshall Plan.
   F. The Latin American countries traded heavily with the United States but within a familiar commodity/manufacture exchange.
   G. The main beneficiaries of this trade were the handful of large landowners and political elites who controlled the governments and the export trade.

II. Frustration with the failures of development and lack of social reform led to several revolutionary experiments in the 1950s.
   A. The first was in Guatemala, where agrarian reform and the threat to expropriate land owned by the United Fruit Company induced the United States to support the overthrow of a populist government in 1954.
   B. Anti-American sentiment generated by the coup opened a new phase in American/Latin American relations, the alliance for progress, but it was cut short by another revolutionary movement in Cuba in 1959.
      1. Cuba, like Guatemala, was subject to a dictatorial regime that had a close relationship with the American sugar companies that controlled Cuba’s main export.
      2. When the United States dropped its support of Cuba’s dictator, he gave up power in 1959 to the revolutionary forces of Fidel Castro.
      3. Once in power, Castro pursued a more radical social revolution than in Guatemala.
      4. He expropriated all the American sugar companies’ extensive landholdings and nationalized all banks and large firms, most of which were American owned.
5. The United States responded by increasing tariffs on Cuban sugar imports and imposing an embargo on all American exports to Cuba except for essential foodstuffs.

III. The Cuban revolution was critical in intensifying Cold War conflict in the region.
   A. The USSR tried to exploit U.S./Cuban tensions by offering aid to the Cubans in the face of an American embargo.
      1. The fear of a Soviet client state on its southern border led the United States to organize a similar insurgency plan to the one successfully used in Guatemala.
      2. That operation, known as the Bay of Pigs, failed miserably; expected popular support for the American-led revolt never materialized.
      3. The failed coup increased tensions; Castro requested and received more substantial military aid from the Soviets.
      4. The decision to send Soviet missiles to Cuba almost brought the superpowers to war during the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962.
      5. Although that crisis dissolved, the whole process cemented Cuba’s dependence on the USSR and magnified the sense of communist threat in the United States.
   B. The presence of communist Cuba refocused the United States on its Cold War priorities in the region until the end of the 1980s, while the alliance for progress languished.
      1. The Johnson administration sent U.S. troops to the Dominican Republic in 1965, and in 1973, the CIA helped sponsor a military coup against the self-proclaimed but democratically elected Marxist Salvador Allende of Chile.
      2. In the late 1970s, the Carter administration tried to return to the alliance for progress, but once again, a new socialist-inspired revolution renewed the Cold War focus of American policy.
      3. Thus, the CIA sponsored an anti-communist “destabilization” campaign in Nicaragua after the Sandinista revolution in 1979 and funneled massive military aid to neighboring El Salvador to crush its own guerrilla movement.
      4. After 1980, President Reagan’s administration pursued a destabilization campaign by organizing opponents (the Contras) in Honduras and Costa Rica to mount a counterrevolution against the Sandinista government.
   C. What conclusions can we draw from the impact of the Cold War on Latin America?
      1. One perspective places heavy blame on the United States.
      2. Another insists that communism was a real threat to the region.
      3. In either case, the Cold War was detrimental to political and economic stability.

IV. In this context, the major development option for many Latin American countries in the 1960s–1970s was the military development dictatorship.
   A. The military had been involved in politics since the 19th century, moving in to oust unpopular political leaders.
   B. But in the late 1960s, the military’s conception of its political role expanded from this function to actually ruling countries.
   C. When the dictatorships were able to maintain order and, thus, political stability, they often achieved some developmental successes, while severely repressing opposition movements.
   D. Good examples of these tradeoffs are found in Brazil, Chile, and Argentina.
      1. These countries embarked on the Southeast Asian model of low-wage, labor-intensive industrialization in their dictatorships, achieving almost 25 percent of their GNP from manufactures by the end of the 1970s.
      2. But thousands of people were tortured and killed by their governments in campaigns to terrorize opponents.
   E. The gains of the 1970s were largely reversed in the 1980s, when economic recession led to massive international borrowing, leaving the region with a huge unmanageable debt.
F. Because 38 percent of Latin American debt was held by American banks, the debt crisis highlighted the continued dependence on the American economy, despite the developmental efforts of the previous decade.

V. The combined impact of economic crisis and the demise of the Cold War opened a new era in Latin America.
   A. In the 1980s and 1990s, the military dictatorships were increasingly replaced by democratic governments.
   B. Partly, the change resulted from the end of the Cold War, which reduced U.S. support for anti-communist dictators, as well as for counterinsurgency.
   C. Partly, the change came as a result of the strain and opposition of brutal repression, as in Argentina, where the outcry over the “disappeared” helped provoke the 1983 transition.
   D. And partly, the resurgence of economic problems in the 1980s made it clear that dictatorships were no better at prolonged development.

VI. What are the prospects for these new democracies?
   A. Since the mid-1990s, most of the democratic regimes have also adopted the free-market strategy of development, thus fully integrating them into the Western political and economic system.
   B. This integration into the world market has increased growth rates once again, but as always, the flip side is the negative impact on the poorest, usually the marginal producers who can’t compete in the world market.
   C. The big question is whether this new democratic market strategy can live up to its supporters’ claims and bring enough of the vast underclasses into economic security to keep democracy stable.
   D. As the 20th century came to a close, Brazil stood out as an example of the most successful attempts at social reform.

Essential Reading:
Thomas Skidmore and Peter Smith, Modern Latin America.

Supplementary Reading:
Walter LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Latin America.
Larry Diamond and Juan Linz, eds., Democracy in Developing Countries, vol. 4, Latin America.

Questions to Consider:
1. With its vast social, ethnic, and economic inequalities, Latin America may be the best test case of whether democracy and the free market can manage these challenges. What do you think?
2. The relationship between Latin America and the United States has been a troubled one, and it is interesting to speculate on whether a different relationship was possible and what its consequences for the region would have been. What do you think?
Lecture Thirty-Nine
Hard Cases—Africa

Scope: In contrast to the relatively successful development cases considered in previous lectures, we turn now to the most difficult ones, where political and economic problems have seemed intractable. The lecture begins with a general consideration of the lack of measurable progress achieved in Africa, where high rates of poverty and political instability are still the norm. It prepares the ground for a closer look at Nigeria, which despite the initial economic advantage of its oil reserves, has not escaped either poverty or instability.

Outline

I. Despite variation by country, in most indicators measuring political stability and economic prosperity, the African continent is at the bottom of the list.
   A. The overall statistics are grim.
      1. Half the population lives in absolute poverty, on less than $1 a day, well above the world average of 26 percent.
      2. Further, the percentage of poor people has been increasing since 1970.
      3. Politically, the country has been rent by civil wars and military coups, and temporary stability has usually been achieved through authoritarian, one-party governments.
   B. In the 1960s, there were both enormous challenges and hopeful indicators.
      1. In addition to poverty, illiteracy, and lack of political and technical skills, the continent was an ethnic, linguistic, and religious quilt: more than 5,000 languages were spoken.
      2. Furthermore, the colonial division of the continent was not made according to ethnic or tribal boundaries, so that new nations often had no elements of shared cultural identity.
      3. On the other hand, the 1960s began with a show of cooperation across national borders, promoted by pan-nationalists, such as Nkrumah of Ghana.
      4. Thus, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), formed in 1963, promised to respect each country’s national boundaries and formed a multinational African army to enforce territorial integrity.
      5. The OAU also proclaimed a position of non-alliance, with a pledge to keep the Cold War out of Africa.
   C. Yet, by the 1970s, the hopes for progress were dimming.
      1. All the democratic regimes had been subverted or overthrown by military dictators or one-party rule.
      2. Further, OAU proved unable to contain regional conflicts, which the Cold War exacerbated after the mid-1970s.
      3. The Soviets began Cold War intervention in the Somali/Ethiopian war.
      4. At about the same time, they got involved in the civil war in Angola.
      5. By the end of the 1970s, Russian military advisors and Cuban troops operated in a dozen African countries.
      6. Finally, the world economic crisis of 1973 devastated African economies dependent on a single commodity export (except for oil-producing nations).
      7. Falling prices for those commodities forced the nations to borrow heavily from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to buy basic goods, driving up indebtedness.

II. Why was Africa not able to follow the East Asian model of cheap-labor industrialization?
   A. Some scholars (and African intellectuals) would place the major blame on neo-colonial economic relationships.
   B. But this relationship was also reinforced by the existence of rich mineral deposits and farmland, in contrast to the East Asian Tigers, which had to look for other sources of “comparative advantage.”
C. The other economic path attempted by some nationalists, such as Nasser in Egypt or Nkrumah in Ghana, was autarkic self-reliance, but the Aswan Dam project demonstrated the difficulty with this path.

D. The other major obstacle to following the East Asian model of development was the lack of strong, stable states.
   1. Even dictatorships did not ensure stability, as illustrated by the 70 attempted coups between 1952 and 1968, 20 of them successful.
   2. Across the continent, ethnic, tribal, clan, and religious identities continued to be stronger than national ones, making it difficult for any government to create a unified state.
   3. Thus, Chad was destabilized by decades of unrest and civil war between Christians and Muslims.
   4. A different kind of instability was imposed by terrorist regimes, such as that of Idi Amin in Uganda from 1971 to 1981.
   5. The most tragic example of exploiting ethnic tensions is Rwanda, where ethnic conflict between Tutsis and Hutus culminated in the genocidal spring and summer of 1994.

E. Ironically, the end of the Cold War and the withdrawal of the superpowers paralleled an increase in ethnic, tribal, and religious violence in the 1990s.
   1. On the positive side, the end of the Cold War allowed Western powers to withdraw their support from dictators they had supported as anti-communist allies.
   2. On the negative side, when dictators in Zaire and Somalia collapsed, so did central governing authority, which was challenged by renewed tribal or clan warfare.
   3. Also on the negative side, the lack of strategic interests in Africa since the Cold War ended has led the Western powers to neglect the continent, while an increase in UN involvement has not filled the gap.

III. A major counterexample to this trajectory of political instability is South Africa.
   A. Under the apartheid system, South Africa’s authoritarian state promoted successful development for the white population.
   B. But the rising violence caused by black opposition finally undermined this stability and forced the regime into negotiations.
   C. After the first elections of 1994, South Africa became Africa’s greatest hope for democracy.
   D. More typical than South Africa’s trajectory is Nigeria, which will be the basis for our more in-depth case study of African development in the next lecture.
      1. Nigeria seemed to have more advantages than most African nations in 1960.
      2. Yet, just four years after independence, a military coup began a pattern of political instability and economic failures.
      3. In the next lecture, we will examine what went wrong.

Essential Reading:

Supplementary Reading:
Jean-Germain Gros, *Democratization in Late Twentieth-Century Africa: Coping with Uncertainty*.

Questions to Consider:
1. Most scholars would argue that a comprehensive strategy for African development is necessary. What would such a strategy look like and how would it be organized?
2. Does the nation-state, as a political unit, make sense in the African context, or are there simply no other choices in the world today?
Lecture Forty
An African Case Study—Nigeria

Scope: Scholars still debate the endemic versus colonialist roots of Third World problems. This lecture delves into the Nigerian case as a way to understand and evaluate this debate. It analyzes the complex legacy of British imperialism, which both created administrative unity and reinforced ethnic and religious internal boundaries through its policies. It then follows Nigeria’s troubled political history through two failed democracies punctuated by coups and military dictatorships, ending with the establishment of a still-fragile democratic regime in 1999. We conclude with an analysis of Nigeria’s democratic and economic failures, using a multifaceted explanatory model that can be applied to other cases.

Outline

I. In this lecture, we move from discussing the general problems of African development to focus on a single case study: Nigeria. To answer the question of what went wrong, we need to go back to 1960 and examine the specific nature of the challenges Nigeria faced, how various governments attempted to resolve them, and what general conclusions we can draw from its experience.

A. In its internal makeup, Nigeria was a classic case of ethnic, religious, and geographical diversity.
   1. Among the 250 tribal groups, three major ethnic groups make up 70 percent of the population.
   2. These groups also corresponded to geographical divisions: the Hausa-Fulani in the north, the Igbo in the southeast, and the Yoruba in the southwest, although there were minority populations in each region.
   3. These divisions were enhanced by religious ones.

B. British imperialism helped shape the political significance of these divisions.
   1. First, the very fact that these three regions were united into a single unit was the result of British administrative convenience.
   2. At the same time as they established administrative unity, however, the British also reinforced ethnic and regional divisions, partly inadvertently and partly to keep a nationalist opposition from forming.
   3. The British also employed two different styles of rule in the north and south, reinforcing ethnic divisions and creating a large cultural gap between the north and the south, which had been Westernized; it was southerners who filled the new positions in the Nigerian civil service from the late 1940s.
   4. In economic terms, the British established a classic dependence trade, with its companies extracting oil in exchange for British manufactures. No efforts were made to create a national economy, and 40 percent of the wage-earning population worked for foreign companies.
   5. On the positive side, the British organized one of the best transitions to independence of any African nation, which included giving local elites training for jobs and running a state administration.

II. Why did the first democratic republic fail to consolidate?

A. The constitution tried to avoid ethnic conflict by establishing strong regional governments to give voice to each ethnic group.

B. In fact, the setup fostered further ethnic political identification, with regional, ethnic-based parties competing for national power.

C. Because the northern region contained 50 percent of the population, its party always had the democratic advantage.
   1. In 1964, the Igbo minority in the Yoruba province tried to secede, and in January 1996, Igbo officers staged a national coup.
   2. Six months later, a counter-coup and a wave of ethnic violence against Igbos led to the declaration of independence by the Igbo southeastern region, which opened a bloody civil war.
D. The end of the civil war in 1970 opened another period of military dictatorship, punctuated by coups and assassinations of leaders, but in 1979, a new democratic constitution was written and elections were held.
   1. The new constitution tried to avoid the mistakes of the previous one and divided the country into 19 states, forbidding the organization of parties along ethnic lines.
   2. However, parties remained closely tied to ethnic groups and regions, and the northern party from the largest region continued to win elections in 1979 and 1983.
   3. Another coup in 1983, largely the result of the economic crisis caused by falling oil prices, instituted another phase of military rule, which lasted until 1999.

III. How do we analyze the failure to consolidate democracy and turn natural riches into sustainable development in Nigeria?
   A. Rather than any single cause, what seems most convincing is the interaction between at least three factors: deep ethnic divisions, the competition for wealth in a poor country, and a rapidly expanding state with few other opportunities for advancement.
   B. As a result of poverty and few economic opportunities, the state becomes the only important source of jobs, status, and wealth for emerging elites.
   C. That means the stakes for winning elections are enormous, setting up a cycle of corruption and even violence.
   D. Finally, in order to win elections, elites need surefire mobilizing techniques for illiterate populations, and ethnic identity fits the bill. Parties transform existing divisions into rigid constituencies.

IV. How do we generalize from this case to ask the larger question of what conditions help consolidate democracy in poor countries?
   A. One general argument focuses on the strength of the political structure itself, including the existence of an educated elite, developed parties, and democratic values.
   B. A second kind of argument is the so-called iron law of development, that democracy needs a certain level of economic development to survive. Nigeria could provide a casebook example of the difficulty of establishing the democratic politics of give-and-take in a situation where the state controls most of the society’s resources.
   C. A third theory focuses on the homogeneity of the population, that is, a sort of iron law of ethnic/racial homogeneity. With reference to the Nigerian case, however, one could argue that it is not ethnic diversity per se but the way ethnicity is manipulated that is the real threat.
   D. A related theory focuses on class and wealth homogeneity, that is, that huge gaps between rich and poor make democratic consolidation impossible.
   E. The Nigerian case seems to provide evidence for some of these arguments, but they are all open-ended propositions. At stake is the enormous question of whether democracy and development are accessible goals for millions of people.

Essential Reading:

Supplementary Reading:
Larry Diamond, Class, Ethnicity and Democracy in Nigeria.
John Wiseman, “The Conditions for Democracy?”
Questions to Consider:
1. By delving into the details of a single case study, we can see that general facts, such as “ethnic divisions,” are more complicated than they seem at face value. How did the closer look at Nigeria’s evolution give you a more nuanced view of the problems faced by African nations?
2. If we accept some of the “conditions for democracy” offered by scholars, much of the world’s population would be excluded from the possibility of living under democratic rule: What do you think?
Lecture Forty-One

A Generation of Protests—Civil Rights

Scope: The Cold War standoff lasted more than 40 years, but it did not go unchallenged. On the one hand, a variety of Western-based protest movements questioned the democratic credentials of the “free world,” while on the other hand, dissidents in Eastern Europe questioned the socialist credentials of the USSR. Fitting into neither camp, a new political movement, based on religious fundamentalism, rejected many of the values of both sides. This lecture begins with the first major challenge, launched from the United States, which began with an attack on a series of discriminatory race laws and opened up into an indictment of racism’s corruption of American democracy. It charts the civil rights movement from Brown v. Board of Education in 1954 to the Voting Rights Act in 1965 and looks at broader debates over the role of race in American society.

Outline

I. In this lecture, we move from the Third World efforts to develop back to the First World. While in the Third World, intellectuals struggled to define a path to prosperity, in the First World, intellectuals questioned the roots of their own prosperity, as well as its limits in promoting truly democratic societies.
   A. Beginning in the mid-1950s and culminating in the late 1960s, a number of opposition movements argued that there was something wrong with the democratic system as practiced in the United States, that it had somehow betrayed its basic principles.
      1. What becomes known as the “60s” encompassed a number of linked but separate movements, organized by students, middle-class women, Chicanos, homosexuals, and African Americans, among others.
      2. The protesters never attained majority status, but they were vocal enough to cause a major national debate about the democratic system in the United States.
   B. At first glance, the mid-1950s seems like an odd moment for political protest.
      1. The United States was in the midst of the most spectacular period of sustained economic growth in its history, when the American Dream seemed accessible to all.
      2. Pundits were already using the term the affluent society to define the era of abundance.
      3. At the same time, anti-communism seemed to have succeeded in imposing political conformity.
   C. Where, then, does the protesting generation come from?
      1. For many, it was the gap between the official image of unlimited prosperity and democracy and their experience of American society.
      2. It was precisely the complacency of the post-World War II generation that sparked the questioning of the following generation, which felt either excluded from prosperity or dissatisfied with it.
      3. Within this broader framework, there were two types of grievances. The majority of the protesters argued that they had been excluded in some way from the American Dream, whether as women, blacks, Chicanos, or homosexuals.
      4. Most of the members of the student movement, however, were children of privilege, white and middle class.
      5. In this general context, each movement had its own spark that initiated it and its own course of development, but by the late 1960s, their collective impact was great enough to transform the political culture and the nature of democratic debate.

II. In this lecture, we will focus on the civil rights movement, the most powerful of the various minority movements demanding inclusion in the American Dream.
   A. Specifically, the civil rights movement was an attack on a series of discriminatory race laws in the southern United States that enforced a kind of apartheid.
   B. But the movement also opened a more general debate about race and American democracy.
III. The specific spark for mobilizing the civil rights movement was the Supreme Court ruling on *Brown v. Board of Education* in 1964.

A. *Brown* established a legal basis for attacking the “separate but equal” Jim Crow laws.

B. However, the Eisenhower administration showed little interest in enforcing it.

C. Thus, *Brown* created a powerful tension: a statement by the Supreme Court that America was not living up to its democratic rhetoric and the indifference of the government to that statement.

D. This tension created the space for the civil rights movement, a movement against an unjust policy in the name of democratic ideals.

E. In the words of Martin Luther King, the movement was “carrying our whole nation back to the great wells of democracy.”

IV. After *Brown*, the movement took shape under the leadership of the Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King.

A. In 1957, King formed the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) to mobilize black churches.

B. His strategy was shaped by Gandhi’s principles of nonviolent resistance.

C. Leaders targeted a particular type of segregation in a certain city, then organized protest campaigns that brought in people from all over to exert pressure and make repression more difficult.

D. The first major campaign was set off by Rosa Parks, a woman who refused to give up her bus seat in Montgomery, Alabama, in December 1955.

E. Other important campaigns involved lunch counters in Greensboro, the “Freedom Riders,” and Birmingham, Alabama.

V. Resistance to desegregation was fierce among local authorities, ordinary white citizens, and the Ku Klux Klan, whose membership skyrocketed.

A. The spectacle of angry mobs yelling epithets at black schoolchildren or police turning fire hoses on protesters almost made more impact than the protests themselves.

B. The specter of violent resistance finally forced the federal government to get involved.

VI. After years of local boycotts and protests, the civil rights movement exploded into national politics in September of 1963 with the march on Washington, where King gave his famous “I have a dream” speech.

A. The march raised a number of issues but focused on the need to get black Americans on the voting lists.
   1. Blacks were theoretically allowed to vote, but southern states used means to prevent them from doing so. For example, they were given literacy tests or charged a poll tax, or the names of registered blacks were published so that the Ku Klux Klan could harass them.
   2. The result was that only 2 million of the 5 million blacks of voting age in the South were registered.

B. In 1965, Congress passed the final civil rights law, the Voting Rights Act, which outlawed the various obstacles preventing black voters from registering.

C. Although the formal civil rights movement had ended, the contradictions of racial discrimination and a two-tiered society could not be solved so easily.
   1. Ironically, only four days after the passage of the Act, race riots broke out in Watts (Los Angeles), continuing a trend of similar explosions of anger by economically disenfranchised blacks living in the ghettos of northern cities.
   2. The riots created a crisis in black leadership, giving rise to an alternative politics of *black power*, which advocated the creation of separate black states and economic self-sufficiency.

D. Since the 1960s, Americans continue to have strong disagreements about the degree to which race undermines democratic practice. Some have seen major progress toward a color-blind society in which all citizens truly are equal, while others insist that the perception of racial differences still forms one of the central cleavages in American society.

Essential Reading:
Martin Luther King, “Letter from Birmingham City Jail.”

**Supplementary Reading:**

**Questions to Consider:**
1. Why do Americans have such fundamental disagreements about the impact of race on their democracy?
2. What are the conditions under which a Gandhi-inspired protest movement works best?
Lecture Forty-Two

A Generation of Protests—1968

Scope: The critique of democratic practice in the West culminated in a wave of protest movements that erupted in the United States, Western Europe, and elsewhere in the late 1960s. This lecture analyzes the nature of that critique, with a special focus on the United States, but we also consider the broader context of mobilization in Western Europe. In the United States, we will examine, in particular, the mobilization of students around their opposition to the Vietnam War, as well as the related phenomenon of the counterculture. We conclude with a discussion of the contested meaning of this generation of protest and its positive or negative place in the evolution of Western democracy.

Outline

I. In the late 1960s, protest movements critical of democratic practice in the West erupted at the same time that the Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia exposed the contradictions in the communist world. In global terms, the fixed polarities of the Cold War system came under fire from all corners at this critical juncture.
   A. For the West, the key issue was the war in Vietnam, which became a powerful symbol.
      1. The United States was following a policy of containment, which was meant to stop the domino effect of allowing any country, however marginal, to fall under communist rule.
      2. Since the French withdrawal in 1954, the United States had been trying to fill the power vacuum by discretely aiding the non-communist government in the south in its civil war against the communist north.
      3. The real escalation came after 1965, when President Johnson responded to attacks on American military bases by sending in regular ground troops and starting full-scale bombing.
      4. By 1968, 500,000 troops were on the ground, and the United States was spending $2 billion a week.
   B. Opposition to the war did not start immediately, but after the Tet offensive of January 1968, public opinion in the United States turned dramatically.
      1. The Tet offensive exposed what came to be called the “credibility gap”; that is, the government had been telling the American public that victory was just around the corner.
      2. In addition, the image of superpower America blasting away at a poor Third World country was becoming increasingly uncomfortable for a public that had to watch the effects of those bombs on nightly television.
      3. To add to the incongruities, South Vietnam was not a democracy but a military dictatorship, making it difficult to claim that America was defending democracy.
      4. Whereas in 1965, only 15 percent of the American public favored withdrawal, by 1969, 69 percent viewed the war as a mistake.

II. It was this context, coming on the heels of the civil rights movement, that brought a generation of students into the streets.
   A. The personal issue was the draft, but criticism of the war spiraled into an indictment of American foreign and domestic policy.
   B. The Port Huron Statement, founding manifesto of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), expresses eloquently the logic of their critique.
      1. It begins by praising American principles.
      2. It then argues that the Cold War and the racial bigotry in the South had opened the students’ eyes to the hollowness of the declaration that “all men are created equal.”
   C. Like the civil rights movement, SDS was, in many ways, a fundamentalist movement, calling for the implementation of true democracy.
   D. Significantly, by 1968, a majority of college students shared these views.
E. Although these views were not shared by a majority of Americans, the illusion of the postwar consensus was shattered.

F. The students’ critique of American democracy went beyond politics to criticize the affluent consumer mass society of what they called “bourgeois culture.”
   1. One of the Frankfurt school critics, Herbert Marcuse, who became one of the prominent “new left” intellectuals, called the phenomenon of conformist middle-class culture “democratic totalitarianism.”
   2. In response to this culture of conformity, a counterculture emerged, which was a raucous celebration of new forms of dress, drugs, rock and roll music, and sexual freedom.

III. At the same time that students in the United States launched their critique of American democracy, students in Western Europe launched similar movements.
   A. Although partly rooted in national issues, these protests shared a general critique of Western democracy as elitist and hierarchical, as well as hypocritical in practicing its values.
   B. They all promoted some version of a revitalization of democracy through greater grassroots participation, inspired by their understanding of Mao’s Cultural Revolution in China.
   C. The message attracted students all over Europe, but only in Paris did it lead to the brink of revolution in May 1968.

IV. What was the result of this challenge to the Cold War order and its impact on democracy at home and abroad?
   A. On one level, the movement failed to end the Cold War or to remake the institutions of democracy.
   B. On another level, some scholars have argued that the combined impact of protests around the world in 1968 did help pull the superpowers back from their increasingly confrontational stance toward a new, less polarized detente.
   C. In a broader sense, scholars have argued over the “meaning” of 1968. The important question is whether or not this movement has a significant place in the Western democratic tradition.

Essential Reading:

Supplementary Reading:
George Herring, America’s Longest War.
Students for a Democratic Society, “The Port Huron Statement.”

Questions to Consider:
1. Would you agree that the place of the “60s” movement in the history of Western democracy is complicated by the variety of messages and the range of behaviors exhibited, so that defenders and detractors find it easy to emphasize the positive or the negative?
2. The Vietnam War has cast a long shadow over American life; what are the “lessons” of the war and how should they be applied?
Lecture Forty-Three
Global Women’s Movements

Scope: One of the offshoots of the 1960s protests was the revival of feminism, or the struggle for women’s rights and power. This lecture discusses the origins and goals of contemporary feminism but within a broader global perspective that recognizes different types of women’s movements. The lecture provides several models of female activism that are rooted in different social, political, and economic contexts. The first model mobilizes women around their status as mothers. The second model of everyday resistance allows women with few economic and political resources to band together to improve the basic conditions of their lives. Finally, the most familiar model is equal-rights feminism, most commonly found in economically privileged communities and nations. The lecture concludes with a discussion of contemporary debates over the future of feminism.

Outline

I. One of the important limits on democratic practice in the 20th century has been discrimination against women and their exclusion from centers of power.
   A. This claim must be qualified by different women’s access to power, which varies so greatly that some scholars have argued against making general claims for “women’s rights.”
   B. While racial, national, social, class, and cultural barriers are clearly significant, other scholars have defended the need for such general claims.
   C. If one examines global statistics on economic and political power, it is clear that on an aggregate level, women are all but excluded from decision-making centers, as a 1995 UN report concluded.
   D. Although women have always found ways to fight against exclusion, what was new in the 20th century was that women were organizing explicitly as women in movements designed to empower them and improve their status in society.
      1. Feminism is the word used to define these movements, but the problem is that the word has often been conceived too narrowly.
      2. The equal-rights feminism that has dominated Western countries has reflected the interests of generally middle-class, educated, usually white women, living in democratic societies.
      3. The fact that not all women have mobilized under the banner of feminism does not mean that they have not worked for improving their status.

II. One of the most common frameworks for women’s politics is a maternalist one. That is, women make demands based on their status as mothers that are meant to improve their lives but usually affect more directly the lives of their families as a whole.
   A. Motherhood is normally perceived as a “private” function, but mothers can be brought into the political arena when they feel that their ability to carry out their motherly duties is threatened.
   B. Maternalist movements exist in all countries, from the Mothers Against Drunk Driving in the United States to the Greenham Common anti-nuclear movement in Britain, but perhaps their most dramatic impact was in Latin America during the period of dictatorship, from the mid-1960s to the late 1980s.
   C. The specific spark for women’s mobilization was the direct attack on their families through the abduction of family members from their homes and their incarceration or murder.
   D. The most famous movement, the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, began weekly demonstrations in April 1977 in Buenos Aires, Argentina.
   E. After the collapse of the dictatorial regimes, mothers continued to organize around issues of economic survival, forming communal kitchens, demonstrating against high prices, and demanding better services in their neighborhoods.
   F. How do we sum up the impact of the “militant mother” model?
1. They have played an important role in debates in newly democratizing countries over what shape the democracy should take.
2. But they have organized themselves as wives and mothers, not as individuals demanding equal rights with men.

III. The second model of mobilization is linked to the poorest and least empowered women, those who are struggling with basic survival—that 70 percent of the world’s population who are living below the poverty level. To exacerbate the effects of poverty, in some cultures, women’s lives are openly less valued than men’s and traditional gender roles impose an extremely passive role for women.

A. We can call this strategy of mobilization the everyday resistance model, because it involves women becoming more empowered in their daily lives.
B. Why should we even pay attention to such quiet activity that doesn’t seek to reform the structure of inequality? Because in this context, the simple fact of women’s independent initiative, or agency, constitutes empowerment for them.
C. Some examples from grassroots women’s organizing in India will help to illustrate the parameters of this model.
   1. In the southwestern state of Tamil Nadu, more than 24,000 local women’s groups have been formed in recent decades.
   2. Perhaps the most far-reaching project has been the formation of the Self-Employed Women’s Association, which makes micro-loans to women.
D. How do we evaluate the impact of everyday resistance? Even though they are not demanding political power or challenging male authority, these women are quietly improving their lives in ways that break tradition in subtle ways.

IV. Finally, we turn to the more familiar Western model of equal-rights feminism that emerged in the late 19th century but returned in a second wave in the 1960s and 1970s.

A. Still rooted in the framework of liberal democracy, the second-wave feminist movement emerged out of the frustration with the limited achievements of legal and political equality won by the first-wave feminists.
B. Many women were confronted with this reality as they protested the Vietnam War side-by-side with male colleagues who refused to accept them as equals.
C. Cultural critics, including Marcuse, helped women to explain why broader attitudes, not simply laws, had to be changed before liberation could be achieved.
D. Out of this realization came a new feminist agenda that went beyond basic political rights.
E. This movement succeeded in passing a spate of new legislation about women’s bodies, from rape laws to abortion, while changing some attitudes about women’s place in society.
F. Although the equal-rights feminist movement had undeniable successes in empowering women, since the 1980s, women have been deeply divided about feminism.
   1. On the one hand are arguments between feminists and non-feminists.
   2. On the other hand are debates within feminism, raised by those who accused the second-wave movement of focusing on the needs of privileged Western women.
   3. Thus, one of the key questions in feminist theory today is whether there is room for a third-wave feminist movement that can form an agenda capable of attracting and promoting women from different political, social, economic, geographical, and cultural contexts, a truly global feminist movement.

Essential Reading:
Charlotte Bunch, “Prospects for Global Feminism.”

Supplementary Reading:
Nancy Cott, The Grounding of Modern Feminism.
Questions to Consider:

1. Why do most Western women today not want to identify themselves with feminism, and does this marginalization reflect problems with feminism or problems in the society at large?

2. Should feminism be redefined to include the range of activities addressed in this lecture, and if so, what definition would encompass them all?
Lecture Forty-Four
The Rise of Fundamentalist Politics

Scope: One of the most powerful challenges to the Cold War order that exploded on the scene with the Iranian revolution of 1979 was the politicization of religious fundamentalism, or the claim that political systems should be ordered according to religious principles. This lecture introduces the roots of fundamentalism as a global movement and the nature of its challenge to the secularism of both Western democratic and communist systems. It then narrows its focus to Islamic fundamentalism and considers some of the reasons for its popularity in parts of the non-Western world, as well as its demonization in the West.

Outline

I. In this lecture, we will talk about the roots of religious fundamentalism and its impact on democratization.
   A. This movement posed a challenge to the Cold War on both theoretical and practical levels.
      1. On a practical level, Islamic fundamentalists rejected the leadership of both superpowers.
      2. On a theoretical level, they rejected the basic secular orientation of both communism and liberal democracy.
      3. With the spread of Islamic fundamentalism, scholars argue today about whether Islam itself is compatible with democracy, but everyone agrees that its fundamentalist version is not.
   B. What are the roots of religious fundamentalism in the 20th century?
      1. The word was first used to define a division of American Protestantism in the 1920s.
      2. In recent years, it has been used to describe a broader phenomenon since the 1970s.
      3. Fundamentalists argue that society should conform to religious, not secular, laws.
      4. They all preach that modern society is in deep trouble and that it requires the reclamation of fundamental religious principles to bring it back to its lost values.
      5. In the broad sense of the word, there are fundamentalist movements in almost every major religion in the world today.
   C. Despite differences, scholars argue that these movements form part of a common global phenomenon.
      1. On a general level, fundamentalism challenges the Enlightenment-project assertion that rational individuals have the capacity for self-government without divine help.
      2. Evidence for this proposition is what fundamentalists see as a decaying moral framework, buttressed by soulless consumerism and the disappearance of traditional cultural values.
      3. In non-Western countries, fundamentalism responded to a fear of Westernization with the message of a return to sacred roots.
      4. Interestingly, the explosion of fundamentalist movements surprised social scientists, who had been predicting a continued trend of secularization, not its reversal.

II. Of all the fundamentalist movements, it is the Islamic version that has had the greatest global political impact and today remains, perhaps, the greatest organized challenge to liberal democracy.
   A. The calls for a return to Islam to solve endemic problems are not new, but the current revival that has been gathering steam since the mid-1970s has reached new levels of influence.
   B. It was in the 1970s that the term fundamentalism began to be applied to the demand to establish a true Islamic state based on Koranic law.
   C. With the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979, the ideal was put into practice for the first time.
   D. The roots of the revolution in Iran lay in several decades of opposition to the dictatorship of the shah.
   E. The Islamic fundamentalist opposition gained support with its combined message of anti-imperialism and a return to authentic roots.
F. Since the Iranian revolution, fundamentalist movements elsewhere have been gaining adherents and influence across the secular Arab world, although they have taken power in only a few cases, such as the Sudan and Afghanistan.

G. The combination of the Islamic revolution in Afghanistan and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, have put Islamic fundamentalism at the center of world politics.

III. Why has Islamic fundamentalism attracted so many adherents in the Arab Middle East?

A. The post-colonial Arabic nations shared many of the same problems of poverty, neo-colonialism, and lack of political unity that plagued other ex-colonies.

B. The discovery of rich oil reserves after World War II did not solve these problems, as many hoped they would.

C. In global terms, the discovery made the Middle East a strategic hotspot, so that superpower intervention was a common occurrence, from the British invasion of Egypt in 1956 to the 2003 war in Iraq.

D. The Iranian case illustrates the combined impact of foreign intervention and fear of Westernization.

E. In this context, Islamic fundamentalism emerged as a continuation of earlier anti-colonial movements and tapped into the same anger against meddling Western powers that had roots in the medieval wars between Christendom and Islam.

F. In addition to being anti-Western, the Islamic fundamentalists attacked secular Arab governments for aping the West and abandoning their “authentic” cultures, what one Iranian intellectual called “West-stricken-ness.”

G. Al-e-Ahmad, an Iranian communist intellectual turned fundamentalist, serves as a personal example of the attractions of this argument.

IV. In the West, Islamic fundamentalism is demonized and disparaged, but this response does not help understand where the movement comes from and why it continues to gather strength. On a basic level, the revival of religious fundamentalism reflects deep dissatisfaction with secular liberalism and the empty materialist world it has created. In the non-Western world, this dissatisfaction is intertwined with deep anti-colonialist sentiments to create a powerful challenge to a democratic world order perceived as essentially Western.

Essential Reading:
Bernard Lewis, “The Roots of Muslim World Rage.”

Supplementary Reading:
Henry Munson, Islam and Revolution in the Middle East.
John L. Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?

Questions to Consider:
1. Why do you think scholars were so unprepared for the explosion of religious fundamentalism in recent decades?
2. In some ways, Islamic fundamentalism represents a rephrasing of the earlier communist and fascist claims that liberalism does not understand human nature and society. Is there any morsel of truth to these claims?
Lecture Forty-Five
Communism—From Reform to Collapse, 1956–1990

Scope: The Cold War order was also being undermined from within the communist bloc, in part through dissident movements in such places as Czechoslovakia in 1968, but more subtly through the increasing stagnation of a society crushed under the weight of a too-powerful state. This lecture analyzes the long-term crisis in communist society and the various failed attempts at reform, from Khrushchev to Dubcek and, finally, to Gorbachev. It looks at the roots of crisis and stagnation and at the reasons why reforms failed, leading finally to the internal collapse of the bloc after 1989.

Outline

I. The other major challenge to the Cold War system came from within the communist bloc itself, which began to confront the realities of Stalinism in the 1950s. In some ways, the various attempts to reform communism and renew its original promises paralleled the civil rights, feminist, and student movements’ attempts to renew the promises of democracy. In the communist case, however, reform failed and the system collapsed. Why?

A. The first reform efforts began after Stalin’s death, when the new premiere, Khrushchev, gave a speech in 1956 denouncing the “excesses” of Stalin.
   1. In Hungary, a reformist communist government took Khrushchev at his word and tried to set a more independent and humanistic path to socialism.
   2. In crushing the Hungarian revolution, the Soviet leadership demonstrated that it was not open for true reform, and Khrushchev was eventually replaced in 1964.
   3. The most dramatic attempt to reform socialism came several years later, in the Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia, which put forward a “Czech road” to socialism.
   4. The USSR tried to pressure the reformist Czech government, then sent in tanks and troops, as in Hungary in 1956.
   5. The last attempt to reform communism in East Europe came in Poland in 1979–1981. This attempt was different in that it was led by a grassroots trade union movement, which was ultimately outlawed in 1981. It became an underground movement, reappearing in 1989, when it no longer pursued the reform of communism but advocated communism’s overthrow.

B. Between the 1960s and the mid-1980s, the USSR was characterized by growing economic and political stagnation, disguised by apparent stability.
   1. By the late 1970s, the stultifying impact of the command economy was finally being felt, and economic growth had virtually ceased.
   2. In a regime of central planning, the bureaucratization of life took away all individual initiative and put all power in the hands of a self-enclosed bureaucratic elite.
   3. The result was increasing passive resistance to working hard for no visible benefits, either in wages or in consumer goods that improved daily lives.
   4. One could argue that this resistance demonstrates the limits of totalitarian methods of control.
   5. As Gorbachev described it in his book, Perestroika, there was a growing gap between the measure of work and the measure of consumption.
   6. Another contributing factor to this gap between work and consumption was the context of the Cold War arms race. In both the United States and the USSR, increasing amounts were spent on armaments, which in the long run, hurt the economies. The USSR’s economy was hurt the most because it was poorer to begin with and funneled a much higher percentage of its resources into military production and its space program.
   7. By the 1980s, it was apparent that the centralization of power had squelched the life out of the society.

C. It was at this moment that the last major attempt to reform socialism took place, under the leadership of Mikail Gorbachev.
1. The turning point was his speech in April 1985 announcing a crisis and the need to reassess the path the USSR was on.

2. Gorbachev’s plans to reform socialism were embodied in his two concepts: perestroika and glasnost.

3. Perestroika was, literally, economic “restructuring,” and glasnost was “openness.”

4. The essence of these reforms was internal: Political power would be greatly decentralized and the economy would be run by independent worker collectives that would be given more incentives to produce creatively. Society would be more open to criticism, and the benefits of communism would be retained—full employment, social services, daycare centers, free health care, and worker management.

5. But these reforms had international consequences when Gorbachev began scaling back Soviet military presence.

6. His withdrawal of 500,000 troops in East Europe in 1988 opened the door to the revolutions of 1989.

7. Within the USSR, Soviet republics took the new powers given them and decided to secede. Thus, Gorbachev’s attempt to turn the Soviet Empire into a commonwealth was a failure.

II. Why did Gorbachev’s reforms fail to save the USSR from collapse and, equally important, to save communism from resurrection?

A. Explanations differ depending on the observer’s viewpoint.

B. For anti-communists, socialism could never survive an open society; thus, glasnost and communism were incompatible.

C. The contrasting viewpoint blamed Gorbachev’s failure on the advanced state of decay of the USSR, which was too far gone to be saved.

D. There is evidence to support both arguments.

1. Gorbachev’s plan did have contradictions, based on the tension between maintaining openness and directing change from above.

2. On the other hand, it is certainly true that the legacy of communism was so tainted by the 1980s that it was a Herculean task to convince people that it was capable of democratic reform.

E. Whichever argument one adopts, what appears indisputable is that the communist alternative to liberal democracy discredited itself through decades of repressive policies and the obvious failure to meet many of its original goals. Whether there could have been another potential path for socialism was no longer relevant, and all eyes turned once again to the West and its liberal democratic system.

Essential Reading:
Leslie Derfler and Patricia Kollander, eds., An Age of Conflict: Readings in 20th Century European History, chapter 12, “The End of the Cold War and the Collapse of the USSR.”

Supplementary Reading:
Stephen White, Communism and Its Collapse.
Ronald Suny, The Soviet Experiment.

Questions to Consider:
1. During the late 1980s, there was a good deal of talk in Eastern Europe about whether there was a “third way” between communism and capitalist democracy. Is such a third way imaginable, and what would it entail?

2. What is your conclusion about why Gorbachev was not able to “save” communism?
Lecture Forty-Six
The “End of History”?  

Scope: A famous essay written after the fall of the Berlin wall proclaimed the “end of history,” meaning the end of the historic struggle between political systems and the final victory of Western liberal democracy. This lecture argues that history has not, in fact, ended. It examines the parameters of the post-Cold War world and analyzes the complex prospects for democracy around the world. Although there was, indeed, an impressive wave of transitions to democracy that culminated in Eastern Europe after 1989, many of them are still fragile achievements. In particular, the lecture focuses on the problems faced by post-communist societies, from the persistence of authoritarian mentalities to the dislocation of the economic transition to capitalism, the dramatic increase in poverty and unemployment, and the role of ethnic nationalism in impeding the consolidation of democracy.

Outline

I. The revolutions of 1989–1990 in Eastern Europe capped a wave of democratization in the 1980s in Asia, Africa, and Latin America that scholars have identified as the third great wave of democratic formation after the 19th century and the post-World War II period.

   A. The trend toward global democracy looked so powerful in 1989 that one scholar wrote a famous essay, “The End of History and the Last Man,” to argue that Western liberal democracy had definitively triumphed over all other forms of government.

   B. In 1997, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright laid out a similar global vision of democracy in a speech at Harvard’s commencement.

   C. The third great wave of democratization has, indeed, been impressive.

      1. Whereas in 1900 there were only 30 democracies, by 1990, 118 of the world’s 191 countries had some form of democratic rule.

      2. Ironically, some of the greatest gains in this period were made in Europe.

      3. Beginning in the 1970s, there were democratic transitions in all of the southern European dictatorships, from Portugal to Spain and Greece.

      4. The great wave came in 1989 and 1990, with the collapse of the Eastern bloc.

      5. In Czechoslovakia, a broad coalition of forces, the Civic Forum, was brought into the government in November 1989 and elections were held in December.

      6. In June of 1989, in Poland’s first free elections since 1939, the trade union movement Solidarity won a huge victory.

      7. Also in June of 1989, communist reformers in Hungary announced the move toward political pluralism.

      8. In March of 1990, elections in East Germany led to unification with the West.

      9. Only in Romania was the transition marred by violence.

II. However, the dramatic transitions to democracy were not the end of the story, demonstrating to most observers that history is not over. Thus, the problems of consolidation, not only in Eastern Europe but elsewhere, were proving how fragile the institutional transitions were.

   A. In 1997, the L.A. Times published a series called “Democracies in Peril,” which attempted to explain why the new wave of democracies was faltering.

   B. Even Fukuyama, who wrote the 1989 essay, scaled back his optimistic conclusions in the 1992 book version, and his critics argued that the period was not the end of history but the return of history.

   C. We have talked about why it is difficult to consolidate democracy in poor post-colonial states, but what about in Eastern Europe, where the new states had many advantages missing in the Third World, that is, educated and skilled populations, modern states, and economic development?

   D. The first problem has been the effect of what we might call the “authoritarian hangover.”
1. Scholars have argued that democracy functions better where there was a preexisting vibrant “civil society” in which people do many things for themselves.

2. Without this self-organization, there is no new political class to take over the reins; most of the elites were trained under the communist regimes.

E. The second problem has been the pain of the economic transition from socialism to capitalism, in which the immediate costs seem to far outweigh the benefits, at least for the majority.

1. In particular, many of the East European countries followed a model of rapid transition, the so-called “shock treatment,” which made dislocation more dramatic.

2. The shock treatment included stabilizing the economy and cutting inflation by reducing government spending, liberalizing trade and allowing production levels to adjust to meet demand, privatizing state-owned businesses, and creating a new banking industry.

3. The result has been dramatic cuts in generous welfare programs, increases in the prices of consumer goods, closures of businesses unable to compete on the international market, few exports to balance a growing trade deficit, and increases in unemployment and the percentage of people living in poverty.

F. The third problem in consolidating democracy is that these economic dislocations make it difficult to sustain democratic government in the short run.

1. Thus, while the transition to capitalism may bring long-term benefits, in democratic regimes, it is hard to sustain voters on long-term promises.

2. As a result, many of the old communist parties either returned to power or made strong showings in the early and mid-1990s, campaigning on promises to better protect citizens from the pain of unemployment and reduced social services.

G. The last problem impeding democratic consolidation is not unique to Eastern Europe or ex-communist states, and that is ethnic nationalism.

1. What was unique to Eastern Europe was that the eruption of ethnic nationalism came as a surprise, having been successfully repressed during decades of communist rule. Its appearance in Europe made it clear that it was not simply a problem for undeveloped tribal societies but also for developed Western societies.

2. Explanations for its eruption lay partly in the collapse of communist control but also in its usefulness for new political elites trying to mobilize voters who were disenchanted with communism and, increasingly, with liberal democracy.

3. The nationalist parties in Eastern Europe threaten Western liberalism, both through their intolerance of racial minorities and their suspicion of market capitalism.

4. There have been different types of ethnic nationalist disputes in Eastern Europe, as in the non-Western world.

5. As elsewhere, such disputes have been most disruptive where there are no majority ethnic groups, as in Czechoslovakia, the USSR, and Yugoslavia.


7. However, the attempt to dismember Yugoslavia around ethnic groups devolved into a bloody civil war that lasted until 1999, when the UN intervened in Kosovo.

III. How do we evaluate the future prospects for democracy on the basis of this complex picture?

A. The consolidation of democracy in many parts of the world is fragile.

B. The biggest challenge to democratic regimes is to manage the huge disparities in wealth and poverty that precede transitions to democracy but that also seem to increase in the transition to capitalism and the free market.

C. The big question is whether democracy is a model that can work in all these different places or whether widespread frustration will lead to the pursuit of other political and economic models, such as Islamic fundamentalist politics or ethnic nationalism, that pose new threats to the Western system.
**Essential Reading:**
Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History and the Last Man.”
Timothy Garton Ash, “Ten Years After.”

**Supplementary Reading:**

**Questions to Consider:**
1. One of the interesting debates among “transitology” scholars is about the role of “civil society” in preparing the ground for democratic transitions. One school emphasizes the importance of political elites making key decisions, while another argues that elites make decisions in a broader context framed by civil society. How would you view the role of political elites in transitional societies?
2. How would you go about systematically evaluating the prospects for democratic consolidation on a global scale?
Lecture Forty-Seven
Globalization and Its Challenges

Scope: In the post-Cold War world, the prospects for democracy rest not only on the health of individual nations but on the increasingly complex interdependence that has been labeled *globalization*. This lecture examines the challenges of globalization, especially the issues of dramatic inequality between Northern and Southern Hemispheres and the problem of environmental decay. The lecture lays out the scope of these problems and analyzes the difficulties in devising solutions to these global issues within a system of independent and democratic nation-states. It includes discussion of the recent debates over globalization that gained public prominence after the noisy protests at the World Trade Organization meeting in Seattle in 1999.

Outline

I. Global interdependence has been a feature of the entire 20th century, but it has intensified in recent decades.
   A. As new nations have embarked on the path of modernization, they have been increasingly drawn in to the world economy.
   B. With the collapse of the communist bloc, the choice to “opt out” has become even smaller.
   C. The integration into a single world market has effectively created a “global shopping mall,” in which 560 million people a day in 160 countries open a can of Coca-Cola.
   D. Technological developments, particularly the Internet, have been crucial in strengthening links.
   E. From a darker perspective, the growth of international terrorism in recent decades has forged unwelcome links.

II. What does growing interdependence mean?
   A. On the one hand, many have argued that it has led to the “Americanization” of the world, through the export of American products and culture around the world.
   B. On the other hand, it has made the West more vulnerable to what happens around the world, as in the example of terrorism.
   C. The term used to describe this interdependence is the *global village*.
   D. The basic concept is that the world’s problems affect everyone, and that if they are not solved collectively, the whole village may go up in flames.

III. Of the various problems plaguing the global village, one of the most important is the huge gap between rich and poor.
   A. There have always been rich and poor people in every society, but what was new in the 20th century was the enormous gulf between rich and poor countries.
   B. Furthermore, the gap has been growing larger, not smaller, since the 1960s.
   C. Thus, for the world’s majority, the myth of replicating First World prosperity has been largely unrealized.
   D. This gulf has a geographical dimension, the Northern versus the Southern Hemispheres.
   E. But why does Third World poverty affect the First World?
      1. One direct impact has been the financial instability caused by Third World debt and the constant threat of default.
      2. A more indirect impact is on the capacity of global markets to continue to expand, which depends on more consumers with disposable incomes.
      3. Perhaps most dramatic has been the effect of the *global workplace*, which has put American and European labor in competition with Chinese workers, who earn 60¢ an hour.
      4. The ability to produce much cheaper products in Third World industries has devastated First World industrial sectors and shut down many of the most high-paying working-class jobs in the First World.
5. Although the First World continues to dominate information management jobs, these are taken by the top layer of the work force.

6. One of the offshoots of Third World poverty, then, has been an increase in First World poverty and an increase in the income gap in First World countries.

IV. Are there any viable solutions to reducing the global income gap?

A. Since the 1970s, Third World nations have argued for radical redistribution schemes.

B. A group of poor nations in the 1970s formed the New International Economic Order (NIEO) to ask the West to participate in several programs that would have resulted in a dramatic transfer of wealth. Among these nations’ goals were:
   1. Greater Western commitment to foreign aid.
   2. Greater power in international financial institutions.
   3. Transfer of technology.
   4. Reform of the world trading system, including the removal of tariffs on Third World imports without the requirement that Third World countries reciprocate and fixed import prices.

C. The NIEO fizzled out, but the issue continues to dominate North/South negotiations, particularly in the increasingly contentious World Trade Organization meetings. In 2003, Brazil led a revolt of 23 developing nations against the refusal of wealthy nations (Japan, the United States, and some countries in Western Europe) to remove the subsidies on their agricultural products that were preventing Third World imports from competing.

V. A second major issue facing the global village is sustaining the environment.

A. The consciousness that environmentalism is a global issue is fairly recent, with the first international conference held in 1972.

B. Despite a series of international conferences in 1992 and 1997, global agreements have been difficult to reach and to implement, even though most people agree that environmental destruction does not respect national borders.
   1. The basic environmental problem that needs to be resolved is that the current patterns of human/environmental interaction are not sustainable.
   2. There are two sides to this problem; the first relates to the amount of resources taken out of the earth. The causes include the high rate of population growth and high levels of consumerism in wealthy countries.
   3. The second aspect of this problem relates to the quantity of pollutants being put into the earth, which scientists argue is producing a phenomenon called the greenhouse effect.

C. Why has it been so difficult to form a global environmental policy?
   1. Biologist E. O. Wilson has argued that the inherent selfishness of the human species is setting it up for suicide.
   2. However, more economic and political reasons can easily be found.
   3. First, the world economic system based on competing capitalist economies is not well adapted to resolve global environmental problems.
   4. Second, the North/South divide creates dramatically contrasting perspectives on how to sustain the environment and who is going to pay for it.
   5. Finally, the formation of a global environmental policy has been hindered by the resistance of many people, especially in the West, who argue that humans will solve these problems not through conservation but through future technological developments.

Essential Reading:
David Held, *Globalization/Anti-Globalization*.
E. O. Wilson, “Is Humanity Suicidal?”
Supplementary Reading:
David Held, et al., *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture*.

Questions to Consider:
1. What are your own conclusions about the globalization debate?
2. Are you optimistic about the ability of technological innovations to sustain the current level of human development, or do you buy the environmentalists’ contention that the First World must curtail its luxurious lifestyle?
Lecture Forty-Eight
A New World Order?

Scope: Despite the end of the Cold War, the new world order announced in the early 1990s has yet to coalesce. Moreover, profound disagreements have emerged over what a democratic world order should look like. In this lecture, we will use the 2003 war in Iraq as a flashpoint to discuss the dramatically different visions of a world order that have emerged for the 21st century. The United States, as the only remaining superpower, is at the center of these debates, about what role it should play in world politics; about its potential relationship with other democratic powers, such as the European Union or the UN; and about the virtues of unilateralism or multilateralism as a defining framework for world affairs.

Outline

I. In this lecture, we will discuss what kind of global framework exists for handling the challenges of the post-Cold War world. Despite the announcement of a new world order in the early 1990s, it has yet to coalesce. Moreover, profound disagreements emerged over what a democratic world order should look like.
   A. One of the lines of dispute that surfaced with the Iraqi war of 2003 came to be defined as multilateralism versus unilateralism.
   B. The Bush administration in the United States articulated one vision, based on American leadership and defense of democracy and the free market, a reformulation of the Cold War world mission.
   C. Some European leaders and others argued that no single power should have this power or responsibility and that the UN should serve as the fulcrum of a multilateral approach to managing global affairs.

II. One of the implicit questions in the unilateral-versus-multilateral approach is the future of the nation-state in the new global order.
   A. Implicit in the American position is that the United States as a nation-state can continue to wield the same power it has in the past.
   B. Implicit in the alternative position is that nation-states are or should be weakening in the face of global challenges.
   C. It is not surprising that Europeans should be more sympathetic to this view, given their relationship to the European Union, which has put the issue of national sovereignty more directly on the table.
   D. This does not mean that Europeans have been willing to give up their nation-states.
   E. The true focus of multilateralist hopes has been the UN.
      1. The UN was charged with maintaining international peace and security.
      2. In addition, it was charged with finding solutions to global social problems.
      3. However, the nation-state has formed the basis of the UN.
      4. The power of the nation-state paralyzed the UN during the Cold War.
      5. In general terms, the UN has had more success with transnational social problems.

III. The UN entered a new, more aggressive phase at the end of the Cold War. Its intervention in global conflicts increased as superpowers disengaged themselves from supporting client regimes around the world, creating political instability as they did so.
   A. But the limits of the UN were revealed in its ineffective and late intervention in Bosnia and the breakup of Yugoslavia.
   B. International pressure forced a peace agreement, but the UN was not the major player.
   C. For some, this means that the UN needs more power and resources, while for others, it means that the UN is incapable of playing the role of global peacekeeper.
   D. Part of the task of maintaining international security has been arms control.
      1. The 1968 non-proliferation treaty failed to quarantine nuclear weapons.
2. In addition, the nuclear powers did not live up to their sides of the bargain of pursuing disarmament.
3. With the collapse of the USSR, the superpowers finally negotiated major arms reductions.
4. But with no talk of disarmament, tensions between nuclear and non-nuclear powers remain.
5. At the center of this tension in the 1990s was Iraq.
6. Whatever one’s position on the war, it demonstrates the lack of consensus on how best to promote international peace and security.

E. Thus, at the beginning of the new century, there are as many questions as there are answers in the long search for a functioning global democratic order. The century and this course end with a set of questions about how this new phase in the “struggle for democracy” will unfold.

Essential Reading:
William Keylor, *The Twentieth Century World*, chapter 22, “A Unipolar World or New Multilateralism?”

Supplementary Reading:
J. Lukacs, *The End of the Twentieth Century and the End of the Modern Age.*
Vaclav Havel, “Kosovo and the End of the Nation-State.”

Questions to Consider:
1. Why was the invasion of Iraq a flashpoint for opposing world visions, and why were Americans so much more supportive of the war than other peoples?
2. The reputation of the UN in the United States has never been high; why do you think this has been the case, and is the lack of respect justified?
Bibliography

Essential Reading:


Carol Fink, et al., eds. 1968: The World Transformed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. ISBN 0521646375. This is one of the few books that provides a truly international interpretation of the impact of 1968, as well as articles dealing with protest movements in the U.S.A., Europe, Eastern Europe and the third world.

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Supplementary


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———. Chapter 10, “The End of European Empire.” The Smith, Lijphart, and Grimal selections focus on the patterns of decolonization from different perspectives.

———. Chapter 12, “The End of the Cold War and the Collapse of the USSR.”

———. Chapter 13, “Nationalism Resurgent: The Break-Up of Yugoslavia.” The essays in the section on Yugoslavia provide an excellent short introduction to the problems of ethnic nationalism in post-communist Yugoslavia.


Garton Ash, Timothy. “Ten Years After.” The New York Review of Books, November 18, 1999. One of the most important journalistic chroniclers of the 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe, Garton Ash wrote a follow-up essay on where these countries were 10 years after the end of communism.


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Herken’s article provides a case study of the relationship between the state and scientists during the Manhattan Project, in which he argues for the detrimental impact on scientific integrity.


Keegan, John. *The First World War*. New York: Knopf, 1999. Written by the foremost military historian of the First World War, this is one of the best and most up-to-date accounts of the war itself.


Leffler, Melvin. *The Specter of Communism*. New York: Hill & Wang, 1994. This book takes the more revisionist perspective, arguing that both sides shared responsibility for the Cold War but placing special emphasis on making the United States a willing partner, rather than an innocent defender of democracy. Reading both Gaddis and Leffler will provide a good sense of how historical debates play out in practice.

———. State and Revolution. New York: Penguin, 1993 (1917). In this pamphlet, written between the February and October Revolutions, Lenin laid out his argument in favor of the violent seizure of power by the vanguard party.

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Lewis, Bernard. “The Roots of Muslim World Rage.” Atlantic Monthly, September 1990. This article, by a prominent scholar of Islam, discusses the historical roots of conflict between Islam and Christianity and the general phenomenon of Islamic fundamentalism.

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Lynd, Robert S., and Helen Merrell Lynd. Middletown. San Diego: Harvest Books, 1959. This classic local study brings the changes wrought by mass forms of leisure to life through its examination of a single community.


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Ortega y Gasset, Jose. *The Revolt of the Masses*. New York: Norton, 1994. Ortega argues that the masses had taken leadership away from the “superior minorities” without having the necessary qualities to lead.


———. 1984. New York: Signet, 1990 (1949). Orwell’s classic novel explored a terrifying totalitarian world in which “Big Brother” had a television/monitor in every room that made it impossible to have a private life.


Polachek, James. *The Inner Opium War*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992. This is the best specialized study on the important turning point of the Opium War, in which the author asks why this major military defeat did not spark an overhaul of China’s foreign policy.


Remarque, Erich Maria. *All Quiet on the Western Front*. New York: Fawcett, 1995. This is probably the most famous World War I novel and one that gives an excellent sense of the disillusionment and despair felt by battlefield soldiers.


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Wills, Gary. “A Reader’s Guide to the Century.” *The New York Review of Books*, July 15, 1999. Both the Judt and the Wills reviews try to make sense of the spate of books published at the end of the century, and it was Wills who organized them into narratives, analytical accounts, or chronologies. These essays are an excellent place to start for considering the bigger question of how to approach the subject itself.


**Internet Resources**